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Freedom of expression has a critical role in modern democracies and consequently 
the influence of social media on the expression of national and political identities 
is growing. In light of recent revelations regarding the extent of surveillance, issues 
of privacy have come to the forefront of attention. In the first exploratory study 
using interpretive phenomenological analysis of individual interviews, British 
citizens' views on surveillance and its different domains, their thoughts, beliefs and 
concerns about privacy in general and online were explored. Trust in the British 
Government, its services and also in online companies (e.g., Google) in regard to 
surveillance was also investigated. Deriving from knowledge gained from Study 1, 
Study 2 was designed using a quantitative approach. Predictors of both online and 
Facebook privacy concerns were assessed, such as personality traits, self-esteem, 
and attitudes towards openness and trust. In another quantitative study, the 
relationship between British identity and system justification, perceived need, 
perceived benefits, and concerns about government surveillance were examined 
(Study 3). Recent terrorist events provided the opportunity to investigate 
individuals’ realistic and symbolic threat perceptions in the aftermath of the attacks 
as well as their support or rejection of surveillance, and attitudes towards Islam. In 
Study 4, in the aftermath of the 2015 Paris attacks, using thematic analysis of an 
online forum discussion, people’s attitudes towards the proposed implementation 
of more invasive surveillance measures by the British Government were 
investigated. Finally, in Study 5, content analysis of tweets after the 2015 
Westminster attack explored people’s attitudes towards Islam on Twitter and 
network analysis was utilised to identify and gain insight into groups within the 
network structure. The body of work promotes a new way to conceptualise attitudes 
toward surveillance and privacy that recognizes how they can intertwine with social 
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Surveillance, as well as the issues surrounding privacy and civil liberties are 
increasingly prevalent in modern societies. Due to the technological advancements 
beginning in the 20th century, mass surveillance has been more and more integrated 
into everyday life and the ubiquitous nature of surveillance has become normalised. 
The rationale for this thesis was to explore the layperson’s understanding of 
freedom, citizenship and national identity as manifested in cyberspace, deploying 
social psychological theories. Privacy concerns and trust in institutions were 
amongst our themes we aimed to explore. The research narrated in this thesis was 
conducted during the time between 2015 and 2018. However, recent events have 
not only changed the landscape of UK democracy but also largely shaped the 
development and execution of the rationale and extended its focus. The unfortunate 
recent terrorist events (Paris attacks in 2015 and Westminster attack in 2017) have 
provided us with opportunities to investigate lay perceptions of surveillance and 
attitudes towards Islam in the context of such events as expressed in cyberspace. 
Through interviews, attitude surveys and thematic analysis of cyberspace 
communications within the UK, this thesis utilised qualitative and quantitative 
methods to explore how surveillance, privacy, trust, British national identity, and 
Islam related post-terrorist attack attitudes are constructed and manifested at a 
psychological level on mediums such as Twitter, Facebook and online forums.  
 
This thesis comprises five empirical studies utilising different methodologies; two 
qualitative, two quantitative and one mixed method approach. The broad linking 
theme of these studies is the manifestation of social constructions in cyberspace.  
 
Starting with a rather large focus, in Study 1 (Chapter 3) through the analysis of 
twenty one-to-one interviews, I explore the views of British young adults on 
surveillance using inductive thematic analysis. Based on the identified themes of 
this study, I shape the narrative and rationale for the rest of the thesis and design 
upcoming studies with a narrower focus. This research also provides a guideline as 




The privacy paradox refers to the phenomenon that has been highlighted in 
numerous studies examining online behaviour, whereby people claim to be 
concerned about their privacy, yet very little is done to safeguard their personal 
data. While in general this thesis focuses on social processes and social identity 
constructions, I believe in order to investigate privacy concerns and the paradoxical 
relationship between disclosing personal data and worrying about privacy, 
individual differences have to be understood and appreciated. As certain personality 
dispositions have been shown to relate to online information privacy concerns, I 
decided to measure people’s personality traits (Big 5) and their privacy concerns in 
regard to a specific online medium – which to my understanding has not been 
investigated previously. Being the most popular social networking site, I focus on 
concerns about information privacy on Facebook. Furthermore, cost-benefit 
analysis has been widely applied to explain online information sharing behaviour, 
with some suggesting that trust has a mediating effect. People show a greater 
propensity to enter into an exchange relationship if costs are outweighed by the 
benefits; trust can reduce cost perception. Intrigued by these findings, I also 
measure people’s propensity to trust others in general and the trust they place in 
Facebook as well as their attitudes towards being open in sharing personal 
information. This quantitative study (Chapter 4) utilises an online attitude survey 
to explore the association between privacy concerns on Facebook and personality 
dimensions in addition to different measures of trust as well to discover whether 
any of these measures predict such concerns.  
 
In Study 3 (Chapter 5) I return to tackling the issues surrounding surveillance, 
focusing on measures imposed by the British Government. It has been argued that 
the UK is the embodiment of a surveillance society, mainly as a result of the 
extensive surveillance practices implemented across the country and which 
ultimately leads to the normalisation of such measures. Research over the past few 
decades has reported diverse public opinions on surveillance, largely influenced by 
socio-political events. For example, people tend to express more positive attitudes 
towards surveillance after terrorist events – 9/11 being the most significant example 
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– for national security reasons. However, views were hugely shifted, and concerns 
amplified as a result of the 2013 revelations by Edward Snowden about the 
extraordinary scope of mass surveillance by the NSA and GCHQ. My interest in 
these events and their subsequent effects on public perceptions led to the initiation 
of my PhD studies and sparked an interest in understanding surveillance 
perceptions through the lens of psychology. The role of shared social identity with 
the source of surveillance in surveillance acceptance has been investigated 
previously, however the effect of national identity specifically has not been 
explored. Surveillance measures are often framed and justified by governments to 
serve national security, which ultimately is a function served by national identity. 
Therefore, in Study 3, a quantitative approach is adopted in order to measure the 
effect of British national identity on three different facets of surveillance 
perceptions; need, benefit and concern, by using a priming manipulation. 
Furthermore, I predict that British national identity will be positively related to 
perceived need for and perceived benefit of government surveillance, but will 
negatively relate to concern about it.  
 
As mentioned previously, various events occurred during the conduct of this thesis 
that not only shaped modern history but also my research narrative. A series of co-
ordinated terrorist attacks took place in Paris on 13 November 2015 leading to the 
death and injury of hundreds. As a result of the attack – and the Charlie Hebdo 
shooting that occurred in January the same year – the British Government started 
to fast-track the passing of the Surveillance Law Investigatory Powers Act 
(nicknamed the Snoopers’ Charter) to implement stricter surveillance measures. 
However unfortunate, these events provided a uniquely suitable climate for the 
conduct of Study 4 (Chapter 6). In order to gain in-depth insight into public 
constructions of surveillance and support or opposition for the implementation of 
stricter measures, I conducted qualitative thematic analysis on an organically 
occurring forum discussion between internet forum members. Research has 
previously suggested that surveillance acceptance can be influenced by trust (in the 
institutions imposing it, in this context, the Government), perception of threat and 
perception of how effective the measures are. In this study I examine whether there 
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is evidence for the emergence of such factors in the forum discussion, in addition 
to monitoring the conversation for other potential themes.  
 
Throughout the thesis I investigated people’s constructions of surveillance (mostly 
government related) and the perception of threat of terrorism turned out to be a 
reoccurring notion, hugely intertwined with surveillance perceptions. As mentioned 
above, the 2015 Paris attacks provided a uniquely suitable setting for the previous 
qualitative study (Study 4; Chapter 6) and terrorist events in Europe throughout the 
design and writing of this thesis increased in frequency (e.g., in 2016; Nice attack, 
Berlin attack, Brussels bombings etc.). While these attacks occurred across Europe, 
the first terrorist attack in the UK since 7/7 happened on 22 March 2017 when a 
British lone offender drove his car into pedestrians on Westminster bridge and 
stabbed an unarmed police officer. Inspired by current events, in addition to 
dialogues and patterns discovered in previous studies of this thesis (Study 1, 
Chapter 3; Study 4, Chapter 6), the narrative of my research took a strong but 
rational turn towards an Islam related focus. The manifestation of Islamophobia and 
negative attitudes towards Islam has been demonstrated to be increasingly 
widespread in the West since 9/11. Furthermore, it has been shown that Twitter has 
become a popular online platform for online hate and Islamophobia. In addition, 
the majority of social science research on Islamophobia explores negative thinking 
about Islam and neglects the counter-discourses which seek to defend Islam.  
 
Similarly to Study 4 (Chapter 6), the Westminster attack provided a suitable climate 
to conduct Study 5 (Chapter 7) to explore people’s views and perceptions of Islam 
after a terrorist attack committed by a Muslim perpetrator, as manifested on Twitter 
in the aftermath of the attack. In this mixed method study I classify tweets in terms 
of their sentiment regarding Islam, and perform an in-depth content analysis of such 
tweets to identify themes, arguments and constructions of nation, Islam, Muslims 
and terrorism. Twitter has been shown to be an excellent platform to study the 
expression of social identity and social processes on a large-scale network. 
Therefore, as a complement to qualitative analyses, a quantitative network analysis 
is also conducted to gain insight into ingroup following, the social identities of the 
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groups and their following behaviour. Study 5 (Chapter 7) aimed to present a 
unique perspective to understanding views on Islam and following behaviour on 
Twitter post-terrorist attack by the application of mixed methods and deployment 
of social psychological theories. 
 
Our identity is a construct which consists of the way in which we see ourselves and 
our position in society as a whole and is mediated via our interactions with other 
people (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 2002). Identity can be understood as a 
continuum encompassing individual differentiators, as well as our role in society, 
as is defined by our interactions within our community. Another way in which to 
understand identity, is the character of the personal attributes ascribed to an 
individual such as gender, ethnicity, or political affiliation. Our identity is a 
powerful motivator behind the way we behave, what we believe and who we 
associate with. Considering the important role identity plays in who we interact 
with and how we express ourselves, it may be useful to consider the ways in which 
communication within a digital context can shape identity processes. 
  
Due to a set of social and technical elements, communication in online 
environments has the potential to affect identity. Online communication often 
masks identity cues and so while it has been found that people are keen to re-create 
their offline selves online, facets of self are often edited to curate a desired 
impression (Bullingham & Vasconcelos, 2013). Facets of self can be 
misrepresented, withheld or shared and so identity is primarily typed into being 
(Sundén, 2003). The reduced/absence of identity cues and asynchronicity in online 
communications facilitates selective self-presentation (Walter, 1996) and the 
formation of a networked self (Papacharissi, 2012). Online users transmit cues they 
deem desirable by constructing messages portraying themselves in a preferential 
light and highlighting desirable characteristics so as to evoke preferential reactions 
(Walther, 2011). These processes therefore function at both the individual and 
social level; individuals make declarations about their identity which need to be 
recognised by other people (Buckingham, 2008). By defining their identity, 
individuals attempt to propound their individuality but also to join with others and 
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fit in within their chosen community. Identity formation therefore involves the 
process of stereotyping, allowing individuals to distinguish between self, group 
members and others. The performance of the self is a way in which to express the 
self and to manage social relations (Papacharissi, 2012). With the absence of 
identity cues in online communication, the presentation of a selective self-presented 
network self allows for the assertion of an individual and group identity 
(Papacharissi, 2012). Selective self-presentation can be carried out by an individual 
in a multitude of ways. A study has found the way in which teenagers construct 
their identities online develops as they age, with younger teenagers placing 
emphasis on the aesthetic parts of their profiles, while older teenagers focus more 
on their social connections with others (Livingstone, 2008).    
 
Social media offers many, complex, interconnected ways to exhibit ourselves, 
communicate and connect with others; providing us new ways to construct and 
express our identity (Miller, 2013). However, online social communication has 
become inculcated into our daily lives and it is now clear it forms part of our 
communicative ecology. Our behaviour online is not merely a reflection of our 
selves offline, but a facet of ourselves as a whole and interactions online are as real 
as our offline interactions. Although online and offline performances differ due to 
the aforementioned affordances (reduced identity cues, asynchronicity, selective 
self-presentation), many individuals using social media are in communication with 
people they know offline, potentially reducing the opportunity for identity 
exploration and modification (Boyd & Ellison, 2007). Many studies have 
concluded that we need to move away from overly simplistic arguments based on 
dualism between online and offline communication and towards a more 
contextualised, culturally contingent understanding of individual identity as a 
construct/s that encompasses our online and offline identities (Livingstone, 2008; 
Miller, 2013; Hampton & Wellman, 2003; Baym, 2010). 
 
Lieberman and Schroeder (2020) proposed four structural ways in which online 
text-based communication diverges from offline communication; reduced number 
of nonverbal cues, increased anonymity, increased opportunity to form and bolster 
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ties, and a greater potential for wider dissemination of information. These structural 
changes can alter the way people behave in an online setting. The absence of non-
verbal cues can reduce people’s ability to understand the communicator’s thoughts 
and feelings (increasing the possibility for miscommunication) (Hall & Mast, 2007) 
and the lack of vocals can reduce feelings of social connection, when compared to 
offline communication (Lieberman & Schroeder, 2020). Reading people’s 
comments and opinions, compared to hearing them casts the communicator as less 
mentally capable (Schroeder & Epley, 2015), thus potentially dehumanising them 
(Waytz, Schroeder, & Epley, 2014). Increased anonymity can result in disinhibition 
and aggression, potentially as a result of decreased accountability (Prentice-Dunn 
& Rogers, 1983). Thus, online environments can encourage such behaviours, and 
studies have suggested that social media sites can incite moral outrage and social 
conflict (Crocket, 2017). Due to an increased capability to form ties with others 
online, homophily becomes a larger driver of whether an individual reaches out to 
another, when compared to offline communication (Huber & Malhotra, 2017). This 
can lead to ‘filter bubbles’ and intellectual isolation (Pariser, 2011). The shift from 
offline to online communication has therefore fundamentally altered the ways 
people socialise and interact with one another, and casts a question mark on the 
impact digital technology has on human well-being. These considerations are most 
pertinent in Chapter 6 and 7. 
 
This thesis offers a unique and fresh perspective on people’s understanding and 
meaning making about some of the most pressing issues of modern societies; 
surveillance, privacy, trust, threat of terrorism and Islamophobia. These timely 
issues are addressed through empirical research that deploys a range of varied 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies, some of which (e.g., network analysis 
of Twitter data) are unusual within (social) psychology. The body of work 
highlights new ways to understand lay perceptions of surveillance and privacy, 
showing how these perceptions intertwine with the juxtaposition of competing 
constructions of national identity, as well as how they can dovetail with competing 
social constructions of Islam and the threat of terrorism. Additionally, novel 
methodological and theoretical insights are gained into the manifestation of 
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Islamophobic prejudice in online environments. An eclectic theoretical approach 
evolves out of this work that draws upon theories as diverse as Billig’s banal 
nationalism, Social Identity Theory, Intergroup Threat Theory, and research on 
personality and support for surveillance. After five varied empirical studies, it 
emerges that lay beliefs about surveillance and privacy in the UK context are 
indelibly linked to current terror events and to manifestations of British national 
identity. The novelty of the work lies in the focus on the UK context, the theoretical 
diversity adopted, the mixed methods approach, and the inclusion of both offline 






Mixed methods research is an approach that intends to provide a framework for 
combining both qualitative and quantitative methods (Almeida, 2018; Aramo-
Immonen, 2011). For further discussion on mixed methods research, please see 
Section 2.5.3. 
 
This thesis deployed a mixed methods approach, taking advantage of a range of 
data collection methodologies and analysis techniques, drawing from both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches. These methods are described and evaluated 
below, and further detail provided in the respective chapters of the thesis that 
present each empirical study. 
 
 
2.1 Ethical Approvals 
Ethical approvals were obtained prior to the conduct of studies requiring 
participants. More specifically, for Study 1 (Chapter 3) I submitted an ethics 
approval with my supervisor, and it was granted by the Departmental Ethics 
Committee (DEC) in November 2015. The process involved the completion of an 
online form – including the name of researchers, duration of the project, funder etc. 
–, a twelve-point checklist in line with the British Psychological Society’s 
guidelines for ethical practices, and the submission consent form, interview 
questions and debrief sheet.  
 
As the DEC ceased to exist as of 1st January 2016, ethics applications for Study 2 
(Chapter 4) and 3 (Chapter 5) were submitted to the College Ethics Committee in 
accordance with the Concordat to Support Research Integrity. Accompanied by my 
supervisor, I completed online self assessment forms for both studies that required 
information regarding the project, academic supervisor, student, email address, 
project title, funder and six yes/no questions identifying any issues of ethical 
concern. After submission, the system confirmed that no further action was needed, 
and the ‘Ethics Self Assessment’ forms were obtained in March 2016 for Study 2 




Study 4 (Chapter 6) and 5 (Chapter 7) relied on analysis of publicly available online 
data. Both studies were internet-mediated projects involving non-reactive methods 
whereby data was collected unobtrusively and was derived from sources of 
information which were not created within an explicit research context (Hewson, 
2008). In study 4 (Chapter 6) I analysed ‘found text’ in an online discussion forum 
and registration for the forum members on the forum was a prerequisite to read and 
contribute to the discussions. Although forum members were not aware that their 
conversation constituted the basis for my analysis (lack of informed consent, 
debrief), the Terms and Conditions of the website stated that all user-posted content 
can be used by users. Furthermore, there seemed to be a general consensus 
regarding online data use, suggesting that by signing up for social media sites, 
people have already consented for their contributions to be used, analysed and 
published (Shaw, 2008). I applied the same rationale to Study 5 (Chapter 7) where 
publicly available tweets of Twitter users were downloaded and analysed. 
Nevertheless, the anonymity of all users whose content we drew upon was 
maintained by removing real usernames and twitter account names. Although there 
are ongoing debates about ethics and internet research, it could be argued that our 
discussion forum and Twitter study do not constitute research with human 
participants in the traditional sense, but rather, are more akin to archival or 
secondary analysis. The British Psychological Society Ethics Guidelines for 
Internet Mediated Research (Hewson & Buchanan, 2013) suggests that where no 
reasonable expectation of privacy is in place, it should be acceptable to not have an 
informed consent process. Furthermore, my supervisor was in direct 
correspondence with the Chair of the B.P.S. Ethics Committee, who confirmed our 
interpretation of B.P.S. guidance on this matter. Key issues are maintaining the 
anonymity, dignity and integrity of participants and not causing them harm. I 
believe I have adhered to these standards in the conduct of the internet research 
reported herein – we anonymised any reported content and note that Twitter users 
can be expected to understand that their tweets are in the public domain. In the case 
of the online football forum we used, while registration was required, this was open 
to any member of the public, and as such I would argue that content posted to the 
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forum would be perceived by the content authors as essentially in the public 
domain. In conclusion, I believe that the empirical work reported in this thesis was 
conducted in full accordance with the published ethical guidelines of the British 
Psychological Society at the time, and this is the standard requirement for ethical 
research required by the Psychology Department at Royal Holloway. 
 
2.2 Participants  
Study 1 (Chapter 3), 2 (Chapter 4), and 3 (Chapter 5) required participant 
recruitment which I did personally from my offline and online social network, with 
the sample therefore being one of convenience, relying on initial personal contacts 
but then widened out through snowball sampling beyond my immediate circle of 
acquaintances. Being British was a prerequisite of Study 1; where I conducted 
twenty face-to-face interviews, so recruitment took only a day, and of Study 3; 
where recruitment took months as I was aiming for a larger sample size (N = 214). 
The need for a desired sample size (N = 191) was determined by conducting an a-
priori power analysis using G*Power in order to detect a small to medium effect. 
 
Since UK nationality was not an inclusion criterion for Study 2 (Chapter 4), 
recruitment took significantly less time. Furthermore, in the final stage of data 
collection I used an online crowdsourcing service (CrowdFlower) for 10% of the 
data collection. The sample (N = 246) in this study was diverse, consisting of 
different nationalities. It is important to note that participants providing largely 
incomplete responses (n = 24) were excluded from the analysis, and most of those 
participants were recruited from CrowdFlower. In addition, CrowdFlower had been 
criticised for its quality and reliability due to intentional or unintentional 
inaccuracies by workers (Kittur, Chi, & Suh, 2008). As a result, I decided not to 
use a crowdsourcing service in subsequent studies (Study 3; Chapter 5).  
 
As a weakness, I highlight that in all three studies that required sample recruitment, 
most of my participants held an undergraduate or even postgraduate degree, 
representing a highly educated demographic. Therefore, I could argue that the 
samples utilised in these studies were not necessarily representative of the general 
22 
 
population, although this is not unusual in much of social psychology. However, 
since the aim of the work was not to map population attitudes per se, but instead to 
delve deeper into the relationships between attitudes and other variables (such as 
personality and social identity), and also to uncover the arguments used to derive 
those attitudes, I would argue that the lack of a truly representative sample (e.g., of 
UK citizens) is not a major flaw, especially given the resources available for the 
purposes of a PhD (buying attitude questions on large probability sample surveys 
from survey companies such as MORI is very expensive). 
 
Participant recruitment per se did not take place in Study 4 (Chapter 6) and 5 
(Chapter 7), as both studies relied on analysis of online data. For more information 
regarding ethics, please see Section 2.2. 
 
A potential weakness of utilising online public data is the lack of any demographic 
information linked to individual users, unless provided in user biographies. Both in 
the online forum (Study 4; Chapter 6) and on Twitter (Study 5; Chapter 7) 
participants are identified with an alias (fake username) and no specific 
demographic information is known about our participants. While potentially 
constraining, I would argue that this is mitigated by the benefit of being able to 
access real-world discourse in cyberspace, unconstrained by the demand 
characteristics and socially desirable responding that can plague experimental and 
survey research.  
 
2.3 Materials and Measures 
Study 2 and Study 3 in this thesis measured outcomes via self-report scales in the 
form of Likert scale responses. Both studies were constructed using Qualtrics 
Survey Software. 
 
In Study 2 (Chapter 4), the questionnaires employed were taken from other studies; 
Facebook intensity scale (Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007), Mini IPIP 
measuring the Big Five personality dimension (Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, & 
Lucas, 2006), propensity to trust scale (Evans & Revelle, 2008), trust in Facebook 
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(Shu & Chuang, 2011), self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965), attitude towards openness 
(Mckinney, Kelly, & Duran, 2012). Only one questionnaire was modified to 
measure information privacy concerns specifically on Facebook instead of ‘Internet 
Users’ Information Privacy Concerns’ (Malhotra, Kim, & Agarwal, 2004). 
 
In Study 3 (Chapter 5) the questionnaires employed were taken from other studies; 
British national identity scale (Cinnirella & Hamilton, 2007); perceived need for 
government surveillance scale (Dinev, Hart, & Mullen, 2008); concerns about 
government surveillance (Dinev et al., 2008). Two questionnaires were modified to 
measure government surveillance (instead of general surveillance/monitoring) 
specifically; potential benefit of and concerns about government surveillance 
(Bayerl & Akhgar, 2015).  
 
The reliability of each scale used was well-established previously and in addition, 
to ensure the internal consistencies of the questionnaires, scale internal reliability 
was analysed in both studies using Cronbach alpha coefficient.   
 
Both quantitative studies in this research relied on self-report attitude-style 
measures, a well-established procedure in social psychology, however they have 
been criticised for a number of reasons, e.g., response bias (Van de Mortel, 2008). 
While these issues are acknowledged yet difficult to control for, I believe a potential 
weakness of my quantitative studies using online attitude surveys is the lack of 
‘attention checks’ which are sometimes implemented in studies to ensure 
participants pay continued attention to survey content (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & 
Davidenko, 2009). However, a majority of our quantitative findings were 
interpretable, and this suggests that response ‘noise’ such as random answering or 
bot answering of online surveys, was not a feature of our data. 
 
2.4 Data Management 
I conducted 20 face-to-face interviews for Study 1 (Chapter 3) which were recorded 
by my iPhone, transferred to my personal computer, then saved on to a USB flash 
drive. The recordings were saved according to the pseudonyms participants were 
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given, and were deleted from both the iPhone – they were not backed up in iCloud 
– and the computer. I transcribed the interviews using the USB flash drive to 
individual Microsoft Word Documents that were saved using pseudonyms, and did 
not include any personally identifiable information apart from age, gender and 
ethnicity – as they were relevant demographic information. In order to ensure data 
back up, the transcriptions, together with data for all other studies (e.g., SPSS data 
files), were saved in my personal Dropbox account and on two external hard drives. 
Apart from myself, nobody has access to the hard drives or the account.  
 
As Study 2 (Chapter 4) and Study 3 (Chapter 5) were attitude surveys and were 
conducted using Qualtrics Survey Software, data were gathered and saved on the 
survey platform using my account that I myself and my supervisor accessed. The 
Qualtrics XM online survey platform conforms to ISO 27001 security standards 
and more information about the security of data on this platform is available on the 
Qualtrics website (Qualtrics Security and Privacy Accreditations | Qualtrics). Data 




2.5 Design and Analysis 
This thesis consists of two quantitative (Study 2, Chapter 4; Study 3, Chapter 5), 
two qualitative (Study 1, Chapter 3; Study 4, Chapter 6) and one mixed method 
study (Study 5; Chapter 7).  
 
2.5.1 Quantitative research  
Each quantitative study employs an online survey research design; correlation 
analyses were conducted to explore the relationship between personality traits, 
trust, self-esteem and information privacy concerns on Facebook (Study 2; Chapter 
4), and to investigate the relationship between British national identity and 
perceptions of government surveillance – need, benefit, concern – (Study 3; 
Chapter 5). In addition, multiple regression analysis was conducted in Study 2 




Experimental design was used only in Study 3 (Chapter 5) where we employed a 
British national identity priming manipulation to investigate whether increased 
feelings of Britishness have an effect on people’s perception of government 
surveillance.  
 
Correlational survey research does not allow for inferences to be made about 
causality; instead, the association between two variables is quantified, and in 
multiple regression the predictive relationship between multiple predictor variables 
and a criterion variable is examined. Given this limitation of correlational attitude 
survey designs, in the chapter discussions of the relevant studies (see Chapter 4 and 
5), I suggest that subsequent work may focus on ascertaining the causal interactions 
between the variables of interest by using more sophisticated analyses with larger 
samples and/or through use of experimental approaches. 
 
2.5.2 Qualitative research 
Qualitative methods are not concerned with the formulation of universal laws but 
instead are interested in meaning, how people make sense of the world and 
experience events and phenomena from their own subjective frame of reference 
(Willig, 2001). 
 
When studying an area which has undergone little prior research, qualitative work 
can be utilised so as to identify principal elements which can then form the 
foundation for the development of measurement instruments e.g., questionnaires or 
surveys (Lyons & Coyle, 2016). In Study 1 (Chapter 3) people’s views of 
surveillance were explored and in Study 4 (Chapter 6) people’s beliefs regarding 
the implementation of stricter surveillance measures were investigated. In both 





2.5.2.1 Thematic analysis 
Thematic analysis cannot be claimed to have been developed by an individual or 
group of people (Clarke & Braun, 2016). Various versions of thematic analysis 
were used in the 1960s when systematic procedures of qualitative data analysis 
started developing (see Benner, 1985). Thematic analysis was not only used to 
describe a technique of generic themes, but it was also used to describe 
interpretative or qualitative content analysis (Woodrum, 1984) and was even used 
interchangeably with content analysis itself (Christ, 1970). Even recently, there is 
sometimes a degree of confusion amongst researchers regarding the difference 
between thematic and content analysis, and the terms are still often used 
interchangeably (Sandelowski, 2010) or even referred to as one method (‘thematic 
content analysis’, see Green & Thorogood, 2004). 
 
Braun and Clarke (2006) have identified another confusion about thematic analysis 
amongst qualitative researchers, whereby themes are often described as emerging 
from the data – lacking the clarity of the analytic procedures followed. By stating 
that themes emerge from the data, the active role played by the researcher in the 
systematic engagement with, analysis and reporting of the data is denied (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006; Taylor & Ussher, 2001). 
 
In the 1990s (see Aronson, 1995), systematic procedures for conducting thematic 
analysis started to be described and now a number of them exist (for example, 
Guest, MacQueen, & Namey). The studies included in this thesis followed the six-
phase step-by-step guide developed by Braun and Clarke (2006). 
 
In contrast to other methodologies used in qualitative data analysis (such as 
narrative and discourse analysis), thematic analysis (which is in fact a method, not 
a methodology) offers epistemological flexibility and can be used within any 
theoretical and epistemological framework underlying qualitative research (Clarke 
& Braun, 2016). For further discussion on the epistemological position of this 




Alongside its flexibility, thematic analysis also has other advantages, such as its 
accessibility to those researchers who are only just beginning their career in 
qualitative research and have little to no experience, such as myself. 
 
There are two ways in which themes can be identified in thematic analysis: in a 
deductive – ‘top down’ – way where the analysis is driven by existing theory or in 
an inductive – ’bottom up’ – way where the analysis is grounded in the data (Braun 
& Clarke, 2006). The studies in the present thesis adopted an inductive approach. 
Inductive thematic analysis is data-driven, whereby data is coded without 
attempting to place it within a pre-existing coding frame.  
 
Furthermore, themes can be identified at a semantic level that captures the surface 
meanings in the data, or at a latent level that searches for underlying ideas and 
conceptualisations in the data. In this thesis, the data in the qualitative studies were 
coded for and described semantic meaning.  
 
Thematic analysis is the process of looking through a data set in order to identify 
recurrent patterns of meaning. Thematic analysis is a useful analytic approach when 
data is detailed and rich in contextual information (Howitt, 2010). A theme captures 
important information pertinent to the research question in the data, and comprises 
meaning or patterned responses within the data set. 
 
Braun and Clarke (2006) offer a six-phase guide to thematic analysis starting from 
data familiarisation through coding ending with writing up the analysis, which was 
adopted in the qualitative studies of this thesis. Although they identified six 
distinctive phases, the process is not linear but more recursive where one can go 
back and forth as needed. As mentioned above, I used this six-phase guide when 
conducting thematic analyses in the studies included in this thesis. These phases are 
described below in detail and short summaries are included in the relevant chapters.  
 
The process starts with data familiarisation where researchers must immerse 
themselves in the data. This phase involves multiple readings of the data, which 
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allows researchers to familiarise themselves with the semantic meanings of, and 
engage analytically with the data. Researchers should note down ideas and 
observations that they will go back to during coding and when developing themes. 
Transcription of verbal data (such as interviews) is regarded as a good way to start 
this phase.  
 
After data familiarisation and generation of the initial list of ideas, phase two begins 
when researchers start developing the initial codes from the data. Codes are not 
only labels that identify key analytic ideas in the data related to the research 
question but also capture the researchers’ interpretations of the data. In other words, 
some codes identify semantic features of the data that are descriptive and more 
obvious, and some identify latent aspects that are interpretative and less obvious. 
Coding should be performed systematically throughout the whole data set. In order 
for the data to be coded in a consistent and comprehensive way, a double round of 
coding is recommended (Clarke & Braun, 2016).  
 
When the data set has been coded and a list of codes have been identified, the third 
phase begins where the researchers sort the codes into different potential themes. 
At this phase, the analysis should move beyond codes, to the broader level of 
themes that can be identified within the data. Codes should be analysed and 
combined to create overarching themes and sub-themes within them. A theme 
should be underpinned by a central organising concept that brings the codes 
together in a coherent manner. Although usually themes are developed by clustering 
codes together that are associated with a certain issue, sometimes a code can 
become a theme if it is sufficiently complex (Charmaz, 2014). Braun and Clarke 
(2012) suggested that themes can be seen as jigsaw pieces, and the analysis as a 
completed jigsaw puzzle. 
 
The fourth phase is about the review and refinement of the themes identified during 
the third phase. In this review process, candidate themes should be checked i) 
against all coded data and ii) against the entire data set to make sure there is a good 
fit between them. This phase is essential in order for researchers to make sure that 
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i) certain aspects of the data were not missed during coding and that the analysis ii) 
represents the data, iii) presents a meaningful and thorough description of the data. 
During this phase, themes can be discarded, combined, dismantled into different 
ones and kept but refined. There should be distinctions between themes (external 
heterogeneity) but the data within them should still cohere together (internal 
homogeneity) in a meaningful way (see Patton, 1990).  
 
Phase five is about refining and defining each theme and subtheme and choosing 
the data extracts that will be presented in phase 6 (the write up). In this phase the 
analytic narrative is built based on the data and refined so that a story is determined 
for each theme and for all themes together. This story will inform the reader of what 
is being shown, why it is important and how it answers the research question. 
 
The final phase of the thematic analysis is the writing up. Typically results and 
discussion are reported as one, with the analytic section covering the importance 
and relevance of the data presented in the narrative. The report can follow an 
illustrative approach, whereby the data extracts illustrate the claims made but the 
specifics of the extracts are not mentioned. Alternatively, it can also follow an 
analytic approach whereby analytical comments relate to the specifics of the data 
extracts – which is what was done in the qualitative studies contained in this thesis. 
The write up needs to contextualise, explain and locate the research findings within 
existing literature and theory. Alongside a literature review, the researcher must re-
engage with previous research findings, discern coherence and intertextuality, 
incoherence and disagreement, extend insights gleaned from the data or potentially 
shed new light or reinterpret previous research. 
 
2.5.2.2 Epistemological considerations 
Qualitative research is inextricably tied to particular sets of assumptions regarding 
the possibilities for knowledge, or epistemology (Coyle, 2016). Epistemology is 
concerned with questions regarding the theory of knowledge; what we can know 
and how we can know it. Thematic analysis itself is not tied to any specific 
theoretical framework and so can be used within different theoretical frameworks 
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allowing it to be wielded flexibly (Braun & Clark, 2016). These theoretical 
frameworks exist across a spectrum, ranging from realism and essentialism which 
can map the meanings and experiences of participants onto reality through to 
relativism and constructionism, which attempt to examine the ways in which 
experiences, meanings and events are the result of the reality built by the discourses 
occurring throughout society (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Coyle, 2016). Between these 
two poles sits contextualism and theories such as critical realism, which maintains 
that there is an observer-independent reality, but individual and social contexts 
mean that this reality cannot be known with certainty.  
 
The foundations of critical realism were established by Bhaskar (1975) as a post-
positivist ontology, so as to consolidate epistemological relativism, ontological 
realism and judgemental rationality (Archer, 1995). Critical realism therefore holds 
that epistemology (knowledge) is distinct from ontology (reality); an objective 
reality exists but our ability to know it is imperfect, as our knowledge is historically, 
culturally, and socially situated (Archer at al., 2016). According to critical realism, 
to make more accurate claims about observable events and reality itself, an 
understanding of the underlying unobservable structures and mechanisms must be 
attained (Cruickshank, 2012). As is the case with other qualitative approaches, 
critical realism embraces synthesis and context but its emphasis on objective reality 
distinguishes it from approaches focusing solely on social constructions, which may 
be inadequate. An amalgamation of the realist’s aspiration to understand the nature 
of reality with the admission that the researcher’s observations may not tally 
directly with this reality means that critical realism can help to uncover the root 
causes and underlying social structures behind phenomena (Willig, 2008).  
 
Madill et al. (2000) argued that researchers must make their theoretical and 
epistemological assumptions transparent, so that readers can evaluate their work 
effectively. Furthermore, the research process and analysis must remain consistent 
with the researcher’s chosen epistemological stance (Lyons, 2016). As such, the 
qualitative studies in the present thesis adopted a critical realist stance in its 
exploration of the opinions, experiences and meaning the participants construct 
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regarding surveillance, whilst also taking into consideration the wider socio-
political and socio-economic factors that can influence this reality.  
 
In both qualitative studies, data were analysed using thematic analysis within a 
critical realist framework. 
 
2.5.3 Mixed methods research 
Mixed methods research is an approach that intends to provide a framework for 
combining both qualitative and quantitative methods (Almeida, 2018; Aramo-
Immonen, 2011). It has become increasingly popular – particularly after 2006 – in 
the field of behavioural and social sciences (Creswell, 2012; Timans, Wouters, & 
Heilbron, 2019).  
 
The recent history of mixed research in the behavioural and social sciences began 
with researchers who considered both quantitative and qualitative methods and 
perspectives to be useful when tackling their research questions. Although the label 
“mixed methods” was coined relatively recently, “mixed research” can be found in 
the work of fieldwork sociologists and cultural anthropologists from the early 20th 
century (e.g., Hollingshead, 1949; Jahoda, Lazarsfeld, & Zeisel, 1931/2003). 
Formalisation of the method began in the mid to late 1980s, when both quantitative 
and qualitative researchers began to realise the benefits of combining the two 
approaches (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). Quantitative researchers came to 
appreciate the added contextualisation and details provided by qualitative methods, 
while qualitative researchers appreciated the way in which quantitative research 
could be more easily generalised to many more individuals and audiences. 
 
In the early 2000s, after mixed methods research’s inclusion in the Handbook of 
Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioural Research (Tashakkori & Teddie, 2003), 
the method was defined by Creswell, Plano Clark, Guntmann and Hanson (2003) 
as the collection and analysis of quantitative and qualitative data in a single study. 
This definition was very much focused on the mechanics of data collection. Over 
the next several years, definitions of mixed methods research increased in 
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sophistication to include outlines of analysis and its advantages, with the 
identification of five core themes by Johnson, Onwuegbuzie and Turner (2007, p. 
123), “Mixed methods research is the type of research in which a researcher or a 
team of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research 
approaches (e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, 
analysis, inference techniques) for the broad purpose of breadth and depth of 
understanding and corroboration.” Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) describe mixed 
methods research as a methodology involving philosophical assumptions that guide 
the collection, analysis and combination of qualitative and quantitative methods 
throughout the research process. This definition included, for the first time, the use 
of philosophical assumptions to inform upon the use of mixed method research. 
 
Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) later proposed a definition of core characteristics 
so as to better capture the essence of MMR. These characteristics provide a broad 
definition of mixed methods research, and describe the key elements to consider in 
the design and conduction of a research study: 
 
1. Meticulous collection and analysis of quantitative and qualitative data, 
founded on research questions. 
2. Integrating or linking the two types of data. 
3. Prioritising or assigning weight to the types of data based on the research 
questions. 
4. Performing these procedures within a single study. 
5. Using philosophical and theoretical perspectives to frame these procedures. 
6. Using these procedures to create research designs that can be used to 
conduct the study. 
 
Mixed method research can therefore guard against quantitative/qualitative 
dogmatism and the combination of the two can benefit the other, leading to broader, 
richer and more in-depth analysis (Coyle, 2016). Integrating quantitative and 
qualitative findings can be challenging, as the epistemological assumptions 
underlying each can be very different, so explaining all findings under the umbrella 
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of a single framework can therefore be difficult. Moran-Ellis et al. (2006) suggests 
that the different methods used to answer the research question be integrated with 
one another by assigning equal weighting to each. This would mean that qualitative 
and quantitative methods are employed discontinuously, each contributing equally 
but distinctly to address the research question (Coyle, 2016). 
 
Mixed methods research is able to provide an array of strengths that can offset the 
inherent weaknesses in quantitative and qualitative research (Creswell, 2009). It 
can provide more comprehensive evidence than either method in isolation and all 
available data collection tools can be utilised. Mixed method research is able to 
address questions that are not able to be answered satisfactorily by either 
quantitative or qualitative methods on their own. It can also aid in the collaboration 
between quantitative and qualitative researchers and encourage collaboration rather 
than adversarialism in solving problems in social, psychological and behavioural 
sciences. In turn this can catalyse the use and exchange of multiple paradigms or 
worldviews between quantitative and qualitative researchers, and perhaps lead to 
innovation in the use of paradigms within research. Additionally, combining the 
use of numbers and words in an analysis can infuse the research with more 
meaningful insights.  
 
However, mixed method research can be challenging due to the resources, expertise 
and time required to analyse both quantitative and qualitative data (Creswell & 
Plano Clark, 2011). Partly for this reason, it should not be assumed that mixed 
method research is always superior to an approach which makes use of a single 
method (Coyle, 2016). Prior to deciding upon a method, it is therefore important to 
determine the approach best suited to answer the research questions. 
 
In Study 5 (Chapter 7) a mixed method approach was employed in order to link 
qualitative and quantitative analysis. Qualitative methods are interested in how 
people make sense of the world and experience events and phenomena from their 
own subjective frame of reference (Willig, 2001). Therefore, the qualitative 
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analysis of tweets in this study allowed for a richer social psychological 
understanding of online communities in cyberspace.  
 
Sentiment analysis on the Islam related post Westminster attack tweets were 
employed manually to categorise them into positive, negative, neutral and 
ambiguous sentiments. Due to the large amount of data (3623 tweets) and the 
intention to quantify the occurrence of qualitatively identified themes, I employed 
content analysis on the positive and negative tweets in order to identify and analyse 
people’s views on Islam. Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six-phase guide to thematic 
was used in the analysis. In order to be able to draw conclusions from large-scale 
content analysis of qualitative data, reliability needs to be demonstrated. Therefore, 
an inter-coder reliability analysis for the codes was conducted using Krippendorff’s 
alpha as a standard reliability measure (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007) after a second 
coder coded 10% of the data. 
 
There is sometimes a degree of confusion amongst researchers regarding the 
difference between thematic and content analysis, as the boundaries between the 
two have not been clearly specified and the terms are often used interchangeably 
(Sandelowski, 2010) or even referred to as one method (‘thematic content analysis’, 
see Green & Thorogood, 2004). It has been suggested that the key difference 
between the two is the opportunity for quantitative analysis of the data; content 
analysis allows for frequency measurements of categories and themes (Vaismoradi, 
Turunen, & Bondas, 2013). 
 
As a complement to the qualitative analyses conducted in this study, a quantitative 
network analysis was also carried out to gain insight into ingroup following, the 
social identities of the groups and their following behaviour. Methods from network 
theory and statistical physics were adopted to identify groups in the network 
structure of tweets. A method developed by Bryden, Funk and Jansen (2013) was 
used in collaboration with Dr John Bryden, one of my supervisors whose 
contribution to the network analysis should be acknowledged. Sentiments and 
themes identified with qualitative analysis were then employed to define social 
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groups on Twitter using quantitative ‘big data’ algorithms that required bespoke 
computer coding by Dr Bryden.  
 
This study presented a unique perspective to understanding views on Islam and 
following behaviour on Twitter post-terrorist attack by the application of mixed 
methods. Using network analysis (quantitative method), online groups tweeting 
about the Westminster attack on Twitter were identified. In addition, the sentiments 
and main themes (qualitative methods) of such groups’ Westminster attack related 
tweets regarding Muslims were also explored. For this study, combining 
quantitative and qualitative methods allowed for the detailed understanding of post 
terrorist attack Muslim related views expressed on Twitter in the context of online 
groups. 
 
Using network analysis to generate community groups in the network and gain 
insight into online group behaviour (e.g., ingroup following) combined with 
qualitative analysis to provide meaning in and sensitivity to context allows for a 
thorough understanding of meaning making from copious amounts of data. This 
methodology could be useful for researchers wishing to gain a deep understanding 
of discussions, in context, within online groups as part of a network (e.g., on 
Twitter) on a given topic.  
 
In conclusion, the body of empirical work presented in this thesis spans attitudinal 
survey, experimental survey, qualitative interview, and internet psychology 
research methods, including techniques applied from network analysis. It is unusual 
to see this mix of methods within a social psychology research project, but I believe 
that there is added validity to the work afforded by this methodological diversity, 
with each method being sensitive to somewhat different aspects of the data, and the 
findings complementing each other substantially. While this chapter endeavours to 
provide a brief overview of the methods deployed, within each empirical chapter 
more detailed information is included about the methods deployed for the empirical 




2.6 Reflections on my Research Journey  
Reflexivity refers to the critical examination of the researcher’s speaking position, 
judgments, beliefs, values and experiences, and how these might have influenced 
the research process (Finlay, 1998). Reflexivity can be further divided into 
‘personal’ and ‘functional’ views, though they cannot be separated from one 
another (Wilkinson, 1988). Reflexive evaluation allows the researcher to discuss 
any subjectivity and any personal or professional biases that may have influenced 
the research process and its outcomes (Banister, Burman, Parker, Taylor, & Tindall, 
1994). Reflexive self-awareness is a key aspect of the research process (Wilkinson, 
1988) and its acknowledgment can aid transparency and so the understanding and 
evaluation of the research (Coyle, 2016).  
 
Although writing personal reflections in a distinct section instead of allocating them 
at appropriate points throughout the research narrative may run the risk of de-
emphasising its importance (Coyle, 2016), I decided to include it as a single text 
confined to a separate section as I felt that this would provide a more coherent and 
analytical account.  
 
I started conducting the first study of my PhD research (Study 1 – Chapter 3) just 
after having completed my undergraduate degree. During my degree, unfortunately 
I had not had the opportunity to learn about or to conduct qualitative research. In 
fact, apart from my third-year research project, I had not conducted any research on 
my own or had any research experience in the form of employment or a Master’s 
degree. Therefore, even though I was excited to explore the then-unknown and to 
carry out my first qualitative study, I was also somewhat anxious. I was unsure 
about where and how to begin. It is not uncommon to have similar feelings when 
embarking upon qualitative research (Coyle, 2016). 
 
The main goal of my first study was to explore and to glean detailed insights into 
people’s views on surveillance, privacy and trust. As semi-structured interviews are 
believed to be the most appropriate method for this purpose, I decided to conduct 
twenty interviews – which in retrospect might have been overly ambitious and 
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perhaps more than what would have been necessary. Most of the participants I 
interviewed were fellow postgraduate researchers, the majority of whom – like 
myself – had just begun their own research. They were therefore eager to help out, 
not only because of possible future reciprocation but because our PhD office has 
always maintained a culture of supporting one another. 
 
It is important to note that at the time of conducting my first study I had only been 
living in the UK for four years and I still lacked confidence in my English language 
skills. Thus, prior to my first interview I was quite nervous not only because this 
was my first attempt at interviewing educated and knowledgeable participants on a 
complex topic but also because I felt slightly inadequate due to my language skills. 
To provide both a professional and psychological crutch, my supervisor listened to 
the recording of my first interview to ensure that it was conducted well. Over time, 
I gained more confidence in my interviewing skills. 
 
Throughout my interviewing I felt as if I was somewhat stepping out of line, a 
feeling tinged with a mild sense of inferiority. In hindsight I think these feelings 
could be attributed to the fact that I was an immigrant interviewing British people 
on their views on surveillance, which to me at the time felt slightly incongruent. To 
be a foreigner, and yet to be dissecting, analysing and theorising on British domestic 
matters, and how natives view these issues was at times uncomfortable.  
 
Given the focus of the research – surveillance, privacy and trust – my background 
as a Hungarian should be taken into consideration. Growing up in Hungary, I was 
surrounded by stories of the era of Soviet control over the county. The Soviet state 
engaged in mass surveillance of Hungarian citizens’ private lives, the extent to 
which was not fully known until archives became publicly available in 1989 
following the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Over time, this knowledge became part 
of the collective domain and to this day remains part of Hungary’s “cultural 
memory”. Although I do not consider surveillance an unmitigated negative, my 
childhood and adolescent experience raised an acute awareness of how mass 
surveillance can be employed by totalitarian governments, not for the benefit of 
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their citizens but for their own expedient motives. These concerns were only further 
amplified by several English language books I read as a young adult, including 
George Orwell’s ‘1984’ and ‘Animal Farm’. Upon reflection, it is therefore 
possible that my position may have influenced the way in which I phrased some 
follow-up questions during the interviews, and I may have subconsciously 
attempted to elicit views that conform to my world view.   
 
Mass surveillance has been used as a preventative strategy to counter terrorism, 
therefore I naturally expected the topic to arise during the interviews. What was 
unexpected was the series of terrorist attacks that took place in Paris on 13 
November 2015, killing and wounding hundreds of people. I conducted most of my 
interviews (17 out of 20) in the aftermath of the attacks, so the topic of terrorism 
was not only a naturally emerging topic (in relation to surveillance), but it was at 
the forefront of everyone’s attention – including my own. Due to the link between 
surveillance and terrorism, interviewing participants immediately after the Paris 
attacks was certainly a strange experience. Nevertheless, this was the first time I 
started to consider the idea of potentially focusing more on terrorism in my 
research. 
 
Transcribing the interviews verbatim took a lot longer than expected, especially 
given the magnitude of the interviews. As I was a novice to qualitative research, I 
conducted thematic analysis without any epistemological consideration or a proper 
understanding of how the analysis should be done. This resulted in the themes 
presented in the study being mapped onto the topic areas associated with the 
clusters of interview questions. Therefore, as a part of my post-viva amendments, 
the data of this study was reanalysed.  
 
The data corpus included the answers of twenty interviewees to questions regarding 
surveillance, privacy online and on social networks sites and targeted advertising. 
However, for the purpose of reanalysis, the data corpus was narrowed to a data set 
of answers to questions regarding surveillance only. There are multiple reasons 
behind this decision. First, after multiple read-throughs of the original chapter, apart 
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from methodological missteps that were pointed out in my amendments which I 
was in agreement with, I also realised that the data set was too broad, and the 
original analysis was diluted amongst many different (although linked) topics and 
therefore nuance, and detail was lost. I felt that my 2015 self tried to spread herself 
too thin and do too much and the lack of focus resulted in a study that did not have 
a concise and meaningful narrative. Second, the aim of the research was to explore 
views on surveillance and gain an in-depth insight into their understandings. 
Therefore, the analysis of the entire data corpus was deemed unnecessary. 
 
It took me a while to find my rhythm and carry out the analysis of the data set – and 
complete the remaining amendment – because i) the data was collected about five 
years ago, ii) I have not done qualitative research in over two years, iii) I changed 
my career and departed from academia to industry in a different line of work and 
iv) the challenges of working during the COVID-19 global pandemic in 2020. In 
spite of these obstacles, the data set of Study 1 (Chapter 3) was reanalysed and as 
a result the whole chapter has been amended. In the light of the narrower focus (i.e. 
surveillance), the Introduction (Section 3.2) has been modified to include a shorter 
literature review which aimed to contextualise the study. A thematic analysis study 
does not have any specific requirements as to the literature review (Huxley, Clarke, 
& Halliwell, 2016) and in contrast to quantitative methods, a comprehensive 
summary of existing research is not necessary (Braun & Clarke, 2013).  
 
My research journey and narrative – and by extension, I – was largely shaped by 
the events unfolding during the course of my PhD, such as the series of terrorist 
attacks committed by Islamist extremists across Europe (e.g., Paris, Nice, Berlin, 
London), the 2016 US Presidential election and of course, Brexit. I have designed 
and collected data for various studies related to current events that eventually were 
not included in the thesis. The most influential occurrence was the peak in terrorist 
attacks, particularly the first one in Westminster, London. I was not only interested 
in how people viewed surveillance in the light of the attack(s), but I also developed 
an interest in how they viewed the attack itself. Not only due to my growing interest, 
but also due to terrorism becoming an emergent theme throughout my research, I 
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dedicated the last study of this thesis to the exploration of an unfortunately related 
phenomenon – Islamophobia – which I would not have thought of back in 2015.  
 
Personal and financial difficulties – that are not unusual for other postgraduate 
researchers – and mental health struggles have certainly affected me throughout my 
journey which was further exacerbated by part-time employment and its related 
responsibilities. While doing my PhD I taught various lectures and seminars at three 
different universities, worked as a research assistant on various projects with 
differing research interests and even got a taste of working in industry as a research 
consultant. I travelled to various countries and presented research (not only my 
PhD) at different venues. All these experiences have shaped me and my thesis and 
I grew a lot as a researcher throughout my research journey. I gained confidence, 
became a better writer, gained a better understanding of research methodologies – 
mostly qualitative – and I believe that this thesis is a perfect reflection of that 
journey.  
 
As mentioned above, all these ad-hoc activities not only had a huge impact on me 
personally and as a researcher but also on my thesis. In practical terms, this means 
that there was a large gap between the writing up the chapters. The first three studies 
(Study 1 – Chapter 3; Study 2 – Chapter 4; Study 3 – Chapter 5) were written up 
immediately after data collection and analysis, not only due to the lack of non-PhD 
related commitments but also because I felt fairly comfortable with quantitative 
analysis which Study 2 (Chapter 4) and 3 (Chapter 5) utilised. I experienced Study 
4 (Chapter 5) and Study 5 (Chapter 6) to be significantly more challenging to do 
than the previous studies due to external commitments and because I used methods 
I was new to.  
 
Lastly, it should be noted that this part of the thesis (Section 2.6) was borne as a 
result of my post-viva amendments, of which I am grateful to have had so that I had 
the opportunity to revisit and reflect on my work and help the reader to have a better 
understanding of my research journey. Other sections mostly related to the 
qualitative work of this thesis were also amended, e.g., in light of epistemological 
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considerations, the reflective chapters were updated. Prior to completing my 
amendments, I had not fully understood the analytical rigour, in-depth insights, and 
sensitivity to context that well-conducted qualitative research can provide. 
However, thanks to these amendments and the additional work I did on my thesis, 











3. To Surveil or Not to Surveil? A Qualitative Exploration 




3.1 Abstract  
Considering recent revelations regarding the extent of surveillance, and the UK 
being an endemic surveillance state, issues of privacy have come to the forefront of 
attention. Yet there remains a relative dearth of recent research, especially in the 
UK context, into lay perceptions of surveillance and their potential psychological 
underpinnings. Using inductive thematic analysis, the present study aimed to 
explore British young adults’ views and perceptions of surveillance – government 
and corporate, online and offline, mass and targeted. Our findings show that 
surveillance perceptions are multi-faceted and complex with interweaving elements 
which weigh on each other and affect views, opinions and justifications – such as 
the belief that surveillance is for the protection of the public, trust in the agent of 
surveillance and concerns regarding surveillance practices. Future studies should 





3.2 Introduction  
Surveillance, as defined by the dictionary is the ‘close observation, especially of a 
suspected person’, however it has been argued that this definition is too narrow and 
insufficient for surveillance in modern times (Marx, 2002). According to him, 
populations and whole groups are targeted through the ‘new surveillance’, often 
using techniques which can extract private information.  
 
Surveillance and the issues surrounding privacy are increasingly prevalent in 
modern societies. The need for surveillance has been ever present, but due to the 
technological advancements beginning in the 20th century, mass surveillance has 
been more and more integrated into everyday life.  
 
Surveillance is a top-down affair where someone hierarchically superior is 
watching the general and comparatively powerless population (Trottier, 2014). 
Orwell (1949) described a future vision based within the nation of Oceana led by a 
leader called ‘Big Brother’, where its own citizens are monitored via a telescreen 
with hidden microphones and cameras within their homes. This device can project 
images while also recording the behaviour of its subjects. The monitoring is 
managed and coordinated by the ‘Thought Police’, agents of the current totalitarian 
state which use this extensive surveillance as a method to maintain social order and 
ensure conformity among its citizens. In contemporary culture, the Orwellian vision 
of ‘Big Brother’ has become a synonym for the abuse of power by the Government, 
especially in relation to civil liberties via the use of mass surveillance. David Lyon 
(2015) considered the relationship between democracy and surveillance to be tense. 
He concluded that surveillance could constrain the freedom of society and in the 
worst case it can also lead to a totalitarian state, as Orwell predicted (Lyon, 2015).    
 
The panoptic guard tower is another oft-used metaphor for understanding 
contemporary surveillance and control (Foucault, 1977). It was the philosopher 
Jeremy Bentham (1995) who proposed the panopticon as a new architectural design 
functioning as a disciplinary tool to reform prisoners. It is a centrally placed tower 
where all inmates are visible to the guards in the tower and was designed to increase 
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the visibility of inmates who were held in solitary confinement in such a way that 
they were unaware if the central tower guards were observing them or not. This 
idea has been referenced in recent research in the interdisciplinary field of 
computer-mediated communication studies. Furthermore, CCTV is being described 
as an ‘electronic panopticon’ where people can be seen but are unable to observe 
(Lyon, 1994). Parallels also exist between the undesirable dystopias, such as 
Orwell’s Big Brother and CCTV. Therefore, CCTV is depicted as a technologically 
advanced form of the surveillance society (Lyon, 1994).   
 
Surveillance occurs not only visually but it is undertaken in various ways using a 
range of technologies. Surveillance instruments include for example CCTV, 
wiretapping, heat-seeking and other sensing devices and movement tracking 
devices (House of Lords, 2009). Furthermore, surveillance can be passive whereby 
it is not targeted on a certain individual, but information is gathered for potential 
use in the future – this phenomenon is called mass surveillance. On the other hand, 
targeted surveillance – which can be carried out both overtly and covertly – is 
directed at certain individuals using specific powers authorised by public agencies. 
 
In 2013, former CIA employee and contractor for the US Government, Edward 
Snowden revealed classified documents proving that western governments were 
involved in the large-scale surveillance and monitoring of their populations in one 
of the most significant intelligence leaks in history (MacAskill, Borger, Hopkins, 
Davies, & Ball, 2013). The Snowden surveillance revelations showed that agencies 
such as the National Security Agency (NSA) in the US and the British General 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) have developed and implemented 
technologies and systems which have rendered worldwide surveillance of internet 
users possible, infringing international laws of civil liberties and privacy in the 
process. These agencies intercept emails, document online behaviour, collect 
telephone and SMS data of millions of citizens and attempt to use this information 




Privacy International (2007) labelled the United Kingdom as an ‘endemic 
surveillance society’ – being the only country in Europe to be labelled as such. The 
UK is the most surveilled country in Europe – the second most surveilled country 
in the world, after China – with one of the largest closed-circuit television (CCTV) 
networks (Armitage, 2002). According to a British Security Industry Authority 
(BSIA) report there are approximately 4 – 5.9 million CCTV cameras in the country 
(BBC News, 2015), meaning that a person being captured on about 300 cameras 
each day (McCahill & Norris, 2003; Murakami Wood & Ball, 2006).  
 
The proliferation of CCTV systems stretches back to the late eighties and they are 
most commonly found in town and city centres, car parks, schools, hospitals, police 
stations, several workplaces and residential areas (Gill, 2003; Gill, Bryan, & Allen, 
2007; Norris & Armstrong 1999, Webster, 2002) with approximately £500 million 
of public money invested by the British Government (Norris, 2006). Most often 
these systems have been introduced to combat criminality, in addition to 
functioning as a device to reduce the fear of crime (Armitage, 2002; Murakami 
Wood & Ball, 2006; Webster, 2009). 
 
Public support for CCTV has been demonstrated in numerous studies (Brown, 
1995; Ditton, 1998; Dixon, Levine, & McAuley, 2004; Honess & Charman, 1992). 
For example, in a public attitudes survey amongst the residents of Cambridge, UK, 
Bennett and Gelsthorpe (1996) found that people supported the installation of 
CCTV in public settings and thought that it was effective in crime detection and 
prevention.  
 
Webster (2009) has argued that public support is generally based on the belief in 
the effectiveness of the systems in reducing crime. However, their effectiveness has 
been called into question by research and it has been showed that the efficacy of 
CCTV cameras has been exaggerated in systematic reviews of CCTV evaluations 
(Armitage, 2002; Ditton & Short, 1999; Gill & Turbin; Gill & Spriggs, 2005; 
Groombridge 2008; Welsh & Farrington, 2003). Therefore, regardless of whether 
surveillance systems are in fact effective or not, the perceived effectiveness and 
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benefits of such systems ultimately lead to more accepting attitudes towards them 
(Murakami Wood & Webster, 2009; Sanquist, Mahy, & Morris, 2008; Webster, 
2009). 
 
In spite of the general support, CCTV surveillance has been shown to raise concerns 
about civil liberties and invasion of privacy (Dixon et al., 2004). For example, 
support for CCTV has been found to drop with around 40% if the questions relating 
to it are framed in the context of civil liberties instead of crime prevention (Ditton, 
1998). Bennett and Gelsthorpe (1996) demonstrated that 59% of people were 
concerned about the CCTV installation due to the corresponding implications on 
civil liberties. However, the same people perceived CCTV to be either good, very 
good or had no strong opinion on this matter. Therefore, the authors concluded that 
public concerns about infringed civil rights were not strong enough to dissuade 
them from supporting the installation of CCTV. Furthermore, Gill and Spriggs 
(2005) showed that in the areas where support for CCTV cameras declined 
following implementation, was not a reflection of the public’s increased worries 
about infringement upon their privacy and civil liberties, as this concern remained 
at a low-level following camera installation. 
 
In summary, most research seemed to have investigated public perceptions of 
government surveillance from a limited perspective – CCTV only – often using 
attitude surveys, and the more in-depth views that can be gathered using qualitative 
methods remain unexplored. This exploratory study aimed to investigate 
perceptions of surveillance in the UK in a general sense, not exclusively of CCTV. 
A sample consisting of British young adults was chosen as they were born after the 
widespread implementation of surveillance measures – such as CCTV – and their 
views have developed in the social context of having been born and lived in a 
surveillance culture in which they willingly and actively engage themselves (Lyon, 
2015). As a group that will only grow in cultural and political power over time, the 
views of young adults on surveillance have not been previously explored. As the 
implications of surveillance disseminate throughout society, the exploration of their 
views and perceptions is imperative. The present exploratory study was therefore 
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guided by the broad research question: how do British young adults perceive 




The method of data collection was interview and a semi-structured interview guide 
was developed by the researcher. Interviews are ideal for exploring the experiences, 
views, perceptions and beliefs of individuals on specific matters (such as 
surveillance in the case of this study). Interviews allow for a ‘deeper’ understanding 
of the studied phenomenon than quantitative methods (Silverman, 2000), 
particularly when little is known about it or when participants might not want to 
discuss the topic in a focus group environment (Gill, Stewart, Treasure, & 
Chadwick, 2008).  
 
In order to make sure participants were asked the same general questions as well as 
enabling them to discuss matters that had not been pre-planned by the researchers, 
a semi-structured interview approach was adopted. Semi-structured interviews 
include pre-written questions that help to demarcate the topics to be discussed, but 
allow for a degree of digression to further probe an idea or response. This lends 
semi-structured interviews a flexibility, permitting elaboration or discovery of 
pertinent information from the participant that may not have been deemed relevant 
from the researchers prior to the interview (Gill et al., 2008). 
 
3.3.1 Participants  
A snowball sample of participants (N = 20; 8 females, 12 males) aged 19 to 32 (M 
= 24.25, SD = 4.08) were recruited from the researcher's circle of friends and 
acquaintances. There was only one inclusion criterion for participation, namely that 
participants were British citizens (defined as having, or qualifying for, a British 




A sample size of twenty was chosen in accordance with the recommendation by 
Braun and Clarke (2013) suggesting that a sample of at least six should be selected 
when using interviews in thematic analysis in order to identify patterned rather than 
idiographic meaning across cases. Thus, the sample of twenty interviews is suitable 
for a thematic analysis interview study of a medium size. 
 
All participants were highly educated to undergraduate degree level or higher and 
described themselves as White British (n = 18; the remaining two participants 
described themselves as British Asian). 
 
3.3.2 Procedure 
Ethical approval for the study was given by the Departmental Ethics Committee. 
Signed consent was obtained from each participant after they were given 
information about the purpose of the study. Interviews were conducted face-to-face 
in the Psychology Department of Royal Holloway, University of London in 
November and December, 2015. The interviews lasted between 22 and 62 minutes. 
Interviewees were given pseudonyms to preserve their anonymity. With their 
explicit permission, the interviews were digitally recorded using a recording device. 
Recordings were deleted after transcription, together with any identifying data of 
the participants. Participants were thanked and debriefed after their interviews.  
 
3.3.3 Data analysis 
Voice recordings were fully transcribed verbatim by the researcher and some 
transcripts were revised by the researcher’s supervisor and compared to the 
recordings. 
 
Answers to all interview questions (see Section 3.6.) were transcribed, therefore the 
data corpus included the answers to each question. However, for the purposes of 
this analysis – informed by the research question –, the data corpus was narrowed 
to a data set of answers to questions regarding surveillance only. Therefore, data 
relevant to surveillance were compiled into a separate file. 
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Interview transcripts related to surveillance were analysed using inductive thematic 
analysis following the 6-phase step-by-step guide outlined by Braun and Clarke 
(2006), within a critical realist framework or contextualist framework (Willig, 
1999), focused on semantic meanings predominantly. This approach fitted well 
with the aims of the interview study to explore and understand the views and 
perceptions of British young adults on surveillance and its different domains in 
terms of their reality, while also acknowledging that these views are shaped within 
their social context.  
 
Thematic analysis is a qualitative method used to identify, analyse and report 
patterns within the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Although it has been described as 
a tool to be utilised by different methods rather than a particular method (Boyatzis 
(1998), Braun and Clarke (2006) argued that it is indeed a method in and of itself. 
One of the advantages of thematic analysis is its flexibility as it is not tied to any 
theoretical or epistemological position and can be applied across a range of 
approaches. Therefore, it provides a useful tool that can offer a detailed and rich 
take on the data. 
 
The present study adopted a critical realist stance, whereby the existence of an 
objective (both environmental and physical) reality is recognised alongside an 
acknowledgement that our portrayal of reality is necessarily mediated and typified 
by social and political factors (Ussher, 1999). Therefore, as a result the answers 
provided by participants can be taken to be an accurate rendering of reality, albeit 
given through the lens of specific cultural, social and political elements.  
 
Furthermore, an inductive – ‘bottom-up’ – approach was taken, meaning that the 
analysis was driven by the data, not by the researcher’s theoretical interest. Data 
was coded without the attempt to fit it into a pre-existing coding frame.   
 
As mentioned above, thematic analysis was conducted using the six-phase step-by-
step guide offered by Braun and Clarke (2006). The analysis started with the 
familiarisation of the data which was achieved through multiple read-throughs as 
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well as the creation of marginal notes (phase 1). Coding of the data set (phase 2) 
was performed manually in a systematic way whereby key analytic ideas relating 
to the research question were identified. The interview transcripts were coded in 
Microsoft Word and after a double round of coding, codes were combined to create 
overarching themes and sub-themes within them (phase 3). In the fourth phase of 
the analysis, the themes were reviewed and examined against the coded data 
relevant to each individual theme and against the entire data set, in order to make 
sure no aspect of the data was missed and that the analysis presented the data set in 
a meaningful way. Themes and subthemes were defined, refined and named, and 
data extracts for every theme were organised in a coherent way (phase 5). An 
example of coding and theming for this study can be found in Section 3.6. Through 
phases four and five, a thematic map was created that maps out the themes, 
subthemes and the relationship between them – both ‘horizontal’ which captures 
how themes fit together and ‘vertical’ that shows the relationships of themes and 
subthemes sitting within themes (Clarke & Braun, 2016). Finally, a written report 
(Section 3.4) was produced that offers a coherent account of the story, the data told 
within and across the themes and subthemes using data extracts to show their 
prevalence (phase 6).  
 
It is imperative to highlight that surveillance is a complex phenomenon and this 
complexity requires the distinction of the agents of surveillance 
(government/public, corporate/private), the types of surveillance (offline and 
online) and forms of surveillance (mass and targeted). To visualise these 











Table 3.1. Different agents, types and forms of surveillance. 






Form Mass Targeted Mass Targeted 
 
Due to its broad research question – ‘How do British young adults perceive 
surveillance?’ – this study presents a unique perspective whereby instead of 
focusing on a particular type or form of surveillance (as existing research had done), 
different domains of surveillance have been explored. When the distinction is 
relevant it will be specified in the related data extract.  
 
 
3.4 Results  
The analytic process identified five main themes in the interviews exploring 
perceptions and understandings of surveillance. The five main themes were 
‘surveillance is ubiquitous’, ‘nothing to hide’ (which includes the subthemes 
‘lawful behaviour’ and ‘ordinary personal information’), ‘protection of the public’, 
‘trust in the agent of surveillance’ (which includes the subthemes ‘efficacy’, 
‘inherent trust in the agent of surveillance’, and ‘transparency regarding 
surveillance’) and finally ‘concerns’ (including 'misuse of surveillance’, ‘privacy 
infringement’, ‘unjustified surveillance’, and ‘surveillance capitalism’ subthemes). 
A thematic map illustrating the main themes and subthemes and the relationship 









Themes and subthemes are illustrated with relevant data extracts. Each participant 
has been given a pseudonym, and data extracts are presented with the participant’s 
pseudonym and age. Any editing of the data (for instance, the removal of 
unnecessary and irrelevant details) is indicated by [...]. Frequency counts are not 
provided when reporting the results, but as a general rule, ‘majority’ and ‘most’ 
refer to around two-thirds or more of the participants, ‘some’ to less than half and 
‘few’ to less than a quarter. 
 
3.4.1 Surveillance is ubiquitous  
The ubiquitous nature of surveillance was expressed amongst all interviewees, most 
often in regard to the presence of CCTV. For example:  
 
“They are pretty much everywhere in London.” (Albert, 24) 
 
“But wherever you go, you’re on CCTV all the time. [...] I mean it seems to 
be everywhere. I think it’s a bit excessive.” (Harry, 21) 
 
The ubiquitous characteristic of surveillance was often linked to the realisation that 
they probably are more exposed to surveillance than they think. 
 
“You don’t think you’re being watched. [...] I don’t really think about it, but 
I guess when you do think about it is probably quite a lot.” (Ava, 22) 
 
“I think probably more than I think I am. I think I'm quite naïve in how 
surveilled I am because I try to stay quite private but [...] I definitely think 
I'm more surveilled than I think I am.” (Sophia, 20) 
 
Surveillance is often perceived to be ubiquitous due to its portrayal in the media, in 
shows such as Crimewatch. Participants usually highlighted the frequent use of 
CCTV on television, in the news and on shows. This may suggest that media 




“it [surveillance] is increasing. But in terms of my kind of day to day 
activities, I don’t really consider myself under surveillance but even if you 
watch a program like Crime watch and you see the amount of CCTV footage 
there is, it kind of makes you realise that actually probably every move is 
recorded, particularly in public place.” (Sharon, 32) 
 
“I suppose it's more prevalent than I realize but I don’t know. I know it is 
weird it's almost like I think it's a good thing because whenever you watch 
police TV shows in the UK it's always done through people spotting 
something on CCTV footage. You sort of grow up thinking that it's there to 
stop crime and all that kind of stuff.” (Louisa, 32) 
 
The ubiquitous nature of both offline and online surveillance was voiced by the 
participants. 
 
”More than you probably think because if you think every time you go on the 
internet then like there are people who can like check what you are looking 
at and what you are saying, things like that. And also every time you leave 
the house I’d imagine like just walking up the street probably caught on some 
sort of surveillance.” (Bianca, 21) 
 
“I remember an advert saying many years ago that you got caught on camera 
300 times a day or something and I imagine it has gone up considerably since 
then. And internet use, I mean, you can track basically everything that 
someone does on the internet.” (Rupert, 23) 
Because surveillance is everywhere, its existence is normalised. People are used to 
it, grew up with it, it is a part of life, it is normal. They do not think about it, they 
do not question it. It is incessant and inevitable. These answers reflect the assertion 
that when people feel that something is inevitable, they are more likely to accept it. 
The inevitability of surveillance has been discussed in research previously (e.g., 
Monahan, 2015). It has been argued that due to the abundance and normalisation 
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of surveillance, it is intrinsic to modern society, and that we therefore live in a 
surveillance society (Aas, Gundhus, & Lomell, 2008; Lyon 1994; 2001; 2007; 
Monahan, 2006). 
 
“I'm under surveillance so much, I don’t even think about it anymore.” 
(Phoebe, 22) 
 
“I think in some ways it is a good thing because we grew in this generation 
where we are just used to it, we wouldn’t question it.” (Ava, 22) 
 
“I've grown up in a generation where CCTV is just there. CCTV for me is just 
something that's just there, it's just a presence, I just don’t even pick up on. I 
don’t attend to it because it's just there, it's everywhere.” (James, 32) 
 
Surveillance is ever present which is well-reflected upon in Phoebe’s (22) definition 
of it, according to whom surveillance is “So people are watching you all the time” 
and further states that “all my life spent is being watched by cameras”.   
 
An interesting insight was offered by Louisa (32) comparing surveillance to being 
watched by someone guarding lives, like God. The comparison of surveillance to 
the eye of God is not uncommon in literature (Lyon, 2014). 
 
“I suppose if you are religiously inclined I suppose you can say that perhaps 
there is some kind of religious element to surveillance because you are sort 
of under the watch of the life guard of something.” (Louisa, 32) 
 
Some said the extent of offline surveillance – particularly getting caught on CCTV 
– is intimidating but they still have positive views about it because it is for the safety 
and protection of the public.  
 
“I think it’s almost like scary in the sense that they say like ‘you got caught 
on a CCTV camera x number of times in a day’ and it’s quite large. But I 
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think in terms of safety and in terms of identifying criminals and I think 
missing people, sort of things like this, I think it can be a very very good 
thing.” (Ava, 22) 
 
The ubiquitousness of surveillance is also reflected in the views regarding corporate 
surveillance – especially with respect to Google. Although concerns were expressed 
about the amount of information corporations gather and monitor, overall, it was 
still often perceived favourably. For example, Ralph’s (26) appreciation of the 
impressive technology mitigated against his objections to the “freaky” nature of 
surveillance. This may suggest that a cost-benefit analysis was employed. 
 
“That is bad as well, you can find out, know where someone is all the time, 
google, google stalk you on your phone, it tells you where you have been, I'll 
show you after the interview, I think it's quite cool, that's why I kept it on, but 
it knows what building I work in, it know I'm there from 8.30 to 6, it knows 
my travel time, it's quite freaky. But it's amazing, impressive.” (Ralph, 26) 
 
The panoptic tower metaphor, though not explicitly named, was often used in 
definitions and explanations of surveillance given by participants. For example: 
 
“[...]people watching you on the TV somewhere and you can't see them but 
they can see you.” (Ralph, 26)  
 
Foucault’s ‘panopticon’ and Orwell’s ‘Big Brother’ are metaphors that predominate 
in academic discourses regarding recent developments in surveillance (Haggerty & 
Ericson, 2000).  
 
Some felt that the fact that surveillance is everywhere makes them feel that they are 
protected because they are always being watched.  
 
“It just really makes you feel protected, someone is always watching, you are 
not by yourself. There is always someone there.” (Sophia, 20) 
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3.4.2 Nothing to hide 
The ‘Nothing to hide’ theme encapsulates the interviewees’ general acceptance of 
surveillance, specifically the surveillance imposed on them, mainly in the context 
of online surveillance, i.e., the monitoring of online information shared in 
cyberspace. The frequently presented arguments in support of surveillance posit the 
infamous argument ‘If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear’. 
 
It should be highlighted that this argument had been frequently employed by the 
British Government in their justification for the introduction of various surveillance 
measures, for example in the installation of millions of public-surveillance CCTV 
cameras (Solove, 2011). It is possible that this argument has been used by 
participants frequently due to their exposure to the news, and media representations 
of surveillance – which are often underpinned by the argument – impacting their 
understanding of it.  
 
The ‘Nothing to hide’ argument has been well documented in privacy literature 
(e.g., Crossman, 2008; Solove, 2007; Solove, 2011; Spears & Erete, 2014). For 
example, in a study exploring individuals’ reactions when questioned on online 
privacy and the effect it has upon their experience online, Viseu, Clement and 
Aspinall (2004) found that participants often had a ‘nothing to hide, nothing to fear’ 
attitude and approach to privacy. The authors argued that approach to surveillance 
accentuates short-termism and individualism in lieu of a longer term, broader, 
societal-centric perspective. They proposed an analogy between privacy and 
environmental concerns as a device to understand the attitude underlying the 
‘Nothing to hide, nothing to fear’ statement. Both sets of concerns encompass risks 
which are remote, abstract and diffuse, contrasting with benefits which are personal, 
immediate and straightforward. For example, just as recreational air travel elicits 
immediate benefits, so does the relinquishing of personal information when using 
the internet (e.g., social media sites). In the present study we found that most 
participants felt comfortable in the knowledge that they were being surveilled as 




“I don’t have anything to hide from them so if they required it I’d like to know 
why but I’d be happy to hand it over.” (Justin, 25) 
 
“I'm OK with them looking at what I do because I’m not doing because I 
don’t have anything to hide.” (Phoebe, 22) 
 
Some people initially had ambivalent views about surveillance, acknowledged 
privacy concerns and understood why others would have such concerns. Yet when 
weighing privacy concerns against the security provided by surveillance, they 
favoured surveillance because they have ‘nothing to hide’. This is more prevalent 
when a threat to safety is perceived to be present. The threat to safety is perceived 
to be higher than the threat to privacy caused by surveillance.  
 
“Obviously in terms of security it's important. To some extent I'm in 
agreement with people who say that if you haven't done anything wrong 
you've got nothing to be worried about. I'm on the fence with this because I 
can see the point of people who are arguing against you know... our 
freedom... to be carrying out surveillance with people's day to day lives. I 
think I probably fall more on the side of, you know, I'm not doing anything I 
wouldn’t be happy for people to know about so you know I'd rather 
particularly in a time when there is a lot of threat around, I'd rather feel there 
is as much done about it as could be done.” (Sharon, 32) 
 
Being protected from threats is perceived to be important and as they have nothing 
to hide, they are willing to accept surveillance.  
 
“I think I sort of accept it [surveillance] because I feel like and I'd like to 
think that that's the way I'm being protected. And I think there's nothing really 
on there that I'm ashamed about or I don’t want them knowing. So I don’t 





To provide a more nuanced understanding of the ‘Nothing to hide’ theme, we felt 
that it was important to distinguish the two different ways in which the argument is 
underpinned. Therefore, two subthemes were identified based on the different 
reasonings behind participants’ ‘nothing to hide’ argument – ‘lawful behaviour’ 
and ‘ordinary personal information’.  
 
3.4.2.1 Lawful behaviour 
Some participants expressed that because they felt that they did not engage in any 
illegal criminal activity either offline or online, surveillance is not an issue for them. 
They have not done and are not doing anything they should not have been doing.  
 
“I don't really mind. But I guess it's because I'm not doing anything illegal, 
then presumably I would mind. No, it's not something that bothers me.” 
(Louisa, 32) 
 
Some even argued that the general public should feel similarly to themselves about 
surveillance. If they did not engage in illegal activity and are innocent, surveillance 
should not be their concern. 
 
“Again, if you’re not doing anything you shouldn’t be doing it wouldn’t 
matter to your life. So you know those who are mostly concerned about it, I 
would wonder what they are doing.” (Caleb, 25)  
 
In the context of online corporate surveillance, Caleb (25) had similar views – those 
abiding the law should not be worried about it.  
 
“I mean I think my personal opinion is that you know if you are a law abiding 
citizen you don’t really have much to worry about. [...] I think for an everyday 
sort of working individual, there is nothing to be concerned about apart from 
the few emails you get from time to time for marketing campaigns. If that 
really bothers you then I would suggest you need to, you know, kind of relax 
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a little bit, I don’t think that’s an issue, marketing emails and so forth.” 
(Caleb, 25) 
 
In some cases, surveillance was acknowledged to be an invasion of privacy or at 
least something which others may consider to be an invasion. But surveillance still 
does not concern them, as they do not engage in illegal activities, so they have 
nothing to hide. Only the guilty need fear surveillance. 
 
“And so I always just feel like I don’t talk about anything that I shouldn’t and 
so it doesn’t affect me. And I know it is an invasion of privacy but then again 
they are only interested in things that are going to be harmful potentially. So 
it wouldn’t bother me.” (Bianca, 21) 
 
“I think it’s a good thing, obviously I know there is cons with it, like people 
think there is too much surveillance and they feel it's a bit too interfering. But 
if you have got nothing to hide I don’t see why it's an issue.” (Meghan, 26) 
 
3.4.2.2 Ordinary personal information 
Often people expressed positive or ambivalent views about surveillance – mostly 
that taking place online – which they justified by stating that their information is 
not worth surveilling anyway. They expressed the opinion that their online 
shopping habits and information is not of interest to the agents of surveillance. This 
viewpoint underpins the ‘Nothing to hide, nothing to fear’ argument, by which the 
participants are implying that because their online activity is ordinary, it would be 
of no interest to those undertaking the surveillance. Their response places the focus 
upon themselves and the ordinary nature of their surveilled information, while those 
in the lawfulness subtheme extend their answers to others and the presumption that 
crimes are being committed.  
 
“you can look at on my surveillance and there is nothing really interesting to 
see unless they want to see what shops I’m shopping” (Ava, 22) 
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“I don’t ever feel like my privacy has been invaded by the government or 
anything. Even if they did go through all my emails and phone calls, they are 
just really boring, there is nothing interesting. So no, I don’t feel under 
scrutiny from public surveillance.” (Louisa, 22) 
 
Bianca (21) even feels more secure knowing that she is being surveilled. She feels 
as if there is no downside to being surveilled as her online activity is “boring”, 
though the upside is that she feels more secure.  
 
“[...]if they read my text messages like it wouldn’t really bother me. If 
anything, it actually makes me feel more secure that they are doing that. 
Actually I don’t think it would bother me if they want to check my Facebook 
or anything. Like they will have a really boring time.” (Bianca, 21) 
 
Both subthemes are reflected in James’ (32) response that indicates no concern 
about surveillance because he i) does not engage in criminal activity and ii) his 
metadata is not interesting. 
 
“I don’t indulge in any terrorist things so I wouldn’t imagine that I'm 
particularly being surveilled. So yeah apart from the information that I freely 
give probably a lot of metadata coming out from my phone and what I watch 
on TV and what I browse. If GCHQ are storing that they are going to find 
that I'm an incredibly boring person. But yeah I can't imagine that I'm under 
surveillance.” 
 
3.4.3 Protection of the public 
The third main theme identified in the analysis is ‘Protection of the public’. This 
theme encompassed various views, feelings and thoughts expressed by participants 
that surveillance is for the protection and safety of the populace, often from a 




Most of the participants felt that surveillance generally is for the protection of the 
public. These views seem to be predicated on an assumption of a paternalistic state 
that has the best interest of its citizens at heart, suggesting trust in the state. Sophia 
(20) for example felt that being watched makes her feel protected.  
 
“I think it’s a good thing I think it can be very helpful when... I like being 
protected, someone watching over you and protecting.” 
 
Surveillance was perceived to be good because it helps the Government keep its 
citizens safe. It is for preventing crimes and prosecuting criminals.  
 
“So I think it’s a good thing all in all in terms of preventing crime and in 
terms of catching criminals, missing people, general stuff like that. Car 
crashes either, attacks.” (Ava, 22) 
 
“I think it is used as a deterrent to stop people from committing crimes 
because they know that their faces can be caught on camera and they can be 
caught afterwards. It is useful in prosecuting criminals because it’s video 
evidence of identification which is more reliable than eyewitness testimony 
sometimes.” (Stephen, 26) 
 
“I think it's a good thing because it helps so if you're attacked it really helps 
finding that person.” (Sophia, 20) 
 
Some – for example, Ralph (26) – felt that it was safe and comforting to know that 
they are being watched and surveillance implemented because if crime is 
committed against someone it helps to catch the criminals. 
 
“It's reassuring for me. If anything happens you know, you're stabbed, they 





The aim of surveillance is to make people feel safe. The gathering of information 
is useful against crime so as to keep people safe.  
 
“I suppose it meant to make people feel safer, if someone feels like there is 
someone watching over them all the time. I suppose that’s the main reason, I 
imagine to have like video evidence of something happening, to make people 
feel safe” (Harry, 21) 
 
The effectiveness of surveillance – specifically CCTV – has been demonstrated 
previously in crime detection, for example when people were wrongly charged for 
crimes they did not commit. Catherine (20) felt that this example illustrates that 
surveillance is for the protection of the public.  
 
“I think it’s good to an extent, when it is protecting people, when it’s for 
safety, makes court cases a lot easier. There are people who have been 
wrongly charged with things and they have been cleared because of the 
CCTV.” 
 
Most interviewees were aware of the efficacy of surveillance – mostly CCTV – via 
the news where successful cases of criminal identification and detection due to the 
use of CCTV are often reported. These media representations of surveillance 
potentially contribute to its positive perception among the interviewees. Studies 
have previously shown that representations of CCTV in the media are often 
portrayed in a positive way (Armstrong, 1999; McCahill, 2002, McCahill & Norris, 
2002; Hempel & Töpfer, 2009; Kroener, 2013). This positive representation is 
reflected in Louisa’s (32) comment:  
 
“I read a story the other day where they captured a man trying to grab a 
woman on the street and they got him right on CCTV, so they got his face and 
everything and obviously it wouldn’t have happened if they didn’t have 
CCTV. I think it's OK, I sort of assume it's there for the public good really. 
There is no sort of malignant deed behind it or anything.”  
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Supportive attitudes towards offline surveillance – particularly in the context of 
CCTV cameras – have been demonstrated in numerous studies (Brown, 1995; 
Ditton, 1998; Dixon, Levine, & McAuley, 2004; Honess & Charman, 1992) as well 
as the perceived effectiveness of such measures (Bennett & Gelsthorpe, 1996). 
 
In some cases, even when CCTV has been shown to be ineffective people still 
perceived it to be useful and were in support of it. Though it often did not lead to 
the successful apprehension of criminals, Catherine (20) for instance thought that 
it was reassuring that the victims were later able to observe the crime caught by 
surveillance cameras. 
 
My brother had his bike stolen in London a couple of months ago. He never 
got it back but he was able to see how it was taken and everything because of 
the CCTV outside McDonald’s nearby. So it’s good that you can have that. It 
should be used for that reason.” 
 
Sharon (32) expressed similar views. In a crime committed against her, CCTV was 
not able to help in the apprehension of the offender, yet she felt that the presence 
of surveillance was still useful and reassuring.  
 
“I've had my bike stolen from somewhere where there was a security camera 
and although it was nice to know that the security camera was there. 
Unfortunately it didn’t pick them up because it was in the wrong place. But 
you know in that circumstance it is nice to know that you can go back and try 
at least.”  
 
The need of surveillance for safety and protection was often expressed in an online 
context as well. People – for instance, Ralph (26) – talked about the need for 
government monitoring of the ‘Dark web’. It has been shown that more than half 
of content hosted on the ‘Dark web’ is illegal, including but not limited to elicit 
drugs, human, weapon and sex trafficking and terrorist communication (Moore & 
65 
 
Rid, 2016; Weimann, 2016). It remains largely unregulated and better monitoring 
and policing is needed. 
 
“Yeah, I mean it's always good that the police are monitoring the silent web, 
you know, obviously those websites where people can talk to each other 
anonymously, but you want to monitor that as well because it's scary what 
they could organise. Obviously it can prevent fraud, prevent terrorism, it can 
prevent anything,”  
 
The majority of people talked about terrorism in relation to surveillance. Terrorism 
relies upon the use of psychological mechanisms which underpin our perception of 
threats (Breckenridge & Zimbardo, 2007). Most of the participants felt that 
surveillance is definitely needed in times of crisis when the threat of terrorism is 
high. The recent terrorist attack in Paris was a frequently cited example.  
 
“Yes. I think generally it’s a good thing, especially everything that is 
happening right now you know, terrorism and things like that. I think it is a 
good thing because it can kind of track people’s online access when 
potentially they are looking at things or showing worrying signs whether 
that’s kind of like in terms of terrorism or in terms of I don’t know like child 
pornography and things like that. I think it can be good for picking up the 
smaller symptoms before they act up this behaviour. For example if it is the 
fact that someone is looking every day how to make a bomb that is something 
quite worrying that we should be sort of keeping track of.” (Ava, 22) 
 
“Particularly at the moment they need to be quite, looking quite closely at 
what people are doing in order to kind of pick up any terrorist threats.” 
(Sharon, 32) 
 
A commonly observed emotional response to a perceived threat is an effort to 
reduce the distress by increasing levels of security, potentially resulting in increased 
support for government surveillance strategies targeting the threat (David & Silver, 
66 
 
2004). Support for surveillance under the threat of terrorism has been demonstrated 
in exisiting quantitative research (Cohrs et al., 2005; Davis & Silver, 2004; 
Malhotra & Popp, 2012). Furthermore, the agenda-setting theory from the field of 
sociology and media studies provides an explanation for the frequent mention of 
terrorism, according to which, the media influences the public agenda by giving 
more exposure to certain topics (McCombs & Reynolds, 2002), with the public then 
tending to feel these topics are more important. Thus, it is relevant for the present 
study because most of the interviews were conducted immediately after the Paris 
attacks on the 13th of November 2015 and news about terrorism were given more 
exposure in the media. 
 
Stephen (26) argued that mass surveillance by the Government is warranted in times 
of crisis when there is threat but not during periods of low threat. This suggests that 
support for surveillance is largely dependent on the context. This is in line with 
existing literature suggesting that in the light of terrorism when there is a high 
perceived threat, surveillance is tolerated where once it may have been regarded as 
unacceptable (Levi & Wall, 2004).  
 
“So maybe surveillance with the intention of protecting people is more of a 
good thing than surveillance generally. So in times of crisis maybe 
surveillance might be warranted, extra surveillance, but then times when 
there is not so much danger or whatever maybe just continuing surveillance 
and collecting everyone’s data isn’t a good thing.” (Stephen, 26) 
 
On the other hand, some participants had different views and felt that the threat of 
terrorism had been overestimated. It has been suggested that fears of terrorism are 
disproportionately high due to the availability heuristic – a bias caused by differing 
retrievability of instance affecting evaluations (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) – 
often originating from media exposure (Kunreuther, 2002; Sunstein, 2003). 
 




“we lose thousands of people in traffic accidents. So when people say that 
terrorism is the greatest threat to national security it is completely absurd. I 
think drowning in your bath is greater threat to national security than 
terrorism.”  
 
Brian (24) also felt that terrorism should not be the reason for the extent of 
surveillance the Government wishes to use.  
 
“I think they are more scared of what could happen than actually using 
precedence, I mean even though there have been terrorist attacks I don’t think 
it probably warrants as much surveillance as they seem to want to use.” 
 
These assertions suggest that some had a more ambivalent sense of trust when it 
comes to their perceptions of the state which suggests that there may be some 
ulterior motive for the state wishing to monitor its populace. 
 
3.4.4 Trust in the agent of surveillance 
Another main theme identified in the discussions about surveillance was trust. 
Three subthemes of trust were generated to differentiate between the types of trust 
in the agent of surveillance, (i) one that stems from the perception that surveillance 
has been (or has not been) performed efficiently by the agent previously, (ii) one 
that describes an inherent trust (or lack of it) in the agent with surveillance, and (iii) 
one that is conditional on transparency provided by the agent regarding the 
surveillance. These are explored below.  
 
3.4.4.1 Efficacy 
For some participants, there seemed to be a connection between their views on the 
efficacy of surveillance measures implemented by the British Government and their 
trust in the Government. They placed trust in the Government when they felt that 




“I trust them in the sense that like they do catch criminals, the security 
services do keep us safe. For example, you know like the 7/7 bombings in 
London, there have actually been lots of similar sort of planned attacks that 
have been stopped by the security services and obviously surveillance played 
a role in that. So I think that surveillance has kept the public safe and I think 
they do a very good job.” (Albert, 24) 
 
“[...] but I think they do their job well. And so if there was a problem that 
they would help through the surveillance doing it, I wouldn’t mind them doing 
it either.” (Sophia, 20) 
 
This notion is reflected in ‘Performance theory’ which states that trust in the 
Government is nourished by increased government performance (Yang & Holzer, 
2006). However, this relationship between trust and performance of government is 
not conclusive as there exists an element of reverse causality; trust in the 
Government can influence the perception of government performance (Van de 
Walle & Bouckaert, 2003).  
 
On the other hand, as asserted by ‘Performance theory’, people hold negative 
attitudes towards the Government in the case of unsatisfactory performance 
(Bouckaert & Van de Walle, 2001). Marcus (21) explained that his lack of trust in 
the Government was due to their past ineffective use of surveillance – the failure in 
using gathered surveillance data efficiently in the context of the Paris attacks. 
 
“It has been proven before that although they kept this information they are 
not effective in using the information. Paris is the most recent example. I 
don’t have a problem with using information if it actually does protect but if 




3.4.4.2 Inherent trust in the agent of surveillance 
The second subtheme nesting under ‘Trust in the agent of surveillance’ represents 
the inherent trust (or distrust) people place in the Government in their use of 
surveillance. Although some, for example, Meghan (26) trusted the Government 
with their surveillance powers “completely” because “I have no reason to think 
that they would use it inappropriately”. Caleb (25) feels that the Government has 
good intentions and is motivated to help the public therefore their surveillance 
powers are justified. 
  
“But if you say do I trust the Government in general, yeah, I would probably 
say that you know the Government clearly has the interest of myself and the 
general public at heart.” 
 
Political trust has been found to positively relate to increasing levels of support for 
policies targeting terrorism and fostering support for anti-terrorism policies 
(Denemark, 2012). In the US and in Canada it has been demonstrated that those 
who trust the government tend to support security and surveillance policies 
(Nakhaie & de Lint, 2013). 
 
An interesting justification was provided by Stephen (26) as to why he trusts the 
Government with their use of surveillance. It is his belief that people are inherently 
good and therefore should be trusted. Stephen even argued that there are good 
intentions behind abuses of power, exemplifying the expression ‘the road to hell is 
paved with good intentions’.  
 
“I believe that people are fundamentally good people and that misuses of 
power aren’t usually malevolent like evil, just people with good intentions but 
going about achieving them in the wrong way. I trust people more than I don’t 
trust them in general.” 
 
In the context of targeted surveillance, Rupert (23) expressed disapproval because 
of his lack of trust in the Government. He further states that he would even be 
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willing to accept targeted surveillance against groups based on stereotypes – in this 
case, religious profiling of Muslims – if it was conducted by a government he trusts. 
This suggests that surveillance (even if it is conducted within a grey area, such as 
for religious profiling) is perceived to be more acceptable when the surveilled trusts 
the surveiller and arguably when surveillance is used for the protection of the in-
group from the out-group.  
 
“Again, I don’t in principle object to it, I would object to it because I don’t 
trust the Government. But if I did trust the Government I don’t think there is 
anything... if you are using your surveillance resources for the good then you 
have got to use them in the most efficient way possible. One of the most 
efficient ways possible is to dispense them on targets that are statistically 
more likely to need to be subject to surveillance. And if one of the things that 
tells you that the person should be surveilled is their ethnicity or religion or 
whatever it is then I don’t think there is anything wrong in principle with 
that.“ 
 
In the context of corporate surveillance, different views were expressed. Most 
people did not trust corporations with collecting their personal information. For 
example, Louisa (32) said that: 
 
“I don’t trust people in large positions of power who want to consolidate their 
power by collecting information. I don’t think that it's good for example that 
a company has increased advertising power. So surveillance is obviously the 
tool to use to direct marketing most effectively so I don’t think it's good.” 
 
Research suggests that trust can be constructed from a shared identity (Calnan & 
Rowe, 2006) and that a shared identity can build trust within a group (Foddy, 
Platow & Yamagishi, 2009; Stroebe, Lodewijkx & Spears, 2005; Tanis & Postmes, 
2005). O’Donnell, Jetten and Ryan, (2010) demonstrated that sharing identity with 
those who introduce the surveillance can have an effect on the acceptance of the 
surveillance. They found that surveillance is less likely to be seen as an 
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infringement of privacy if the people identified more strongly with their city. Thus, 
they stated that sharing the same group membership as the source of surveillance 
increases the acceptance of surveillance. This is because shared identity allows 
surveillance to be perceived as a benefit to the in-group (i.e. safety). It also implies 
that a lack of shared identity results in people perceiving surveillance to be an 
invasion of privacy (as it is not being used for their safety). In line with previous 
research, the findings of this study suggest that surveillance is perceived to be 
more/less acceptable when there is/is not trust between the agent of surveillance 
and the surveilled. Additionally, according to self-categorization theory (Turner, 
1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), shared social identity 
between leaders and followers can form a foundation for influence (Reicher, 
Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005; Turner, 2005; Turner & Haslam, 2001; Turner, 
Reynolds, & Subašić, 2008) which can help governments increase acceptance of 
their policies and practices including surveillance measures.  
 
3.4.4.3 Transparency regarding surveillance  
Most of the participants felt that more transparency is needed from the Government 
regarding surveillance and the extent to which it has been carried out, as the 
unknown and secretive nature of surveillance is perceived to be a disadvantage. The 
desire for transparency is reflected in these data extracts: 
 
“I think they should be clear. If they’re going to collect everything, they 
should be clear on what they are going to collect and for what purpose. For 
me it's not the fact that they were collecting it, it's the fact that you don't know 
what it's for, why do they need to know that? And that's what is missing.” 
(Marcus, 21) 
 
“I think it’s bad that you don’t actually know the extent to which you are 
personally being watched, I think there should be more about that. Because 





Catherine (20) further stated that she felt that “it is weird'' how surveillance is 
“quite a taboo subject and we don’t really know how much just normal people are 
being watched”. This lack of transparency regarding surveillance was given as a 
reason for the lack of trust in the Government. This assertion has been evidenced 
in literature, operational transparency for example has been shown to increase 
people’s trust in the Government (Buell, Porter, & Norton, 2016). This is further 
reflected in the comments below: 
 
“I don’t think anyone can fully say that they trust the Government or the 
surveillance people or the police or whatever because like you can never fully 
know. Because we are not given that knowledge. It’s never talked about. And 
it’s always just assumed. We all know we’re watched, we all know that it’s 
for security reasons, we just accept it, but I don’t think we should trust it.” 
(Catherine, 20) 
 
“That's a disadvantage in fact that people don’t know what's happening. So 
if you are getting information that way you are deceiving huge amounts of 
people, individuals, violating their rights in some way, so that is a 
disadvantage. It doesn’t build any trust. [...] Yeah, I think it should be more 
transparent. You should really know what your government is doing, I 
suppose.” (Victor, 19) 
 
Participants who felt that the Government should provide more transparency 
regarding its surveillance practices often mentioned Edward Snowden and his 
revelations to support and justify their views. Due to past misuses of surveillance 
powers without the knowledge of the public – which was brought to the public’s 
attention by Snowden – transparency is needed to elicit trust in the Government and 
their use of surveillance. It has been suggested that as a result of the revelations, the 
public started to question government mass surveillance activities (Murphy, 2014). 
For example, Catherine (20) felt that leaks about the extent of surveillance carried 




“Because there are certain times, when things are leaked, we find out a little 
bit more about something but you do end up thinking ‘this is very bad’ and 
we just don’t know how fully it is affecting our privacy.” 
 
Justin (25) felt that Snowden leaking classified information about the extent of 
surveillance was the right thing to do because “when it comes to national security 
and freedom of information that should be already there”. Sophia (20) thought that 
due to the Government lying about surveillance activities in the past, the public 
might feel that they cannot be trusted. 
 
“Lying to the public about what they have done and what they haven't done. 
You meant to trust them with your privacy and you feel like you can't trust 
them.” 
 
Furthermore, Rupert (23) also explained that he would be more supportive of 
surveillance if he had trust in the Government which was doing the surveilling. He 
felt that more transparency and less secrecy is needed from the agent of 
surveillance. 
 
“If I trusted the Government doing the right thing then I wouldn’t mind doing 
surveillance and things in secret but given they are not I think it's very 
important that we have people [Snowden] who are able divulge important 
information about what's going on so that we can at least try to hold people 
in power accountable.”  
 
An important distinction was made between online and offline surveillance – 
implemented by the Government – in relation to the interviewee’s trust in them. 
This was reflected in Sharon’s (32) statement: 
 
“Certainly I'd like to think that I do [trust the British Government]. I mean I 
would struggle to think for what other purpose they might use CCTV footage. 
I could kind of see more for the online things kind of a more of a big unknown. 
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But in terms of CCTV footage, I'm not sure what else they would use it for 
realistically.” 
 
Often in the case of online surveillance – linked to its unknown extent and lack of 
transparency – mistrust was expressed. On the other hand, in relation to offline 
surveillance, trust was conveyed perhaps due to the ‘known’ nature of offline 
surveillance. People are well aware of CCTV for instance, due to its ubiquitous 
characteristic, and of course the crime deterrent aspect of CCTV relies on it being 
conspicuous. Cameras are everywhere and people are not only constantly exposed 
to it but also reminded often of surveillance. Furthermore, the use of CCTV is often 
portrayed in movies, TV shows (The Wire, Black Mirror) and news that almost all 
of our participants described exposure to.  
 
Interestingly, in the face of uncertain information, people can be encouraged into 
conspiratorial thinking, influenced by their perception of the morality of the agent 
in question (Van Prooijen & Jostman, 2013).  
 
3.4.5 Concerns 
When discussing their understanding of and views on surveillance, various 
concerns were raised by the participants which can be distinguished into (i) misuse 
of surveillance (ii) privacy infringement, (iii) unjustified surveillance (iv) 
surveillance capitalism. When discussing surveillance, even those who had 
favourable views on it, considered it to have some disadvantages.  
 
3.4.5.1 Misuse of surveillance  
Concerns about the possible misuse of surveillance powers by the British 
Government were also expressed in the interviews. For example, Caleb (25) 
believed that there are always people who want to abuse their powers. 
 
“I think when you go down to the specific individual, there is always going 
to be individuals in the Government or police or anywhere that will abuse 
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their powers. I wouldn’t say that would apply to everybody who is in 
government you know, but there is always going to be one or two people who 
are going to abuse their power and use it for things they shouldn’t be doing.” 
 
Stephen (26) stated that there is potential for misuse of the information. He felt that 
people in the Government are also prone to human error and can be influenced by 
emotions. He further explained that the abuse of surveillance powers – for instance, 
incorrectly targeted surveillance – has a higher probability of occurring in scenarios 
when there is a threat – for example, after the terrorist attacks in Paris – and the 
Government is pressured to produce results. 
 
“I think there is too much potential for misuse of the information. I don’t 
think that people in government and security agency are immune to human 
failure and human emotion and I think that sometimes in like historical 
situations or like incident and scenarios where people want to catch people 
or you know maybe let what they think is right or let what they think happened 
get the better of them over the facts and then they can end up causing more 
harm than good. If they get some shit on innocent people and use that wrongly 
and stuff. So for like Paris and stuff and the moment, maybe it’s like really 
acute situations, tensions are really high and people have lots of pressure to 
catch people and produce results. I think in those situations there is more 
chance that information collecting will be abused.” 
 
Albert (24) felt similarly towards both government and corporate surveillance, he 
felt that increased surveillance powers would increase the potential for abuse. 
 
“Well, I think the more you increase the kind of online surveillance powers 
and give those powers to I don’t know like organisations or people, it 
increases their scope for abuse.” 
 
The majority of participants felt that surveillance should be more targeted at 
criminals instead of being used as a tool for mass surveillance. They explained that 
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surveillance targeted towards specific people (e.g., criminals) can be beneficial, 
however blanket surveillance of the public was considered to be negative. 
 
“Good in some ways the fact that if surveillance is being conducted if it's for 
a you know, it's specific surveillance on specific things, specific groups, 
specific people, I think that's absolutely, and there is a legal framework for 
that, I should think that wouldn't be too much of a problem. But as just like a 
general overall thing I don’t think that's a great thing.” (James, 32) 
 
“It seems intuitively bad because you don’t want your stuff tracked but a lot 
of stuff happens on the internet that I’m unaware of, so I don’t know how bad 
some stuff is so like child pornography and stuff like that. If you could track 
people who put those stuff online, then I think that’s a good thing. But then 
tracking just everyone’s stuff is probably a bad thing.” (Stephen, 26) 
 
Ava (22) further explained the problem with mass surveillance by saying that 
surveilling everyone (like herself) could be a waste of resources resulting in other 
more important things being overlooked or missed. 
 
“It’s more that I don’t trust them in a sense that they are not picking up and 
then missing things or they are potentially focusing too much on people like 
me who you know, you can look at on my surveillance and there is nothing 
really interesting to see unless they want to see what shops I’m shopping at 
whereas they may be missing big hidden stuff which may be really 
important.” 
  
Marcus (21) had similar thoughts and stated that it is important for the right amount 
of people to be surveilled, only those who in fact should be. He used the attacks in 
Paris as an example as to why mass surveillance is ineffective. He claimed that the 
terrorist attacks in Paris could have been prevented if the security services focused 
on the right people, not the masses. This suggests that terrorist events can have a 
paradoxical effect on beliefs about and support for surveillance – some draw upon 
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such attacks to justify existing surveillance or even support calls for extensions of 
its coverage, while others use the same terrorist event to support arguments that 
surveillance is effective at preventing terrorism and should not be supported or 
extended.  
 
“A bad thing is whether you are surveilling the right people or you have 
enough intelligence to basically assume that you're focusing on the right 
people. I think it's the differentiation between how many people you have 
surveillance of and whether it is the right amount of people. I think you can 
have surveillance over too many people and then it becomes ineffective. In 
the sense that if you look at the Paris attacks all those people were surveilled 
as such, they were all known to people, but they still couldn’t stop them. [...] 
They could have acted on the surveillance better because they sort of didn’t 
have too many people to look at.” 
 
Indeed, published speculation regarding mass surveillance has doubted its efficacy 
in identifying terrorists and claimed it to be a statistical impossibility (Rudmin, 
2006). 
  
Furthermore, an account of perceived misuse of surveillance was described by 
Catherine (20) who reported a personal experience in the context of surveillance 
conducted by a private company. Catherine felt that she was inappropriately 
surveilled by the company she worked for and therefore had her privacy invaded, 
as she felt the purpose of the installed camera was not to observe her but to protect 
her, whereas the authority responsible for the CCTV potentially had a different 
view.  
 
“We got a phone call, they watched it up in the office, they were cashing up, 
they were watching me on the CCTV doing this other thing and they called 
down, they rang down to the kitchen and they were like ‘why are you doing 
that?’, I can’t exactly remember what it was, it was really weird. [...] So they 
used to have all these cameras everywhere. In a way it was good because if 
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there was a fight or something happened, they could see… or vandalism. But 
they shouldn’t be using it at 2 o’clock in the morning to watch the workers 
when they are clearing up after a 7-hour shift.” 
 
3.4.5.2 Privacy infringement  
When discussing the characteristics of surveillance, people often raised privacy 
infringements as a disadvantage. Concerns regarding privacy infringement, 
stemming from stronger surveillance measures leading to a surveillance society 
have been demonstrated previously (David Lyon, 2003; Lyon, 1994; Mitchener-
Nissen, 2014; Murakami Wood & Webster, 2009). For example, Rupert (23) began 
his definition of surveillance with “I guess the main thing is government intrusion 
on people's lives’. Moreover, in the context of government surveillance, Ralph (26) 
felt uncomfortable with the extent of personal information the Government has 
access to.  
 
“I don’t think the Government should be knowing what I'm doing every day. 
Obviously they know where I work for insurance purposes but no, definitely 
I don’t want them knowing exactly who I'm meeting, all sorts of privacy, you 
don’t want them knowing too much about you.”  
 
Catherine (20) also felt that the Government “knows too much” and did not agree 
with mass surveillance. She expressed concerns about the surveillance of non-
illegal activities and claimed that it adversely affects privacy.  
 
“The Government kind of knows too much about you. I think there are 
definitely disadvantages, it does affect privacy basically. And if you’re not 
doing anything wrong to be watched that closely that’s a bit strange. [...] I 
think it’s bad that people just generally get watched.”  
 
Victor (19) argued that surveillance is “an instrument of state oppression and 
control, usually forms of political control” and specifically talking about online 
surveillance, he comments that “the common excuse which is used is that we need 
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to accept a limitation in our freedoms to prevent radicalism” and “I don’t think 
that surveillance actually prevents terror or prevents attacks in any way. And I 
think most commonly to use this as an excuse to attack left-wing anti-government 
movements.” This latter argument also fits into our ‘Efficacy’ subtheme (nested 
under ‘Trust in the agent of surveillance’) due to the fact it states that surveillance 
is ineffective and cites the attacks in Paris as an example. It is just an excuse used 
by the Government to exert more control over its citizens in order to attack opposing 
political movements. Lastly, he argues that “limitation of individual privacy, 
individual autonomy, state and corporate control” are all disadvantages of 
surveillance.  
 
Privacy infringements were also acknowledged in the context of corporate 
surveillance. For example, Ava (22) provided Apple as an example of a corporation 
she felt violates privacy via tracking location through its operating system.  
 
“[...] when the IOS thing came up with the tracking and it could tell exactly 
where you have been, everywhere, I think people kind of thought that was an 
invasion of privacy.” 
 
Interestingly though, most of the participants who felt that surveillance was an 
invasion of privacy also felt happy to sacrifice it for protection. The relationship 
between civil liberties and security are often expressed as a trade-off, whereby any 
gain in security via implementation of surveillance measures results in a 
proportional loss of citizen’s privacy (Friedewald et al., 2015; Lewis, 2005; Pavone, 
& Esposti, 2012). Sharon (32) felt that online surveillance is there to prevent crime 
and even if it is an invasion of privacy, she was willing to sacrifice it for increased 
safety. This statement also fits into the ‘Nothing to hide’ theme. 
 
“Yeah, but personally I don’t think I do anything online that I would be 
particularly worried about. I kind of yeah, it's more my details than actually 
the content of the websites I use or my emails and things like that. Obviously 
it's a bit of invasion of privacy but at the same time as I said before I would 
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be willing to sacrifice a bit of that in order to, you know, know that these 
strategies are placed to prevent crime.” (Sharon, 32) 
 
Similar to our participants’ views, it has been argued previously that people are 
more willing to sacrifice privacy for both convenience and security (Chesterman, 
2011). Accepting surveillance in spite of its infringement on privacy reflects 
Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance reduction. According to 
cognitive dissonance theory, when people have beliefs, ideas or attitudes that do 
not correspond, a state of discomfort (dissonance) is formed. However, people seek 
consistency among their attitudes and try to reduce this dissonance. A good 
example for this was a study carried out by Brehm (1959) where he gave 8th grade 
children a vegetable they disliked and half of them were told that they would be 
given that vegetable in the future. He demonstrated that those children who believed 
that eating the vegetable again was inevitable rated the vegetable more positively. 
Thus, to reduce the dissonance caused by a dislike of the vegetable and the 
knowledge they would face eating it again, the children started liking the vegetable 
they previously disliked. We believe that because people perceive surveillance as 
inevitable, in order to reduce their dissonance, they are more likely to accept it over 
time.  
 
3.4.5.3 Unjustified surveillance 
A lot of participants discussed worries and concerns about the extent of surveillance 
of the masses and the unjustified use of targeted surveillance. Most of these worries 
were expressed about the unjustified targeted surveillance of Muslims especially as 
a possible consequence of the attacks in Paris perpetrated by Islamic extremists. 
The religious profiling of Muslims was a frequently identified pattern in the data 
set.   
 
“I think because there is still like, as bad as it is, there is still like prejudice 
against certain groups. Particularly like at the moment I can see it quite a big 
deal with like because there is a lot of like Islamophobia and stuff so I can 
imagine – even that I completely disagree with it – that someone who is a 
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Muslim would probably be target more than I would. But that’s not right.” 
(Bianca, 21) 
 
“Obviously there is always this ongoing case with terrorism and so forth and 
whether we should you be surveilling. I mean there is stuff in the media for 
example about how ISIS or just the Islamic State now sort of using online 
media to recruit for example. Obviously if it’s people who are purposely 
linked to the Islamic State then it’s fine, but we’re applying that more to just 
Muslim background, then I have an issue. It has to be again this sort of 
individualistic criteria that goes beyond just somebody’s religious status. [...] 
But you know, if we’re going to say, anybody who is a Muslim should have 
higher levels of surveillance then I think that’s obviously incorrect and real 
infringement on people’s freedom.” (Caleb, 25) 
 
Bianca (21) and Caleb (25) – amongst many – did not approve of religious profiling 
and unjustified targeted surveillance of Muslims.  
 
In line with our findings, the alienation of Muslims as a result of counter-terrorism 
laws and policies has been raised as a concern previously (Choudhury & Fenwick, 
2011). For example, it has been demonstrated that an increased frequency of 
Muslims being stopped by police has contributed to feelings of alienation, and 
opaqueness regarding CCTV camera installation in areas with large Muslim 
populations has undermined their trust in police. Furthermore, research has shown 
that particular counter-terrorism policies and practices, especially ones considered 
to increase repression or stigmatisation of certain groups, work to foment sympathy 
and encourage silence among these groups (Silke, 2005).  
 
Others however, felt differently. For example, Rupert (23) felt that the problem with 
targeted surveillance was that it was implemented by a government he did not trust. 
 
“I think they usually call this [the idea that surveillance might be targeted at 
some groups in societies more than others] racial profiling. I don’t in 
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principle object to it, I would object to it because I don’t trust the 
Government. But if I did trust the Government, I don’t think there is 
anything... if you are using your surveillance resources for the good then you 
have got to use them in the most efficient way possible.” (Rupert, 23) 
 
Some recognised that religious profiling and therefore targeted surveillance of 
Muslims is discrimination which should not happen but also felt that it was 
understandable, especially in the light of the recent terrorist attacks. This notion 
also shows that when the realistic threat of terrorism is perceived to be high, people 
are more likely to overlook infringements on basic human rights. Discrimination 
seems to be more accepted when the realistic threat of terrorism is present. 
 
“Because obviously you want everybody to feel like a valid citizen, you don’t 
want to discriminate against people by surveilling some more than others. 
But then it's almost understandable because if you're looking at for example 
and Islamic terror threat then it would make more sense to look within the 
Muslim community than it would within the Romanian community.” (Louisa, 
32) 
 
Research has previously suggested that – beginning with the September 11 attack 
– an increasing negative social perception of Islam is a response to the perceived 
realistic and symbolic threats caused by terrorism in the Western world (for 
example Ciftci, 2012; Croucher, 2013; Hitlan, Carrillo, Aikman, Zárate, 2007). For 
example, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia found that 
Muslims living in Western Europe had experienced an increase in hostility and 
physical attacks since September 11 (Allen, & Nielsen, 2002). Post 9/11 a growth 
of prejudice against Muslims has been reported in the United Kingdom (Sheridan 
& Gillett, 2005), and evidence for the rise of both covert (implicit, e.g., being 
treated with suspicion) and overt discrimination (explicit, e.g., violent experiences) 
experienced amongst British Muslims was found (Sheridan, 2006). Furthermore, as 
mentioned previously, terrorism was at the frorefront of attention due to the recent 
terrorst attacks in Paris and news about terrorism were given more exposure in the 
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media (agenda-setting theory; McCombs & Reynolds, 2002). This finding is also 
compatible with Cinnirella’s IRM model of Islamophobia (Cinnirella, 2012), in 
which it is argued that Muslims are positioned by negative media representations, 
fear of terrorism and strong British identity, as dangerous outsiders who threaten 
the British in-group.  
 
Similar views regarding unjustified targeted surveillance were expressed in a non-
Muslim related context too. People recognised that just as sometimes people are 
wrongly convicted, they are also sometimes wrongly surveilled. A lot of the 
participants felt that the end justifies the means and surveillance still should be 
implemented – the pros outweigh the cons. This thinking may be explained by a 
cost-benefit analysis. According to Roman and Farrell (2002), all crime prevention 
measures – including CCTV – are evaluated using cost-benefit analysis.  
 
“I mean, yes, it is a concern, but it is probably in some ways an accepted, you 
know, a negative outcome for some people. Some people get wrongly 
convicted; some people get wrongly surveilled. But it’s obviously for the best 
interest of the general public to monitor certain people’s behaviour, whether 
it’s online or not. And if that occasionally leads to incorrect outcomes, you 
know, unfortunately it’s just something we have to live with in a way [...] so 
you know there are some people incorrectly surveilled but I mean it’s about 
weighing the pros and cons and I think it’s likely that the pros are in this case 
outweighing the cons.” (Caleb, 25) 
 
Some felt that unjustified targeted surveillance is understandable due to the lack of 
time and resources to surveil the entire population, prejudices have to be relied upon 
to expedite the process.  
 
“whether I agree with it or not, I assume that it would happen at some point 
that they would potentially target groups that they would consider dangerous 
or if they have good reason to do so and the people are hiding anything than 
they have to somewhat degree even if it’s again one of those slightly grey 
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areas of targeting a specific group rather than everybody but I guess you only 
have so much time to filter through this information.” (Justin, 25) 
 
To summarise, in their arguments against targeted surveillance, people often raised 
concerns about its improper use leading to religious profiling of specific groups (i.e. 
Muslims), although they argued that its use was understandable because of the lack 
of time to surveill everyone. In arguments against mass surveillance people often 
raised concerns about its extent and magnitude and suggested that it should be more 
targeted.  
 
3.4.5.4 Surveillance capitalism 
Surveillance capitalism has been defined as the capture of information so as to 
predict and alter human behaviour in order to generate revenue and increase market 
control (Zuboff, 2015).  
 
This subtheme comprises views from interviewees that describe their distaste for 
targeted advertising whose sole purpose is to further the agenda of the agent of 
surveillance. An example commonly cited is the surveillance undertaken by 
corporations, often via the means of targeted advertising, that are implemented to 
increase the corporations’ own wealth or power.  
 
Out of all the different types of surveillance – targeted vs corporate, online vs 
offline – the majority of people expressed concerns about online corporate 
surveillance the most, specifically about targeted advertising and spam emails. 
Catherine (20) for example, described online corporate surveillance as a “sinister 
element” of surveillance.  
 
Often people accepted mass surveillance by the Government because it is for 
protection, but not the mass corporate surveillance of internet users or targeted 




“I think it’s a good thing that we’re being protected and there are people who 
can stop terrorist plots, stop on plots and stop people generally. But I don’t 
think that things like checking what type of jumpers you like and what sort of 
programs you like to watch, I don’t think that’s necessary, I think that’s too 
far.” (Catherine, 20) 
 
“It’s just tricking people into buying something they don’t necessarily want, 
but they are convinced they need. So it’s not good. I suppose most people 
won’t realise that. It’s just a sneaky way to make money.” (Harry, 21) 
 
Previous studies have found that the privacy concerns of consumers are said to be 
related to the following aspects of data collection and the use of it: unauthorized 
collection and access to personal data, errors in integrity of the databases, secondary 
use without authorization (Smith, Milberg, & Burke, 1996; Stewart & Segars, 
2002). Furthermore, Paine, Reips, Stieger, Joinson and Buchanan (2007), 
demonstrated that viruses, spam, hackers and spyware seemed to be the main 
concerns of consumers regarding online privacy. In the context of social network 
sites, Allmer, Fuchs, Kreilinger and Sevignani (2014) showed surveillance to be 
the most common concern amongst SNS users, resulting from data abuse, data 
forwarding or lack of data protection measures. 
 
James (32) opposed the every-day online metadata gathering mass surveillance 
from both the Government and corporations. 
 
“Maybe sometimes surveillance is good for you know you can say for the 
greater good, for protecting the nation, protecting the populous, maybe that's 
ok, but if it's something that happens on a day-to-day basis I don’t think it 
would be a good or acceptable thing for governments or tech companies or 
you know to be constantly looking at what we are consuming, doing and 




A few of the participants recognised that aspects of online corporate surveillance 
are ‘irritating’ and rely on personal information but accepted it due to its benefits, 
such as free service and tailored product marketing. This corresponds with the 
assertions that privacy is traded in exchange for products, improved services or 
other specialized deals, meaning that people often give their personal data to certain 
companies in exchange for something in return, for instance rewards or a more 
personalized service (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000). 
 
“I mean when it comes to things as simple as cookies, it can be a bit annoying. 
But at the end of its kind of for your benefit and some of the things that happen 
because of it, you get free access to content that would usually be paid for, 
you get things that are better targeted towards you. [...] The same with things 
like Youtube, Facebook, the surveillance side of it is you agreeing in some 
small way to give the information over in exchange for the free service of 
access to talking to thousands of people online or access to the latest news.” 
(Justin, 25) 
 
Rupert’s (23) disapproval and opposition to online corporate surveillance stem 
from his general dislike for and distrust in large corporations. 
 
“It's not just targeted advertising, that's just a part of it. I mean you can use 
information for lots of things. And information is very useful and the people 
that is going to be useful to are large corporations and I'm generally against 
everything that works for them. Even if they use it to improve the quality of 
their website, that itself is not such a bad thing but given that most profitable 
corporations in general their success is sort of comes at the expense of pretty 
much everyone else's success. I just wouldn’t approve anything that helps 
them. There would be exceptions but as a general rule I'm not a fan. Because 
essentially in Europe and America you see a situation where people who have 
lots of power, wealth and influence have been using it to increase their power 




Trust has been found to be a critical factor in the sharing of information and the 
development of relationships in the offline world and it is also considered vital 
for successful online interactions (Coppola, Hiltz, & Rotter, 2004; Lewis, 




This qualitative study explored British young adults’ understandings and 
perceptions of surveillance using inductive thematic analysis. The five themes 
identified in this study underpin their perceptions of surveillance. First of all, 
surveillance in general is perceived to be ubiquitous, ever-present and inevitable. 
The findings suggest that their positive (acceptance, support) or negative (rejection, 
opposition) views towards surveillance were discussed and evaluated in several 
aspects relating to surveillance, as captured by the other four themes. 
 
Although concerns were expressed amongst participants regarding surveillance, 
such concerns often were not expressed in a binary fashion, but were discussed 
alongside various rationalisations and justifications, such as the ‘nothing to hide’ 
argument – which is well documented in privacy literature (e.g., Crossman, 2008; 
Solove, 2007; Solove, 2011; Spears & Erete, 2014) – and the belief in surveillance 
as a protective measure. For example, surveillance and privacy concerns were often 
weighed against one another, often resulting in a ‘nothing to hide’ justification for 
surveillance. This was frequently coupled with the perception that surveillance is 
for the greater good, especially when the threat to safety was perceived to be high, 
for example threat of terrorism. A commonly observed emotional response to a 
perceived threat is an effort to reduce the distress by increasing levels of security, 
such as that provided by surveillance (David & Silver, 2004). Support for 
surveillance under the threat of terrorism has been demonstrated in existing 
literature (Cohrs et al., 2005; Davis & Silver, 2004; Levi & Wall, 2004; Malhotra 
& Popp, 2012). In regard to terrorism, concerns about the unjustified targeted 
surveillance of specific groups (Muslims) were raised and although for some this 
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was deemed unacceptable, for others it was considered justified for protection and 
reduction in threat. Research has previously suggested that – beginning with the 
September 11 attack – an increasing negative social perception of Islam is a 
response to the perceived realistic and symbolic threats caused by terrorism in the 
Western world (for example Ciftci, 2012; Croucher, 2013; Hitlan, Carrillo, 
Aikman, Zárate, 2007).  
 
Governmental trust seemed to be closely linked to the threat perceptions of 
terrorism, often being associated with more positive views on surveillance. This has 
been demonstrated in research showing that in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the 
level of trust citizens had in the Government increased to heights not seen since the 
1960’s (Chanley, 2002; Cook & Gronke, 2005; Westin, 2003) along with the public 
approval of new government surveillance powers (Harris Interactive & Westin, 
2001). Davis and Silver (2004) concluded that individuals who felt a greater sense 
of threat from terrorism were more willing to support surveillance and to trade off 
civil liberties in exchange for security, with one’s trust in the government 
interacting with this effect. It has been found that political trust positively relates to 
support for policies targeting terrorism (Denemark, 2012). Furthermore, it is 
imperative to further distinguish trust – so as to better understand it – which is 
influenced by its other subthemes, which are people’s evaluations on the 
transparency of surveillance measures and the perceived efficacy of the government 
implementing such measures. When the government was perceived to be effective 
with their use of surveillance, people seemed to be more trusting of them. This is 
reflected in ‘Performance theory’ stating that trust in the Government is nourished 
by increased government performance (Yang & Holzer, 2006). Moreover, lack of 
transparency in regard to surveillance measures was often provided as a reason for 
the lack of trust in the Government. It has been shown that operational transparency 
increases people’s trust in the Government (Buell et al., 2016). These views were 
often accentuated by the example of Snowden and his revelations regarding 
extensive global surveillance programs. Additionally, often in the context of online 
surveillance – linked to its unknown extent and lack of transparency – mistrust was 
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expressed. On the contrary, in relation to offline surveillance, trust was conveyed 
perhaps due to the ‘known’ nature of offline surveillance (e.g., CCTV). 
 
The relationship between civil liberties and security are often expressed as a trade-
off, whereby any gain in security via implementation of surveillance measures 
results in a proportional loss of citizen’s privacy (Friedewald et al., 2015; Lewis, 
2005; Pavone, & Esposti, 2012) and trust impacts upon the balance between privacy 
and security (Pavone & Esposti, 2012). In this study, trust in the agent of 
surveillance seemed to be an important element in surveillance evaluations, when 
trust was present between the surveilled and surveiller, surveillance appeared to be 
more acceptable and less intrusive. This is in line with findings showing the 
acceptance of surveillance increases when the surveiller and surveilled share the 
same group membership (O’Donnell et al., 2010). Furthermore, shared social 
identity between leaders and followers can form a foundation for influence (Reicher 
et al., 2005, Turner, 2005, Turner and Haslam, 2001, Turner et al., 2008) which can 
help governments increase acceptance of their policies and practices including 
surveillance measures. Additionally, the role of trust in accepting privacy invading 
measures has been demonstrated previously (van den Broek, Ooms, Friedewald, 
van Lieshout, & Rung, 2017; Vermeersch & Pauw, 2018).  
 
People generally believed that surveillance was for the protection of the public, 
perhaps founded upon an assumption of a paternalistic state having the best interest 
of its citizens at heart, suggesting trust in the state. Offline government surveillance 
was often considered to be beneficial even if it lacked efficacy.  These positive 
perceptions of offline government surveillance may have been influenced by 
positive media representations of CCTV (Armstrong, 1999; McCahill, 2002, 
McCahill & Norris, 2002; Hempel & Töpfer, 2009; Kroener, 2013). 
 
However, concerns were expressed regarding the misuse of surveillance in the form 
of mass surveillance by the Government which participants often felt should be 
more targeted. Focusing on the masses instead of specific individuals – according 
to our participants – could lead to ineffective surveillance, the attacks in Paris being 
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cited as an example. This suggests that terrorist events can have a paradoxical effect 
on perceptions of surveillance. Some draw upon such attacks to justify existing 
surveillance, while others use the same terrorist event to support arguments that 
surveillance is effective at preventing terrorism and should not be supported. 
 
Most concerns about surveillance were expressed in the context of online corporate 
mass surveillance, especially about targeted advertising and spam emails. It was 
often considered to be unnecessary, irritating and an invasion of privacy. This 
sentiment is in line with previous research (Paine et al., 2007; Stewart & Segars, 
2002). In spite of that, some accepted it due to its benefits, such as free service and 
tailored product marketing. This corresponds with the assertions that privacy is 
traded in exchange for services, products or deals, meaning that people often give 
their personal data to certain companies in exchange for something in return 
(Haggerty & Ericson, 2000). 
 
Privacy infringement was also often raised as a concern about surveillance, which 
has been demonstrated previously (David Lyon, 2003; Lyon, 1994; Mitchener-
Nissen, 2014; Murakami Wood & Webster, 2009). However, people often felt 
happy to sacrifice privacy for protection provided by surveillance. The relationship 
between civil liberties and security are often expressed as a trade-off, whereby any 
gain in security via implementation of surveillance measures results in a 
proportional loss of citizen’s privacy (Friedewald et al., 2015; Lewis, 2005; Pavone, 
& Esposti, 2012). 
 
It is imperative to emphasise that the majority of the interviews (17 out of 20) were 
conducted almost immediately after a terrorist attack. Therefore, this could have 
influenced their responses due to terrorism being at the forefront of attention. 
Participants raised concerns regarding the unjustified targeted surveillance of 
Muslims – racial profiling – and while some were opposed to such practices, some 
also seemed to be in support of it as they thought it was understandable, given the 
circumstances. The agenda-setting theory from the field of sociology and media 
studies provides an explanation for this phenomenon, according to which, the media 
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influences the public agenda by giving more exposure to certain topics (McCombs 
& Reynolds, 2002), with the public then tending to feel these topics are more 
important.  
 
It is also important to highlight that participants were recruited from the 
researcher’s circle of friends and acquaintances, so it was easier to build rapport in 
interviews if compared to a group of strangers, allowing for a more open, honest 
and forthright discussion in this complex, often sensitive topic.  
 
A limitation of this study is that during the interview, sometimes participants only 
offered short answers without further elaboration, even after being prompted. Due 
to the questions being quite specialised and specific many people had not given 
much prior thought to the answers they were required to provide. People had to 
process the questions and formulate answers in interview conditions which may 
have hampered their ability to speak freely and fluently about the issue at hand. 
 
Furthermore, a qualitative approach does not seek to survey attitudes and beliefs in 
a comprehensive manner that could be called generalisable or representative of a 
population. It is therefore imperative to realise that the study does not provide, nor 
did it seek to provide, insight into the prevalence of the beliefs that we identified 
within the wider population of the UK. Additionally, we must accept, as is the 
nature of thematic analysis, that the interpretation presented here is a unique 
product of the specific researcher, and as such represents one possible lens to make 
sense of the data, the value of which should be judged based on the degree to which 
the analysis appears to be coherent and insightful (Elliott, Fischer, & Rennie, 1999). 
 
This study provided an in-depth overview of British young adults’ views on 
surveillance and future studies should focus on each aspect individually in relation 
to surveillance. This study is unique in a sense that the topic of surveillance was not 
limited to a certain type of it but instead both government and corporate, online and 
offline, and mass and targeted surveillance practices were discussed. Based on the 
thorough answers and implications provided by the study, future quantitative 
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research should be conducted to further elaborate on people’s views on the 
aforementioned topics on an individual basis.  
 
In summary, views on surveillance are multi-faceted and complex with 
interweaving elements which weigh on each other and affect views, opinions and 
justifications. These discussions revolve around culturally important topics that 
have disseminated throughout the lives of British young adults. These topics come 
together within discussions around surveillance and help shape the perceptions of 









3.6 Supplemental Material 
 
Semi-structured interview guide: 
 
What comes to your mind when you hear the word surveillance? 
Have you read anything about surveillance? 
Who do you think is doing the surveilling? 
Do you think surveillance is a good or a bad thing? 
Thinking specifically about online surveillance, do you think that this can be a 
good or necessary thing? 
Are there any disadvantages of online surveillance? 
What do you think about CCTV in public settings? 
Why do you think CCTV is used? 
What do you think about the idea that surveillance might be targeted at some 
groups in societies more than others? 
Do you think it is OK for this to happen? 
What groups or kinds of people do you think might be targeted? 
What comes to your mind when you think about privacy? 
What areas of life do you think privacy is relevant to? 
How important is privacy to you? 
Have you been the victim of what you felt was improper invasion of privacy? 
Is privacy an important issue for you in the online context? 
Do you have any concerns about privacy when using the Internet? If yes, what are 
they? 
Do you take any action to protect your privacy while you are using the Internet? 
Who do you allow to view your Facebook profile? 
Do you include a picture of yourself/email address/phone/home 
address/age/information about your interests on your profile/information about 
your personality on your profile? 
How often do you edit the privacy settings on your profile? 
Do you ever worry about what someone could learn about you from your 
Facebook profile? 
What do you think about targeted advertising based on your browsing history? 
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Do you have any concerns about online shopping sites collecting and storing 
personal information about you? 
Do you trust that online companies keep your best interest in mind when dealing 
with your personal information? 
Or do you think it is risky to give personal information to online companies? 
Do you think online companies misuse personal information? 
 
 
Table 3.2 Example of coding and theming. 
Data extract (example) Codes Themes 
Suzie: Thinking specifically 
about online surveillance, do 
you think that this can be a 
good or necessary thing?  
Catherine (20): Definitely, I 
think, because this is how 
people communicate 
nowadays. Primarily, 
obviously after face-to-face 
communication or like 
telephones, that is one of the 
main forms of communication 
and with things like terror plots 
and horrible things that can go 
on the internet, sort of abuse 
and things like that, I think 
that’s good that there is 
surveillance. People do know 
about what goes on. I think 
that’s good.   
Suzie: Do you think it has any 
disadvantages? 
Catherine (20): Yeah, I think, I 
haven’t really thought enough 
into it really, but I think there 
are definitely disadvantages. 
The government kind of 
knowing too much about you. I 
think there are definitely 
disadvantages, it does affect 
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you’re not doing anything 
wrong to be watched that 
closely that’s a bit strange. I 
can see why they do it to people 
who have sort of like criminal 
past or have done something 
wrong or they are being 
suspected of plotting 
something like terrorism and 
part of groups like ISIS, they 
need to be stopped. So yeah it’s 
good that they do that, but I 
think it’s bad that people just 
generally get watched. And I 
think it’s bad that you don’t 
actually know the extent to 
which you are personally being 
watched, I think there should 
be more about that. Because it 
is very secretive, I think that’s 
probably the disadvantage of it. 
Suzie: So what would you do 
about that? You said that it’s 
bad that people don’t know the 
extent to which they are being 
surveilled. 
Catherine (20): I don’t really 
know if I was in that position, I 
would inform them, but I think 
I wouldn’t in some cases 
because it needs to be secret. I 
think it’s weird how it is quite 
a taboo subject and we don’t 
really know how much just 
normal people are being 
watched. So I don’t really 
know. 
surveillance infringes 
on privacy  
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Previous research on the influence of personality dispositions has focused on 
predicting privacy attitudes, concerns for information privacy, privacy concerns 
using location-based services, concerns regarding online information transmission 
security, information security management, health information disclosure online, 
personal information disclosure on Facebook as well as information control on 
Facebook. However, there is a gap in the literature investigating whether 
personality factors relate to or predict individuals’ concerns about their personal 
information on Facebook. The present study was intended to address this gap and 
was also aimed at discovering whether individuals’ trust has an association with 
their concerns about personal information privacy on Facebook (N = 246). The 
results showed that individuals’ Facebook privacy concerns tend to be influenced 
by their differing personality traits. For example, agreeable and conscientious 
individuals, as well as those who are open to new experiences, tend to display more 
concerns about the privacy of their information on Facebook as opposed to 
individuals who have the tendency to be open in sharing information about 
themselves. While people’s general propensity to trust positively related to privacy 
concerns, their trust in Facebook related negatively to such concerns. This study 
also demonstrated that neuroticism is a positive predictor, whilst self-esteem and 
attitude towards openness are negative predictors of Facebook privacy concerns. 
The results of this study extend the literature on information privacy concerns by 
showing that certain personality dimensions and trust should be considered when 






4.2.1 Facebook and privacy  
Social network sites (SNS) attract millions of users worldwide, many of whom use 
these sites on a daily basis. There are multiple SNS supporting a wide demographic. 
The majority of these sites help maintain pre-existing social networks although a 
minority allows strangers to connect based on their common interests or activities. 
SNS can either appeal to a diverse audience, or a more specific one, perhaps based 
on race, sexuality, language or nationality. SNS can also incorporate 
communication tools such as blogging or photo sharing and often vary in the extent 
to which these tools are incorporated on to the sites (boyd & Ellison, 2007).  
 
Facebook, founded by Mark Zuckerberg in 2004, is the largest and most popular 
SNS in the world with over 2.38 billion active users per month (Zephoria, 2019). It 
allows its members to create an online profile and connect with people around the 
world. Facebook users can share posts, photos, videos and links with their friends, 
they can view each other’s profiles and also comment on each other’s Facebook 
profiles. It is also possible for the users to join online groups based on common 
interests (Ellison et al., 2007). 
 
With the growing popularity of online social networks, the amount of personal 
information available on websites is continuously increasing. Privacy settings on 
Facebook allow its users to control the sharing of information on their profile, who 
can search for them and how, as well as the information people are able to see. Even 
though Facebook provides a privacy policy for its members, the vast majority of 
users have not read this policy (Acquisti & Gross, 2006). Prior research on social 
networking sites (SNS) found a paradoxical relationship between privacy concerns 
and actual privacy settings. For instance, Barnes (2006) suggested that adults in the 
USA are concerned about the invasion of their privacy and their personal data being 
collected and stored by the Government and associated companies. Meanwhile 
teenagers freely disclose personal and private information in order to join online 
SNS and write online blogs. Another empirical example for the privacy paradox is 
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a study which assessed privacy concerns and behaviours of 468 American students 
by Campbell et al. (2001). They concluded that while the students are aware of 
Internet privacy and even concerned about it, they still tend to participate in risky 
activities online, such as sharing personal information.  
 
Previous research conducting analyses of Facebook user profiles revealed that a lot 
of personal information is disclosed on public profiles. For example, an analysis of 
more than 4000 students’ Facebook profiles indicated that only a small fraction of 
had changed any of the default privacy settings (Gross & Acquisti, 2005). 
Moreover, based on the review of all members of an American university class 
Lewis et al. (2008) concluded that merely one third was set to private. Govani  and 
Pashley (2005) investigated student knowledge of online privacy issues and privacy 
protection options available on Facebook. They found that most of the students 
were aware that they are able to limit the amount of information provided to other 
Facebook users, however most of them did not take any steps to protect their 
information. Even though students claimed stalking and identity theft to be their 
main privacy concerns, they still provided personally identifiable information (e.g., 
phone number, home address). The study also demonstrated that even after the users 
had been told about the possible consequences of sharing identifiable personal 
information, only minimal changes had been made to their Facebook profiles. 
Students were comfortable sharing their personal information because they claimed 
they did not have anything to hide and did not mind if their information could be 
seen by others. The authors concluded that only in the case of an unfortunate 
incident, for instance stalking or identity theft, Facebook users would become more 
selective with sharing their personal information (Govani & Pashley, 2005). 
 
In a study by Jones and Soltren (2005), 74 percent of the participants were familiar 
with the privacy options provided by Facebook, nevertheless only 62 percent used 
them. The results indicated that those who actively decided not to use the privacy 
options on Facebook believed that sharing personal information and allowing other 
users to see it is beneficial for them. The findings of a study by Tufekci (2008) 
showed that online privacy concerns were not of much relevance to students 
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regarding their decision to disclose information. Facebook users’ understanding of 
privacy issues, the perceived benefits and observed risks of online social 
networking was investigated by Debatin and colleagues (2009) using mixed 
methods. They found results consistent with the aforementioned studies; even 
though Facebook users were familiar with the privacy settings on Facebook, they 
still uploaded a large amount of personal information. The results also indicated 
that until people have been a victim of an invasion of privacy they tend to view the 
risks regarding their privacy in terms of a third-person effect, according to which 
the risk to others’ privacy is perceived to be larger than the perceived risk to one’s 
own privacy. The results showed that the perceived benefits and the gratification of 
using Facebook tended to override the risks of sharing personal data and the threats 
to privacy. Ellison et al. (2007) argued that the greatest benefit of using Facebook 
is possibly the social capital ensuing from the creation and maintenance of 
interpersonal relationships, and as such the sharing of personal information could 
be perceived by users as an integral aspect of social networks, rather than as a 
problem. 
 
4.2.2 Personality and SNS use 
According to the Five-Factor Model, personality is divided into a series of five 
dimensional traits; neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, 
agreeableness and conscientiousness (Costa & McCrae, 1992). The first trait, 
neuroticism refers to the tendency to experience psychological distress. Neurotic 
individuals tend to be anxious, tense, unstable, worrying and self-pitying. The 
second dimension, extraversion, represents the individual’s tendency to be 
assertive, sociable, talkative and enthusiastic, as well as the capability to experience 
positive emotions. Openness to experience reflects a tendency to be intellectually 
curious, imaginative, artistic and behaviourally flexible. Individuals who are high 
on the trait agreeableness are trusting, appreciative, sympathetic, generous and 
cooperative. Finally, the fifth trait, conscientiousness represents the extent to which 




The association between these five personality traits and online behaviour has been 
studied extensively. Emotionally unstable, anxious, neurotic individuals prefer to 
use means of communications which do not require face-to-face contact, such as 
online communication or mobile phone text messaging (Butt & Phillips, 2008). 
Research has shown that neurotic people tend to use the internet to substitute real-
world social interactions as well as to avoid feelings of loneliness (Amichai-
Hamburger & Ben-Artzi, 2003; Butt & Phillips, 2008). A positive association was 
found between neuroticism and the quantity of time spent on Facebook (Ryan & 
Xenos, 2011). Another study showed that neurotic students in Zurich tend to use 
SNS for longer periods of time and with a higher frequency (Wehrli, 2008). It has 
been argued that neurotic individuals tend to use Facebook for social reasons 
(Hughes, Rowe, Batey, & Lee, 2012). Furthermore, in a study conducted amongst 
Chinese university students Wang, Jackson, Zhang and Su (2012) found that 
neuroticism was positively associated with status updates on a Chinese SNS called 
Renren. Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
 
H1: There will be a positive relationship between neuroticism and different 
Facebook use measures (i.e. daily frequency and duration of Facebook use, 
Facebook intensity). 
 
Contrary to neurotic individuals, extraverted people do not use the internet as a 
replacement for real-world social interactions, but rather as an extension of them 
(Amiel & Sargent, 2004; Ross et al., 2009). According to the Social Enhancement 
hypothesis – also called ‘Rich Get Richer’ hypothesis – those individuals who are 
highly sociable and have well-developed offline social networks try to enhance it 
by creating extensive online social networks, therefore the internet confers the 
greatest benefits to individuals who are extraverted (Kraut et al., 2002; P. Sheldon, 
2008; Zywica & Danowski, 2008). Extraversion has been shown to be related to 
greater Facebook use (Seidman, 2013; Wilson, Fornasier, & White, 2010). 
Extraverts were also found to make more comments and status updates on SNS 




H2: There will be a positive relationship between extraversion and different 
Facebook use measures. 
 
There is little existing research on the association between conscientiousness and 
Facebook use. Conscientiousness has been shown to be negatively related to mobile 
use – writing and receiving messages (Butt & Phillips, 2008). Conscientiousness 
has been found to be correlated negatively with time spent on Facebook (Ryan & 
Xenos, 2011; Wilson et al., 2010) and with the social use of Twitter (Hughes et al., 
2012). Furthermore, a study demonstrated that students scoring high on the trait 
consciousness visited StudiVZ (a German SNS) less frequently and for shorter 
periods of time (Wehrli, 2008). These findings can be explained by individuals 
scoring high on conscientiousness displaying more responsibility and dutifulness 
in their tasks and henceforth avoiding sources of distraction and procrastination 
such as computer-mediated communication tools. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
H3: There will be a negative correlation between conscientiousness and 
different Facebook use measures.  
 
Previous studies have shown that social anxiety tends to be one of the factors which 
influence people’s concern about privacy. Socially anxious individuals tend to be 
cautious and reticent with respect to the information they share (Liu, Ang, & Lwin, 
2013) and they are less prone to disclose personal information about themselves 
online (Marcus, Machilek, & Schütz, 2006). This is thought to be because people 
with social anxiety fear being negatively evaluated by others on the information 
they reveal about themselves (Kashdan, 2002) and this fear of negative evaluation 
is associated with the tendency to protect their privacy (Chen, Chen, Lo, & Yang, 
2008). Neuroticism has been found to be associated with social anxiety (Norton, 
Cox, Hewitt, & McLeod, 1997). Emotional instability – which refers to neuroticism 
– has been shown to positively impact on Internet users’ information transmission 
security concerns (Bansal, 2011). Furthermore, individuals high on the trait of 
neuroticism have a high tendency to control the information they share (Ross et al., 
2009). Liu et al. (2013) found consistent results according to which social anxiety 
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increased concerns about privacy. Sumner, Byers and Shearing (2011) showed that 
neurotic people are more likely to be concerned about privacy issues. 
 
H4: There will be a positive correlation between neuroticism and Facebook 
information privacy concerns on Facebook.  
 
H5: Neuroticism will be a positive predictor of Facebook information privacy 
concerns. 
 
Introverted individuals – who are low on the trait extraversion – tend to display 
increased concern in regard to the privacy of their personal information and prefer 
to exert more control over it (Stone, 1986). In a study by Chen and Marcus (2012) 
it was shown that individuals who were low on extraversion were less prone to 
disclose information online. Egelman and Peer (2015) found that extraversion 
negatively predicted the control (control over personal information) dimension of 
people’s information privacy concerns, although it only had a low predictive ability. 
Furthermore, a negative association was found between extraversion and concern 
about privacy issues (Sumner et al., 2011). Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
H6: There will be a negative correlation between extraversion and Facebook 
information privacy concerns. 
 
Conscientious people tend to have a heightened awareness of those around them, 
extending to the actions that these individuals may undertake (Costa & McCrae, 
1992). This concern for the actions of other people increases their attentiveness to 
the possible negative consequences of misuse of their personal data (Junglas, 
Johnson, & Spitzmüller, 2008). The increased concern about their privacy is due to 
their foresightedness, which may allow them to accurately foresee the 
consequences of any possible privacy breach. A positive association was found 
between conscientiousness and people’s security concerns (Bansal, 2011). In a 
study investigating the predictors of privacy and security attitudes, Egelman and 
Peer (2015) found that conscientiousness predicted internet users’ information 
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privacy concerns, especially awareness of privacy practices and concerns about 
data collection. As Junglas and colleagues (2008) have demonstrated, individuals 
high on the trait conscientiousness tend to have higher concerns for privacy in the 
context of location-based services. Furthermore, conscientiousness was positively 
correlated with privacy concerns amongst Facebook users (Stieger, Burger, Bohn, 
& Voracek, 2013) and attitude towards the technical and organizational activities 
of information security (Uffen, Guhr, & Breitner, 2012). Therefore, we predict that:  
 
H7: There will be a positive correlation between conscientiousness and 
Facebook information privacy concerns. 
 
H8: Conscientiousness will be a significant positive predictor of Facebook 
information privacy concerns. 
 
Individuals high on the trait agreeableness are not only concerned for their own 
information privacy but also the information privacy of others, as they are not only 
trusted by others, but generally also exhibit a high degree of trust in others. An 
individual with high agreeableness would feel a similar level of unease with the 
possibility of the misuse of another’s information as they would feel with the 
misuse of their own. Korzaan and Boswell (2008) showed a significant positive 
influence of agreeableness on concerns for information privacy. Bansal, Zahedi and 
Gefen, (2010) investigated the influence of personality traits in sharing health 
information online and indicated that agreeableness positively affects privacy 
concerns mediated by health information sensitivity. Moreover, agreeableness 
positively predicted Internet users’ concerns about situations where their personal 
information might be misused (Egelman & Peer, 2015). However, Junglas et al., 
(2008) found inconsistent results according to which people high on the trait 
agreeableness tend to have lower concerns for privacy towards location-based 
services than those low on agreeableness. They suggested that is because highly 
agreeable individuals aim for consonance in their social relationships and are 
therefore more likely to place trust in their surroundings. Moreover, Sumner et al. 
(2011) also showed evidence for a negative relationship between agreeableness and 
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privacy concerns. Based on the inconsistent results emerged from previous 
research, we hypothesize that:  
 
H9: There will be a correlation between agreeableness and Facebook 
information privacy concerns. 
 
H10: Agreeableness will be a significant predictor of Facebook information 
privacy concerns.   
 
The personality trait openness to experience represents people’s tendency to 
experience novel situations as well as to try new things and it has been also found 
to influence individuals’ privacy concerns. Junglas et al. (2008) reported that open 
individuals had higher levels of concerns for privacy towards location-based 
services than their non-open counterparts. This is due to the fact that open 
individuals tend to have a wide variety of life experiences and thus have acquired a 
broader and more profound sense of awareness in comparison to others. Due to 
their higher levels of awareness they tend to display an increased sensitivity to 
threats. Furthermore, Egelman and Peer (2015) demonstrated openness to 
experience to be the strongest predictor of information privacy concerns of Internet 
users throughout all the Big 5 personality traits. 
 
H11: There will be a positive correlation between openness to experience and 
Facebook information privacy concerns. 
 
We intended to explore the relationship between people’s attitude towards being 
open in sharing personal information with others in their social circles and their 
privacy concerns. A study by Acquisti and Gross (2006) found a discrepancy 
between Facebook users’ privacy concerns and their actual personal information 
disclosure; although participants were concerned about their information privacy, 
they still provided personal information – a phenomenon referred to as the privacy 
paradox. They demonstrated that even though participants were slightly concerned 
with the accessibility of their personal information and its possible misuse, there 
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was no such concern for the information itself due to the control of that information 
lying with the participants. They also stated that the participants knew that the basis 
of social networks was the sharing of information.  
 
H12: There will be a correlation between attitude towards openness and 
Facebook information privacy concerns. 
 
H13: Attitude towards openness will be a significant predictor of Facebook 
information privacy concerns. 
 
Self-esteem is defined as one’s overall feeling of self-worth; the extent to which 
one values oneself (Rosenberg, 1965). The role of self-esteem in Facebook use has 
been studied extensively, however the amount of research investigating self-esteem 
in relation to privacy concerns is limited. Christofides, Muise and Desmarais (2009) 
investigated whether certain personality factors may have an impact on people’s 
information disclosure and control on Facebook. They found that self-esteem 
positively predicted information control and individuals with higher self-esteem 
were more likely to use privacy settings on Facebook.  
 
H14: There will be a positive correlation between self-esteem and Facebook 
information privacy concerns. 
 
H15: Self-esteem will be a significant positive predictor of Facebook 
information privacy concerns. 
 
4.2.3 Trust and SNS use 
Acquisti and Gross (2006) provided a few different explanations for the dichotomy 
between people’s privacy concerns and information sharing behaviour (privacy 
paradox) and they believed that participants’ trust was one of them. They found that 
people generally trusted Facebook itself and what is more, they trusted other 
Facebook members more than members of other SNS. In an online survey by 
Dwyer et al. (2007) peoples’ perceptions of trust and privacy concerns of Facebook 
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and MySpace were compared. They demonstrated that even though Facebook and 
MySpace users displayed comparable levels of concern about internet privacy, 
members of Facebook held higher levels of trust in Facebook and its users and were 
more likely to share personal information. Metzger (2004) also found consistent 
results, according to which trust predicted online information disclosure to a 
commercial website amongst university students. Moreover, they also found that 
trust was positively predicted by the perceived privacy protection of the website 
and negatively predicted by online privacy concerns. In a study by Krasnova, 
Spiekermann, Koroleva and Hildebrand (2010) the results showed that people’s 
trust in the online social network provider reduced their perception of privacy risks 
regarding information disclosure.  
 
The effect of trust on self-disclosure has been explained by the social exchange 
theory (Roloff, 1981), according to which social interactions are formed based on 
a cost-benefit analysis. People are likely to enter into an exchange relationship if 
the benefits are perceived to outweigh the costs. It is believed that trust is essential 
to this process because it would lead to a reduced perception of costs. While the 
majority of studies investigated trust and self-disclosure in terms of interpersonal 
relationships, similar dynamics exist online (Culnan & Armstrong, 1999). These 
dynamics consist of weighing the benefits of sharing personal information online 
against the risks of providing said information and therefore trust is an essential 
component in the decision to disclose information both interpersonally and online. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
 
H16: There will be a negative correlation between propensity to trust and 
Facebook information privacy concerns. 
 
H17: There will be a negative correlation between trust in Facebook and 
information privacy concerns on Facebook. 
 
H18: Trust in Facebook will be a significant negative predictor of information 
privacy concerns on Facebook. 
107 
 
4.2.4 The present study 
The present study intended to investigate whether certain factors (Big 5 personality 
traits, self-esteem, attitudes towards openness in sharing information, propensity to 
trust, trust in Facebook) have an association with or predict information privacy 
concerns on Facebook. The influence of personality dispositions has been explored 
in terms of predicting privacy attitudes (Egelman & Peer, 2015) concerns for 
information privacy (Korzaan, & Boswell, 2008), privacy concerns using location-
based services (Junglas et al., 2008), concerns regarding online information 
transmission security (Bansal, 2011), information security management (Uffen et 
al., 2012), health information disclosure online (Bansal et al., 2010), personal 
information disclosure on Facebook (Chen & Marcus, 2012; Liu et al., 2013) as 
well as information control on Facebook (Christofides et al., 2009). Sumner et al. 
(2011) investigated the association between the Big Five personality traits and level 
of concern about privacy with measuring Facebook activity, however they 
measured privacy concern with a single item which was not Facebook specific. 
Thus, there appears to be a gap in the literature investigating whether personality 
factors relate to or predict individuals’ concerns about their personal information 
on Facebook. Therefore, we intended to address this gap by conducting an online 
attitude survey including a large and diverse sample. We also aimed to discover 
whether individuals’ general inclination to trust and their trust in Facebook as 
an organization has an association with their concerns about personal information 





Participants (N = 246) were recruited through the researcher’s acquaintances by 
snowball sampling as well as from a paid online crowdsourcing service named 
CrowdFlower. The sample consisted of 135 males (55%) and 111 females (45%) 
ranging in age from 18 to 65 (M = 28.88; SD = 7.93). The sample was diverse in 
terms of ethnicity with White/Caucasian representing the largest proportion of the 
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sample (n = 193, 79%). The most frequently occurring nationalities were British (n 
= 52, 21%), Hungarian (n = 41, 17%) and Serbian (n = 16, 7%). In terms of 
education, the most commonly held qualification was an undergraduate degree (n 
= 103, 42%), followed by a postgraduate degree (n = 96, 39%). This study was 
given ethical approval by the College Ethics Committee. 
 
4.3.2 Stimuli and materials 
The study was an online attitude survey constructed using Qualtrics Survey 
Software (https://www.qualtrics.com). All data were held securely and 
confidentially on the researchers’ computers. The online attitude survey contained 
eleven sections which are described below. Scale reliability was analysed by 
calculating the Cronbach alpha coefficient, representing the internal consistency for 
sets of items.   
 
Informed consent 
It described the study, the purpose of the study and informed participants of the 
approximate expected participation time. The participants were also informed that 
they could withdraw from the study at any time. 
 
Demographics 
This section contained questions about the participants’ age, gender, ethnicity, 
nationality and their highest qualification attained. 
 
General Facebook use 
In this section participants were asked 6 questions about their Facebook use, 
friendship and profile, such as ‘How often do you browse your Facebook page per 
day?’. They were also asked 9 questions regarding their privacy settings on 
Facebook, such as ‘Who can see your email address on your Facebook profile?’.  
 
Facebook intensity 
This 6-item questionnaire was designed by Ellison et al. (2007) to assess one’s 
emotional connectedness to Facebook and the extent to which it is integrated to 
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one’s everyday activities. Items were scored from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly 
Agree (5). A sample item from the scale is ‘Facebook is part of my everyday life’. 
Higher scores in this questionnaire indicate a more intense use of Facebook. The 
Cronbach’s alpha obtained was .875. 
 
Propensity to trust  
These 11 questions measured the degree to which one is inclined to trust other 
people using a 6-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Inaccurate (1) to Strongly 
Accurate (6). The questions were taken from the Propensity to Trust Survey (PTS) 
designed by Evans and Revelle (2008). A sample item from the scale is ‘I can get 
along with most people’. Higher scores suggest higher propensity to trust others. 
The Cronbach’s alpha obtained was .741. 
 
Trust in Facebook 
These 6 questions were taken from a questionnaire used by Shu and Chuang (2011) 
measuring SNS perceptions, people’s trust in websites more specifically. For the 
purpose of the present study, items were changed to assess people’s trust in 
Facebook instead of general websites, for example ‘I trust Facebook in general’. 
Responses were made on a 7-point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to 
Strongly Agree (7). Higher scores show higher levels of trust in Facebook. The 
Cronbach’s alpha obtained was .935. 
Information privacy concerns on Facebook 
The ‘Information privacy concerns on Facebook’ questionnaire contained 11 
questions originally designed by Malhotra, Kim, & Agarwal (2004) – Internet 
Users’ Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC) scale – but items were modified 
regarding specifically to Facebook, such as ‘I’m concerned that Facebook is 
collecting too much personal information about me’. Items were scored on a 7-
point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (7). Higher scores 
in this questionnaire show higher levels of information privacy concerns on 






This section included the Mini International Personality Item Pool (Mini-IPIP) 
which is a 20-item measure of the Big Five personality dimensions (Donnellan et 
al., 2006); extraversion (α = .727), agreeableness (α = .759), conscientiousness (α 
= .603), neuroticism (α = .605) and openness to experience (α = .773). Due to 
conscientiousness and neuroticism scores having questionable reliability, any 
relationship between these and other variables should be interpreted with caution. 
Responses were made on a 5-point Likert scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to 
Strongly Agree (5). Higher scores indicate higher degrees of a certain trait. 
 
Sense of self-esteem 
Subjective perceptions of self-esteem were measured using the 10-item Rosenberg 
Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). Answers to the items were on a 4-point 
Likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (4). A sample 
item from the scale is ‘On the whole, I am satisfied with myself’. Higher scores 
demonstrate higher self-esteem. The Cronbach’s alpha obtained was .859. 
 
Attitude towards openness 
In this section the degree to which one is open in sharing information with others 
in their social circles on Facebook was measured using a 10-item questionnaire 
originally developed by Mckinney, Kelly and Duran (2012). Items were scored on 
a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5). 
Higher scores in the questionnaire imply higher levels of openness in sharing 
information with others in one’s social circles. A sample item from the scale is ‘I 
don’t hide much about myself with a wide circle of friends’. The Cronbach’s alpha 
obtained was .807. 
 
Debriefing form 
After completing the questionnaires, participants were debriefed fully as to the 





4.3.3 Design and statistical analysis 
Correlational and regression statistics were computed using IBM SPSS Statistics 
21 Software. In the Pearson’s correlational design, the variables included were daily 
duration of Facebook use, daily frequency of Facebook use, Facebook intensity, 
propensity to trust, trust in Facebook, information privacy concerns on Facebook, 
the Big Five personality traits, self-esteem and attitude towards being open. 
 
A multiple regression analysis was conducted with information privacy concerns 
on Facebook as the dependent variable (outcome variables). Items entered as 
predictor variables included: Facebook intensity, propensity to trust, trust in 
Facebook, the Big Five personality traits, self-esteem and attitude towards being 
open.  
 
The expectation maximization algorithm was used to account for missing data 




4.4.1 General Facebook use 
Although not associated with any hypotheses, participants were also surveyed in 
regard to their Facebook use habits for exploratory purposes and in order to better 
understand the Facebook behaviours of our participants. As Table 4.1 shows, most 
of the participants (n = 89, 36%) use Facebook for less than an hour on a daily basis. 
Only 8% of the participants (n = 20) reported to use Facebook for more than four 








Table 4.1 Daily duration of Facebook use. 
 Number of participants 
(N = 243) 
Percent of sample  
(%) 
< 1 hour 89 36.2 
1-2 hours 77 31.7 
2-3 hours 45 18.5 
3-4 hours 13 5.3 
> 4 hours 20 7.7 
Note. N=243 due to three missing cases.  
 
The responses provided to the question ‘How often do you browse your Facebook 
page per day’ are included in Table 4.2. The majority of participants (n = 98, 
39.8%) frequent their Facebook page 0-5 times in a day. As the frequency of 
Facebook visits increases, the number of participants decreases, although 19.7% of 
the participants (n = 48) reported going onto their Facebook pages more than 15 
times per day. 
 
Table 4.2 Daily frequency of Facebook use. 
 Number of participants 
(N = 244) 
Percent of sample  
(%) 
0-5     times 98 39.8 
6-10   times 66 27 
11-15 times 32 13.1 
>15    times 48 19.7 
Note. N = 244 due to two missing cases. 
 
Table 4.3 includes the correlations of three personality traits and Facebook use 
measures. As table 4.3 shows, the daily frequency of Facebook use was found to be 
correlated positively with extraversion (r (246) = .163, p = .005) and negatively 
with conscientiousness r (246) = -.133, p = .036), but not with neuroticism. 
Furthermore, the daily duration of Facebook use correlated positively with 
neuroticism (r (246) = -.124, p = .027) and with extraversion (r (246) = .110, p = 
.043). On the other hand, it correlated negatively with conscientiousness (r (246) = 
-.134, p = .019). Facebook intensity showed a significant positive correlation with 
extraversion, r (246) = .233, p < .001. However, it was not significantly correlated 




Table 4.3 Pearson’s correlations between different personality traits and Facebook use measures.  
 
Daily Frequency  
of Facebook Use 
Daily Duration  
of Facebook Use 
Facebook 
Intensity 
Conscientiousness -.133 * -.134 *    -.006  
Neuroticism .068  .124 *     .090  
Extraversion .163 * .110 *     .233 ** 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
 
4.4.2 Privacy settings 
Participants were categorised into four different ‘privacy settings groups’ based on 
the responses they gave for the nine questions relating to their privacy settings used 
on Facebook. As figure 4.1 shows the majority of the participants (n = 141, 57%) 
chose to share most of their information (photos, email address, date of birth etc.) 
with their Facebook friends. 62 people (25%) were categorised into the ‘I don’t 
include it on my profile’ group suggesting that their Facebook profile did not 
contain a lot of personal information. Furthermore, 28 participants (11%) decided 
to share their information provided on Facebook with the public and the rest of the 
participants (n = 18, 7%) used the ‘only me’ privacy settings function suggesting 
that their personal information on Facebook is available only for them. These 
results clearly show that the vast majority of participants limit in some way the 















4.4.3 Information privacy concerns on Facebook  
Regarding the Big Five personality dimensions, agreeableness (r (246) = .213, p < 
.001), conscientiousness (r (246) = .206, p = .001) and openness to experience (r 
(246) = .117, p = .033) were found to be positively correlated with information 
privacy concerns on Facebook. However, none of the other personality traits were 
found to be significant. Self-esteem (r (246) = -.193, p = .003) and attitude towards 
openness (r (246) = -.341, p < .001) were found to be negatively correlated with 
information privacy concerns on Facebook. In terms of trust, interestingly 
propensity to trust (r (246) = .149, p = .010) positively correlated with information 
privacy concerns on Facebook, whilst a significant negative correlation was found 
between trust in Facebook (r (246) = -.105, p = .050) and information privacy 
concerns on Facebook (see Table 4.4).  
 
Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics for the personality and trust variables and Pearson’s coefficients for 
their correlations with information privacy concerns on Facebook. 
 M SD 
Pearson’s r for Information privacy 
concerns on Facebook 
Extraversion I 11.99 3.11 -.030  
Agreeableness I 14.60 2.83 .213 ** 
Conscientiousness I 13.04 2.63 .206 ** 
Neuroticism I 11.69 2.72 .051  
Openness to experience I 14.59 2.93 .117 * 
Self-esteem I 21.65 4.88 -.193 ** 
Propensity to trust II 42.08 6.9 .149 * 
Attitude towards openness II 26.13 5.74 -.341 *** 
Trust in Facebook I 21.20 8.19 -.105 * 
Note. I One-tailed, II Two-tailed *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Multiple regression analysis was employed to explore what factors predict one’s 
information privacy concerns on Facebook (the criterion variable). Using the enter 
method it was found that the overall model was significant (F (9, 236) = 7.204, p < 
.001, R2 = .216, R2Adjusted = .186). Thus, self-esteem, propensity to trust, trust in 
Facebook, attitude towards openness and the Big Five personality traits explained 
18.5% of variance in peoples’ information privacy concerns on Facebook. Within 
the model, it was found that neuroticism (standardised ß = .149, t = 2, p = .046) 
significantly predicted higher levels of information privacy concerns on Facebook. 
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Self-esteem (ß = -.184, t = -2.6, p = .010) and attitude towards openness (ß = -.321, 
t = -4.82, p < .001) were significant predictors of lower levels of information 
privacy concerns on Facebook. The rest of the predictors were found to be non-
significant. The unstandardised and standardised coefficients for information 
privacy concerns on Facebook as the outcome variable and different predictor 
variables are included in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5 Multiple regression analyses on Information privacy concerns on Facebook with all 
predictors. Both standardised (ß) and unstandardised (B) coefficients are reported. 
Predictors ß        t B Std. Error 
Openness to experience    -.029 -.453     -.096 .212 
Conscientiousness     .092 1.438      .337 .234 
Extraversion    -.004 -.058     -.012 .208 
Agreeableness     .112 1.569     .382 .243 
Neuroticism       .149* 2.007     .526 .262 
Self-esteem     -.184* -2.599    -.363 .140 
Attitude towards openness     -.321* -4.838    -.537 .111 
Propensity to trust    .120 1.54    .166 .108 
Trust in Facebook   -.053 -.852   -.062 .072 





The present study investigated the extent to which certain personality traits 
(neuroticism, extraversion, conscientiousness, agreeableness, openness to 
experience, attitude towards openness and self-esteem) and trust (general 
propensity to trust and trust in Facebook) were associated with information privacy 
concerns on Facebook. We were also interested in whether and how these factors 
predict peoples’ concerns about the privacy of their information.  
 
First, we intended to explore how much time our participants generally spend on 
Facebook. As the results showed, the majority of participants (67%) use Facebook 
for less than two hours a day, which is in line with findings from previous research 
(Child & Starcher, 2016; Stieger et al., 2013). Also 67% of them browse their 
Facebook page less than ten times per day.  
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We had three hypotheses regarding personality traits and their relation to people’s 
Facebook use. The findings indicated that neuroticism and extraversion positively, 
and conscientiousness negatively, related to different Facebook use measures, 
supporting H1, H2 and H3. Different Facebook use measures included daily 
frequency and daily duration of Facebook use as well as the intensity of one’s 
Facebook use. According to our results, neurotic individuals tend to spend more 
time on Facebook (H1), which is consistent with previous findings which reported 
that neuroticism was positively linked to internet and SNS use in order for neurotic 
people to avoid feelings of loneliness (Amichai-Hamburger & Ben-Artzi, 2003; 
Butt & Phillips, 2008; Hughes et al., 2012).  
 
The results also showed that extraverted people spent more time on Facebook, and 
logged in to Facebook more frequently, as well as being more intense Facebook 
users (H2), which is in line with previous research (Seidman, 2013; Wilson et al., 
2010) and supports the ‘rich get richer’ or Social Enhancement Hypothesis about 
people with good social skills and established offline friendship networks making 
good use of social networks like Facebook to further extend and maintain their 
social networks (unlike neurotic people, who tend to be heavy internet and social 
media users to substitute or compensate for diminished offline social interactions).  
 
As previous studies have demonstrated (Ryan & Xenos, 2011; Wilson et al., 2010), 
we also found that conscientious individuals tend to spend less time on Facebook 
(H3). Due to conscientious people being organized, responsible and dutiful in their 
daily tasks, they have the tendency to avoid sources of distractions and thus refrain 
more from the use of social media. 
 
Our next fifteen hypotheses were related to personality dimensions and privacy 
concerns on Facebook. Seven of our hypotheses were supported, six of them were 
not and for two hypotheses we found significant results but in the opposite direction 
to what was expected. The results showed that the vast majority of participants 
tended to control their privacy settings on Facebook, most of them used the ‘friends 
only’ option and only a minority of them had a public profile. This supports the 
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notion of Facebook as a largely ‘nonymous’ social network in which users are 
known to their Facebook friends and in which interaction with complete strangers 
is less common than on some rival social networks.  
 
The results did not show support for H4 regarding the positive relationship between 
neuroticism and privacy concerns on Facebook. Previous research has shown that 
people with social anxiety – which has been found to be associated with neuroticism 
(Norton, Cox, Hewitt, & McLeod, 1997) – have increased privacy concerns (Liu et 
al., 2013), although the authors also posited that even though socially anxious 
people tend to use SNS more and to be more concerned about their privacy, they 
are also very careful and reserved with regard to the content they disclose. Although 
support was shown for H5, where, interestingly, neuroticism was found to be a 
significant positive predictor of information privacy concerns on Facebook. It is 
unusual for a bivariate Pearson correlation to be non-significant but that same 
independent variable be a significant predictor of the dependent variable in a 
multiple regression, as is the case here. This can be due, for example, to issues 
around shared variance, and this finding requires further investigation before any 
firm conclusions can be made about the relationship between neuroticism and 
Facebook privacy concerns.  
 
Contrary to H6, we did not find a significant association between extraversion and 
privacy concerns on Facebook. H6 was based on previous studies that demonstrated 
that introverted people tend to disclose less personal information on SNS (Chen & 
Marcus, 2012) and they need more privacy (Stone, 1986). However, Junglas et al. 
(2008) also failed to find support for their hypothesis according to which 
extraversion would be negatively associated with concerns for privacy in the 
context of location-based services.   
 
Our findings indicated that conscientiousness is positively related to privacy 
concerns on Facebook (H7). The role of conscientiousness in regard to privacy 
concerns has been demonstrated in the literature; conscientious individuals are 
more likely to have higher concerns for privacy in the context of location-based 
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services (Junglas et al., 2008), to have higher concerns for security (Bansal, 2011) 
and to quit Facebook because of their heightened concerns about privacy (Stieger 
et al., 2013). However, information privacy concerns on Facebook were not found 
to be predicted by conscientiousness, therefore H8 was not supported. We believe 
this result might be explained by the negative correlation between 
conscientiousness and Facebook use also found in this study. Conscientious people 
tend not to use Facebook very often and thus they might not be too concerned about 
their personal information being on it.  
 
We found both agreeableness and openness to experience to be positively 
associated with privacy concerns on Facebook (H9 & H11). These findings are 
consistent with research showing the positive effect of agreeableness on concerns 
for information privacy (Korzaan & Boswell, 2016) and for health information 
sensitivity (Bansal et al., 2010), as well as research showing openness to experience 
is related to higher levels of concern for privacy around location-based services 
(Junglas et al., 2008). There is also previous work showing that agreeableness 
predicts general online privacy concerns (Egelman & Peer, 2015). This is due to 
the fact that open individuals tend to have a wide variety of life experiences and 
thus have acquired a broader and more profound sense of awareness in comparison 
to others. Due to their higher levels of awareness they tend to display an increased 
sensitivity to threats. However, agreeableness was not shown to be a significant 
predictor of overall privacy concerns (H10) in our study.  
 
Attitude towards openness was found not only to be negatively related to (H12) but 
also to be a negative predictor of privacy concerns on Facebook (H13). These 
results suggest that individuals who are open in sharing personal information tend 
to be less concerned about the privacy of their information. This finding is 
consistent with previous research which showed that privacy concerns reduced 





Contrary to our hypotheses (H14 & H15) whereby we predicted self-esteem to be 
positively correlated with and positively predict Facebook privacy concerns, we 
found the opposite results; a significant negative correlation and a negative 
prediction. These results suggest that not only lower self-esteem is related to but 
also predicts privacy concerns on Facebook. At first, we were puzzled by the 
unexpected results, however an alternative interpretation offers a feasible 
explanation. People with low self-esteem have relatively low liking for themselves 
and they also tend to be more anxious and shyer than those with higher self-esteem 
(Leary & MacDonald, 2003). Self-esteem has been also shown to be one of the 
lower order indicators of neuroticism (Eysenck, 1990; Watson, 2000). Judge, Erez, 
Bono and Thoresen (2002) suggested that self-esteem and neuroticism (together 
with locus of control and self-efficacy) might possibly be indicators of the same 
higher order construct. As described earlier, the results of the present study showed 
a prediction between privacy concerns and neuroticism which are in line with the 
results related to self-esteem and privacy concerns. Due to their proneness to feel 
socially anxious and their fear of being negatively evaluated, they tend to be 
cautious about self-disclosing and thus they also tend to have increased privacy 
concerns. Furthermore, Forest & Wood (2012) showed that individuals with low 
self-esteem view Facebook as a safe, appealing platform that offers the opportunity 
to disclose oneself. This ability of self-disclosure, while still being isolated, results 
in people with low self-esteem spending more time being active on Facebook, as 
opposed to their counterparts with a higher level of self-esteem. Therefore, after 
considering the existing research evidence we believe that the negative relationship 
between self-esteem and privacy concerns is understandable.  
 
Predictions about different aspects of trust and their relationship to Facebook 
privacy concerns were made (H16-H18). Contrary to our hypothesis (H16), instead 
of a negative correlation, we found a positive correlation between propensity to 
trust and information privacy concerns on Facebook. This suggests that individuals 
who are likely to trust others tend to be more concerned about their information 
privacy on Facebook. The results can be explained by the possible difference 
between trust as a personality trait and trust in social networks. While one’s 
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propensity to trust leads to a generalised expectation about the trustworthiness of 
others, one’s trust in Facebook refers to the amount of trust one puts in Facebook, 
the company, and therefore they are unrelated. Another plausible explanation for 
this positive relationship is that in the Big Five personality framework propensity 
to trust is considered to be a facet of the Agreeableness dimension. Similarly to 
propensity to trust, the present study found agreeableness to be positively related to 
and predict privacy concerns on Facebook.  
 
H17 predicted that people’s trust in Facebook will be negatively correlated with 
their information privacy concerns on Facebook, which was supported. This means 
that with increasing levels of trust in Facebook comes decreasing privacy concerns 
on Facebook. However, trust in Facebook was not found to be a negative predictor 
of privacy concerns (H18). Our predictions regarding trust and privacy concerns 
were based on the results of Dwyer et al. (2007), according to which people trusted 
Facebook more than MySpace and were therefore more likely to share personal 
information on Facebook. We believed that with higher trust, resulting in higher 
likelihood of personal information disclosure, people would have less concerns 
about their privacy, as previous studies have shown (Joinson et al., 2010; Liu et al., 
2013). 
 
The present study revealed some new insights on different personality dimensions 
and information privacy concerns, such as how certain traits are associated with, 
and predict, privacy concerns. The present study is unique because it attempted to 
discover how the Big 5 personality traits, self-esteem, attitude towards openness 
and trust relate to online information privacy concerns on Facebook. Previous 
research has explored the role of personality traits relating to one’s attitude towards 
information security (Uffen et al., 2012), information privacy concerns (Korzaan, 
& Boswell, 2008) in case of location-based services (Junglas et al., 2008), online 
health information disclosure (Bansal et al., 2010) and in predicting privacy 
attitudes (Egelman & Peer, 2015). The influence of personality dispositions on 
Facebook were studied in regard to personal information disclosure (Chen & 
Marcus, 2012; Liu et al., 2013) together with information control (Christofides et 
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al., 2009). In our understanding, no previous studies attempted to reveal the 
relationship between one’s personality and their information privacy concerns on 
Facebook, or how one’s trust as a personality dimension or in the company relates 
to those concerns.   
 
One of the strengths of the present study is that it utilised a fairly diverse sample. 
The participants of the study represented a diverse range of nationalities (British, 
Hungarian, Serbian, etc.). There were similar numbers of male and female 
participants, therefore gender could not be an influencing factor in terms of 
Facebook use and privacy concerns in our study. It is argued that women are more 
active on Facebook (Feng & Xie, 2014; Sheldon, Abad, & Hinsch, 2011), are more 
likely to be concerned about privacy (Acquisti & Gross; Fogel & Nehmad, 2009) 
and compared to men are more prone to have private profiles (Lewis et al., 2008). 
Another strength is that this study included a wide age range of participants (18-
65). However, the sample mainly consisted of people who held an undergraduate 
or postgraduate qualification, raising the possibility that the sample may be better 
qualified than a fully representative sample of all Facebook users. 
 
One limitation of this study, as is the case with a great deal of previous research on 
SNS (Abell & Brewer, 2014; Bergman, Fearrington, Davenport, & Bergman, 2011; 
Ellison et al., 2007; Gonzales & Hancock, 2011; Mehdizadeh, 2010), is that it relied 
on self-reports captured via a survey, which requires reliance on the participants’ 
understanding, memory and honesty. Furthermore, the present study relied on 
correlational design, therefore it is unable to make inferences regarding the causal 
direction of the predicted relationships. As is often the case with correlational 
designs, there could be other variables which were not considered in this study that 
may influence the relationship. Further – including experimental studies – are 
needed to clarify the relationship between the variables which were measured in the 
present study. 
 
The influence cultural memory may have had upon the study should also be 
considered, due to the range of countries and cultures the participants originated 
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from. Cultural memory is a type of collective memory that moves beyond the 
individual and is shared by a group of people (Dessí, 2008). It is specific to these 
groups of people, is formed by past cultural experiences and informs upon an 
individual's identity, beliefs and actions. In the context of this study, participants 
hailed from at least 10 different countries, so it should be acknowledged that the 
divergent cultural memories the participants hold may have influenced their 
answers to the survey questions. As an example, the cultural memory of participants 
from post-communist countries (Hungary, Serbia, Poland etc.) may have an 
influence on their attitudes towards privacy, just as it does towards surveillance 
(Svenonius & Björklund, 2018). 
 
Furthermore, the replication crisis that was unfolding around the time this study 
was conducted revealed the importance of power analysis in designing and 
conducting empirical experiments. As a result, we performed a post-hoc power 
analysis on our data which suggested that a larger sample size should have been 
used in order to show a medium effect (α = 0.001, β = 0.05, r = 0.3, N = 257). This 
happened after the Facebook data breach in 2018 (Wong, 2018), which presumably 
affected people’s privacy concerns, thus supplemental data collection was not 
deemed to be appropriate. Although samples of an equivalent size to the one used 
in the present study were typical in social psychology and it has been suggested that 
low-power studies are common (Button et al., 2013; Szucs & Ioannidis, 2017), we 
believe the lack of a priori power analysis somewhat limits the reliability of the 
study. 
 
In conclusion, the present research investigated whether certain factors (Big 5 
personality traits, self-esteem, attitudes towards openness in sharing information, 
propensity to trust, trust in Facebook) have an association with and/or predict 
privacy concerns regarding Facebook. The results of this study extend the literature 
on information privacy concerns by showing that certain personality dimensions 
and trust should be considered when exploring individuals’ information privacy 
concerns online and on Facebook. As was discovered in the present research, 
individuals’ Facebook privacy concerns tend to be influenced by their differing 
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personality traits. Agreeable, open and conscientious individuals (as measured by 
the Big Five) tend to display higher privacy concerns and individuals who have the 
tendency to be open in sharing information about themselves are less likely to be 
concerned about their information privacy on Facebook. Furthermore, people with 
low self-esteem and those who put lower levels of trust in Facebook tend to have 
higher concerns about the privacy of their personal information on Facebook. This 
study also demonstrated that neuroticism, general attitude towards being open to 
share personal information and self-esteem are significant predictors of information 




5. British National Identity and Perceptions of 
Government Surveillance  
 
5.1 Abstract 
Many have suggested that surveillance has been normalised in the UK and has 
transformed the country into a surveillance society. Public views on government 
surveillance have been hugely diverse and mostly affected by modern socio-
political events, such as recent terrorist events and the 2013 Snowden revelations. 
The role of social identity in surveillance acceptance has been explored previously, 
however no previous research took identity approaches a step further and 
investigated the effect of national identity. As national identity serves a national 
security function – a reason by which surveillance is often framed and justified by 
governments – we believe the investigation of its effect on different surveillance 
perceptions is timely. The present study (N = 214) measured the effect of British 
national identity on different perceptions of government surveillance (need, benefit 
and concern) using a national identity priming manipulation and measured the 
relationship between them. Even though the priming manipulation had no effect, 
significant positive associations were found between British national identity and 
perceived need and perceived benefits of government surveillance. Furthermore, 
the study also showed that people with stronger feelings of British national identity 
tended to be less concerned about surveillance imposed by the Government. This 
study presents evidence that the various surveillance perceptions that ultimately 
impact upon one’s positive or negative attitudes towards government surveillance 






5.2.1 Surveillance in the UK 
The abundance and normalisation of global surveillance make it intrinsic to modern 
society and it has therefore been argued that we live in a surveillance society (Aas, 
Gundhus, & Lomell, 2008; Lyon 1994; 2001; 2007; Monahan, 2006). A 
surveillance society structures and organises itself using surveillance as a means to 
electronically gather data on the populace, which organisations or the Government 
can analyse and use to manipulate the individual or society as a whole. The 
decisions which are made based on the collected data are pervasive and may affect 
criminal justice, access to benefits, health/well-being, products and services or 
movements in private and public arenas (Murakami Wood & Ball, 2006). Examples 
of increased levels of surveillance within a surveillance society may include 
extensive use of video cameras to potentially identify faces and number plates, 
analysis and sale of data related to spending habits to banks, insurance providers or 
advertisers and the monitoring of telephones, emails and internet usage by 
intelligence services. Additionally, work performance and productivity may be 
more closely monitored, and attitude and lifestyle choices may be put under 
increased scrutiny by employers (Murakami Wood & Ball, 2006). 
 
It has been argued that the UK has normalised surveillance to a higher degree than 
elsewhere, and so is often considered to be a model to aspire to by security 
professionals. Due to this the threat of the UK being a bad example to other 
European countries is tangible (Murakami Wood & Webster, 2009). The UK is one 
of the most surveilled countries in the world; according to a report from the British 
Security Industry Authority there are approximately 4 – 5.9 million CCTV cameras 
in the country (BBC News, 2015), which is equivalent to one camera for every 
fourteen people, with a person being captured on about 300 cameras each day 
(McCahill & Norris, 2003; Murakami Wood & Ball, 2006). The proliferation of 
CCTV systems stretches back to the late eighties in town and city centres as well 
as in public service and residential settings (Gill, 2003; Norris & Armstrong 1999, 
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Webster, 2002) with approximately £500 million of public money invested by the 
British Government (Norris, 2006). Most often these systems have been introduced 
to combat criminality, as a deterrence and detector of crime/antisocial behaviour, 
in addition to functioning as a device to reduce the fear of crime and terrorism 
(Armitage, 2002; Murakami Wood & Ball, 2006; Webster, 2009). 
 
Surveillance systems have generally been popular, and they have enjoyed 
widespread support amongst the public, politicians and policymakers resulting in 
the installation of ever more cameras. Their popularity in conjunction with their 
perceived effectiveness is further reinforced by increased financial assistance and 
political rhetoric from governmental institutions, principally the Home Office 
(Murakami Wood & Webster, 2009; Webster, 2009). 
 
Even though public support has been demonstrated in numerous studies (Brown, 
1995; Ditton, 1998; Dixon, Levine, & McAuley, 2004; Honess & Charman, 1992) 
it has been argued that such support was based on the fact that the public believed 
in the effectiveness of the systems in reducing crime (Webster, 2009). In fact, it has 
been suggested that the swift proliferation of CCTV has been so rapid due to its 
perception as a ‘silver bullet’ for crime prevention (Bannister et al., 1998). 
However, their effectiveness has been called into question by research and it has 
been demonstrated that the efficacy of CCTV cameras has been exaggerated in 
systematic reviews of CCTV evaluations (Armitage, 2002; Ditton & Short, 1999; 
Gill & Turbin; Welsh & Farrington, 2003). A study funded by the Home Office 
assessed 13 CCTV systems and found only two of them to have a statistically 
significant effect on crime reduction and the authors explained one of those 
reductions with other confounding factors (Gill & Spriggs, 2005). Furthermore, 
Groombridge (2008) argues that the lack of thorough, consistent evidence for the 
efficacy of CCTV suggests that they are not a cost-effective tool for crime 
prevention. 
 
Another explanation for the public’s enthusiasm was also offered by Murakami 
Wood and Webster (2009), who suggested that the reasons for implementing 
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surveillance, in this case CCTV, are more related to what they represent rather than 
what they do. They argued that CCTV cameras are an overt display of the 
Government’s concern regarding security and crime and they demonstrate the 
Government’s willingness to ‘do something’. In a society where fear predominates, 
and we are encircled by numerous potential dangers, this ‘security theatre’ 
(Murakami Wood & Coaffee, 2006), or ‘stage-set security’ (Schneier, 2008) 
provides the populace with symbols of safety. David Lyon (2001) argued that 
surveillance is as much about care as about control, and while the presence of 
CCTV means that you are being watched, for some it also means that you are being 
watched out for. Furthermore, it has also been suggested that CCTV is now part of 
Britain’s current zeitgeist, a permanent artefact of the cultural landscape; an 
example being their frequent portrayal in TV shows (Groombridge, 2002). 
 
All in all, regardless of whether surveillance systems are in fact effective or not, the 
perceived effectiveness and benefits of such systems ultimately lead to more 
accepting attitudes towards them (Murakami Wood & Webster, 2009; Sanquist, 
Mahy, & Morris, 2008; Webster, 2009). 
 
5.2.2 Perceptions of government surveillance  
As described above, public views on CCTV have previously been examined, 
however research exploring people’s broader attitudes and thoughts concerning 
surveillance is still an under-researched area, especially when it comes to 
perceptions of government surveillance in the UK.  
 
However, the 2013 Edward Snowden revelations about the extraordinary scope of 
mass surveillance by the NSA and GCHQ prompted researchers to conduct studies 
and public opinion polls to explore people’s views on the leaks, privacy, mass 
surveillance and national security. The Digital Citizenship and Surveillance Society 
Project (DCSS) concluded that the issue of state surveillance was important to 
British people, through the analysis of in-depth focus groups and opinion polls in 




Based on the analysis of public opinion polls – mainly conducted by YouGov – it 
was shown that there was more support for increased surveillance at the cost of 
privacy amongst those who were aged 60 and above. All other age demographics 
showed greater concern regarding surveillance’s impingement upon privacy and 
voiced concern over the Government’s surveillance of digital communications. 
Furthermore, the analysis of focus group interviews highlighted the concern 
regarding online data collection by various entities, tied in with a lack of 
understanding or capability in preventing it. The focus group results therefore imply 
that governmental surveillance is undertaken by reason of public resignation, rather 
than by approval or indifference (Bakir et al., 2015) . The Surveillance, Privacy and 
Security (SurPRISE) project also explored public views on privacy and surveillance 
and a part of it focused on public concern in the UK (Strauss, 2015). They 
demonstrated that the majority of British participants were concerned about privacy 
yet believed that the Government should use surveillance technologies and that they 
improve national security.  
 
On the other hand, more recent public opinion polls conducted by YouGov in 2016 
as a response to Theresa May’s proposal to provide Britain’s police and intelligence 
services with additional surveillance powers showed that approximately half of 
those polled approved of the Government’s decision to provide the security services 
with increased powers (YouGov, 2016).  British views seem unchanged; the results 
of public opinion polls between January 2015 and February 2019 suggest that the 
majority of Britons surveyed believe that additional help should be provided to the 
security services to fight terrorism, regardless of the cost to people’s privacy and 
civil rights (de Waal, 2019). 
 
Studies conducted in the USA also presented a varied picture. A survey consisting 
of mostly US participants showed that the overall acceptance of online government 
surveillance was at an intermediate level and negative attitudes were significantly 
greater than positive attitudes (Bayerl & Akhgar, 2015). Moreover, survey 
respondents were particularly concerned regarding threats to freedom of speech and 
online surveillance resulting in a subsequent loss of trust in the Government. Claims 
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the Government frequently use, that surveilling online behaviour safeguards the 
internet and ensures the safety of society, found minimal agreement from 
participants. However, they also showed a significant positive correlation between 
the perceived benefits of surveillance and acceptance of government surveillance. 
 
Moreover, a study conducted in the USA investigated the relationships between 
views of government surveillance and Internet privacy concerns and showed that 
those who believed the Government needs increased online surveillance powers to 
ensure security and the safety of online transactions were less likely to have privacy 
concerns. They also found that concerns vis-à-vis privacy were positively 
correlated with concerns of government intrusion and negatively correlated with 
perceived need for surveillance (Dinev et al., 2008). 
 
Another US based study, utilising two experiments embedded in a nationally 
representative survey, assessed the degree to which perceptions of online 
government surveillance are influenced by politically associated conflicts (Best & 
Krueger, 2008). Those who hold a poor opinion of the President are more likely to 
perceive government surveillance and are more likely to view monitoring 
techniques as being comparatively more invasive.  
 
Furthermore, Budak, Anić and Rajh (2013) carried out a study in Croatia exploring 
people’s attitudes towards privacy and government surveillance. They discovered 
that Croatian citizens who demonstrated the most concern about the manipulation 
of personal data tended to be more cautious regarding the efficacy of and need for 
government surveillance.  
 
5.2.3 The role of shared identity  
The social identity approach comprises social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979, 1986) and self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987). One’s social 
identity stems from a person’s identification with a social group (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979, 1986) and while SIT explores how the group aspect of identity can impact 
intergroup relations, SCT is broader in scope, and depicts the circumstances and 
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consequences of an individual perceiving collections of people as groups (Turner 
et al., 1987). Within the scope of social identity theory, those identifying themselves 
as part of a group are more likely to look to other groups’ members as a model for 
thinking and behaving. For example, previous research has shown that when 
participants are anchored to the concept of group membership, they were more 
liable to be persuaded by an in-group, as opposed to an out-group member 
(McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson, & Turner, 1994). Other studies have shown that 
attempts at influencing a person are more effective when coming from an in-group 
member rather than an out-group member (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & 
Turner, 1990; Mcgarty, Turner, Hogg, David, & Wetherell, 1992). 
 
In the context of surveillance perceptions, it has been suggested that the social 
identity approach offers a lens through which to understand the potential impact 
that the surveillance source has upon surveillance acceptance (Alder, 2001; Oz, 
Glass, & Behling, 1999). O’Donnell et al. (2010) investigated the role of social 
identity in surveillance acceptance and demonstrated that sharing group identity 
with those who introduce the surveillance has an effect on the acceptance of the 
surveillance. They argued that one’s perception of surveillance’s infringement upon 
privacy is dependent on the perceived social relationship with the source of the 
surveillance; when group identity is shared with the perpetrator of surveillance it is 
deemed more acceptable. The explanation for this is that shared identity allows 
surveillance to be perceived as a benefit to the in-group (i.e. safety).  
 
Moreover, we believe our previous study (Chapter 3) exploring young British 
adults’ views on surveillance supported the social identity approach in explaining 
government surveillance perceptions – and their trust in them – to an extent. In said 
qualitative study, we observed that individuals having positive views of the British 
Government and thus shared group identity also had more supportive views towards 
surveillance and vice versa. In Study 1 we suggested that trust and perceived 
legitimacy of authority also contribute to explanations of surveillance acceptance, 
but the present research solely focuses on feelings of British national identity. We 
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believe that shared national identity with the source of surveillance affects 
perceptions of surveillance. 
 
A person’s national identity reflects one’s sense of belonging to a nation as a 
cohesive whole and is embodied by its distinctive language, symbols, customs and 
traditions (Smith, 1991). Theoretical literature suggests that there is a difference 
between ethnic and civil forms of national identity (Cederman, 2001; Lijphart, 
1977; Scharpf, 1999). Civic national identity puts the emphasis on a civic culture, 
a historical territory with a legal political community, while ethnic national identity 
emphasises the community of descent and birth (Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 
2010). There exists no mutual exclusivity or clear borders between ethnic or civil 
national identity. Although varying levels of ethnic and civil national identities may 
exist between countries, a country’s collective national identity cannot be 
characterized by only ethnic or civic national identities (Berg & Hjerm, 2010). 
 
While some theories argued that ethnic homogeneity (ethnic version of national 
identity) is essential in order for societies and institutions to be legitimate and 
functional, which has been supported by research (Citrin, Green, Muste, & Wong, 
1997; Sears & Citrin, 1985), others have argued the opposing position. The 
importance of civic national identity in binding together societies with the 
honouring of mutually beneficial agreements has been highlighted and supported 
by research that found that some states possess a strong sense of community not 
based on an ethnic national identity (Føllesdal, 2001; 2002). 
 
Since the enlightenment, Britain has adopted a longstanding liberal tradition based 
on secularism, individualism and a free market economy, and with this in mind it 
has been argued that contemporary British national identity emphasizes civic rather 
than ethnic aspects (Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2010), although it should be 
noted that there are competing conceptualisations of the nation, with, for example, 
extreme right wing political entities typically preferring a more ethnic kind of 




Even though the association between national identity and governmental trust is a 
relatively under-researched area, a cross-national European survey study (ESSII) 
demonstrated that civic national identity positively correlates with trust in political 
institutions (Berg & Hjerm, 2010). Extrapolating from these findings, we assume 
that – as current mainstream constructions of Britishness tend to emphasise civic 
national identity – strong British national identity is linked to political trust, which 
is essential in the context of government surveillance. 
 
Furthermore, another reason why we believe that British national identity positively 
associates with perceptions of government surveillance is because research has 
previously posited that surveillance is often framed and communicated to the public 
in terms of national identity for reasons of national security. For example, a study 
was conducted examining www.lifeandliberty.gov, a US Government website 
created to educate the public on the USA PATRIOT Act and found that rhetorical 
strategies utilising authority, security, efficacy, responsibility, and efficiency were 
overused (Simone, 2009). Furthermore, the discourse analysis revealed that 
surveillance is positioned as if it is carried out ‘for the good of a government’s 
citizens’. The portrayal of the Government’s role as a paternalistic protector, 
framing citizens as innocent victims and terrorists as foreign threats, was deployed 
so as to link national identity to national security, a finding similar to previous 
studies (Iacovetta, 2000; McCormick, 1997). This links to a variety of theories 
around national identity, which emphasise how one of the important motivations it 
serves is a security function (see, for example, the review of relevant work in 
Druckman, 1994). Moreover, in the context of surveillance, security is often 
depicted as a collective, societal right, while privacy is viewed as an individual right 
(Solove, 2009).  
 
In our understanding, no previous research has yet attempted to explore the 
relationship between national identity and surveillance perceptions. Extrapolating 
from findings of studies on social identity and surveillance attitudes, we believe 
that the relationship between surveillance perceptions and shared national identity 
with the source of surveillance is worth exploring. Strong feelings of national 
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identity mean stronger identification with one’s nation, therefore the protection and 
safety of this group is of great importance.  
 
5.2.4 The present study 
Given the ubiquitous nature of surveillance in modern societies, especially in the 
United Kingdom, assessment of these technologies and how the public responds to 
them is timely. There is a lack of research investigating whether one’s national 
identity is associated with one’s attitudes towards surveillance. The present study 
aimed to fill this gap in the literature by exploring whether the national identity of 
British citizens affects and is related to different government surveillance 
perceptions.  
 
The studies and public opinion polls described above depicted a varied cross-
cultural picture of attitudes towards government surveillance. British citizens were 
supportive and accepting towards CCTV (Murakami Wood & Webster, 2009; 
Webster, 2009) but concerns were expressed after the 2013 Snowden revelations 
(Bakir et al., 2015; Ball, 2002). However, recent public support was discovered for 
the implementation of stricter surveillance measures by the Government in 
response to terrorist attacks (Bennett, 2016). This suggests that perceptions of  
government surveillance can vary across time and aspects of these perceptions are 
context dependent, however we suggest that national identity is likely to be 
associated with these perceptions, despite this contextual variation. This is in 
keeping with the idea that social identities such as national identity themselves vary 
in salience, and can be drawn upon in discourses and rhetoric by persuaders in an 
attempt to manipulate perceptions through leveraging the desire to conform to the 
norms of a social identity (see examples of this in relation to national identity in 
Billig’s work on banal nationalism and Reicher and Hopkins writing on national 
identity; Billig, 1995; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).  
 
In the present study instead of assessing whether people thought surveillance was a 
‘good’ or a ‘bad’ thing, we decided to measure three different facets of one’s 
perception of surveillance; need, benefit and concern. The role of social identity in 
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surveillance acceptance has been explored previously, and O’Donnell and 
colleagues (2010) suggest that sharing group identity with the source of 
surveillance positively influences acceptance. Based on the findings of our previous 
qualitative study (Chapter 3) we believe that sharing national identity with the 
source of surveillance will have an effect on different facets of surveillance 
perceptions, especially when national identity is primed. Social priming refers to 
the activation of knowledge constructions in response to exposure to a prior 
stimulus and evidence for priming effects has been found previously in the field of 
social psychology (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Warner, Kent, & Kiddoo, 2016; 
Wyer, & Srull, 1989). To test this idea, we decided to employ a national identity 
priming manipulation, whereby people’s feelings of Britishness are made salient. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
 
H1: Increased British national identity will have an effect on perceived need, 
perceived benefit and concerns about government surveillance.  
 
As mentioned previously, instead of measuring surveillance acceptance and 
rejection, we decide to assess three different perceptions that relate to acceptance 
or rejection. Previous studies have shown that when surveillance systems are 
perceived to be effective and beneficial (Bayerl & Akhgar, 2015; Budak et al., 
2013; Dinev et al., 2008; Murakami Wood & Webster, 2009; Sanquist et al., 2008; 
Webster, 2009) people are more likely to be have supportive attitudes towards 
surveillance. We believe that those who have stronger feelings of Britishness are 
more likely to perceive that there is a need for surveillance imposed by the British 
government as well as perceive such measures to be beneficial. Therefore, we 
hypothesised that: 
 
H2: There will be a positive correlation between British national identity and 
perceived need for government surveillance. 
 
H3: There will be a positive correlation between British national identity and 
perceived benefits of online surveillance.  
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It has also been demonstrated that concern about privacy, mainly stemming from a 
fear of loss of privacy and civil liberties, leads to negative attitudes towards 
surveillance. We believe that when people’s British national identification is lower, 
they are more likely to perceive surveillance by the British Government as an 
infringement on their privacy, and therefore more likely to be concerned about such 
measures. Thus, we hypothesised that: 
 
H4: There will be a negative relationship between British national identity 





In order to detect a small to medium effect size (f2 = .10), an a-priori power analysis 
(error probability α = .05, power = .95) was conducted using G*Power (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) determining that a sample of 191 participants 
would be needed for a MANOVA with four dependent variables (British national 
identity, perceived need for government surveillance, perceived benefits of 
government surveillance, concern about government surveillance).   
 
Participants (N = 214) were recruited through the researcher’s acquaintances by 
means of snowball sampling as well as from a pool of psychology students enrolled 
at Royal Holloway, University of London who received course credit for their 
participation. Due to the nature of the study the sample consisted of British 
participants only. 163 participants were female (76%) and 51 were male (24%) 
ranging in age from 18 to 66 (M = 22.10, SD = 7.93). In terms of education the most 
commonly held qualification was an undergraduate degree (n = 163, 76%), 
followed by a postgraduate degree (n = 46, 22%). This study was given ethical 




5.3.2 Measures  
The study took the form of an online attitude survey constructed using Qualtrics 
Survey Software (https://www.qualtrics.com). All data were held securely and 
confidentially on the researchers’ computers. The online attitude survey contained 
seven sections which are described below. Scale reliability was analysed by 
calculating the Cronbach alpha coefficient, representing the internal consistency for 
sets of items.   
 
Informed consent 
It described the study, the purpose of the study and informed participants of the 
approximate expected participation time. The participants were also informed that 
they could withdraw from the study at any time. 
 
Demographics 
This section contained questions about the participants’ nationality, age, gender and 
their highest qualification attained. 
 
British national identity 
British national identity was assessed using a 7-item questionnaire developed by 
Cinnirella and Hamilton (2007) and aimed at capturing the key elements of social 
identity as defined by social identity theory and self-categorisation theory, 
including importance, salience, self-stereotyping and affect. A sample item from 
the scale is ‘To what extent do you feel strong ties with other British people?’. Items 
were scored from Not at all (1) to Extremely (7). Higher scores on this scale 
indicated stronger identification with being British. The Cronbach’s alpha obtained 
was .872, indicating high internal reliability.  
 
Perceived need for government surveillance   
This section included 4 questions measuring belief that the Government needs to 
be able to monitor people’s personal activities to a greater extent (Dinev et al., 
2008). A sample question is ‘The Government needs to have greater access to 
personal information’. Responses were made on a 7-point Likert scale from 
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Strongly Agree (1) to Strongly Disagree (7) and the scores were recoded prior to 
analyses. Higher scores suggest increased perceived need for government 
surveillance. Cronbach’s alpha obtained was .873. 
 
Potential benefits of surveillance  
These 6 questions – originally designed by Bayerl and Akhgar (2015) – were 
changed to assess people’s attitudes toward the benefits of government 
surveillance, for example ‘Governmental monitoring of the web can prevent offline 
crimes’. Items were scored on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Agree 
(1) to Strongly Disagree (7) which were recoded before the analyses. Higher scores 
indicate stronger beliefs that online surveillance conducted by the Government is 
beneficial. The Cronbach’s alpha obtained was .870.  
 
Concerns about government surveillance   
Participants’ concerns about governmental monitoring of online activity was 
measured with 6 items scored from Strongly Agree (1) to Strongly Disagree (7) and 
the scores were recoded prior to analyses. The first three questions were developed 
by Dinev et al. (2008) and a sample item was ‘I’m concerned about the 
Government’s ability to monitor internet activities’. The last three questions were 
taken from a study by Bayerl and Akhgar (2015) and were modified to assess 
people’s concerns about online surveillance conducted by the Government, such as 
‘I am concerned that governmental online surveillance threatens our freedom of 
expression and speech’. Higher scores show higher levels of concerns regarding 
governmental online surveillance. The Cronbach’s alpha obtained was .880.  
 
Debriefing form 
After completing the questionnaires, participants were debriefed fully as to the 






Data collection for the study took approximately four months, between September 
2016 and January 2017. Participants first completed the demographics questions 
then they were randomly allocated into two conditions. Participants in the first 
condition received a British national identity prime where they were asked to think 
about reasons why the United Kingdom is unique in comparison to other countries 
and to list 5 of them. This manipulation procedure was applied in previous research 
where perceptions of collective continuity were manipulated by reading about 
different national values, attitudes and beliefs (Warner et al., 2016), and has been a 
well-used procedure in social identity research for making a national identity salient 
prior to an experiment or survey. Participants in the second condition received no 
prime, and instead were asked to think about reasons why the telephone was an 
important innovation and to list 5 of them, a task expected to be neutral in terms of 
national identity or affect. After national identity priming, the participants 
completed the rest of the questionnaire.  
 
5.3.4 Design and statistical analysis 
The study used an experimental and correlational design (essentially a survey 
experiment), and analyses were computed using IBM SPSS Statistics 21 Software. 
The independent variable was national identity priming with two levels: British 
identity primed versus not primed. The dependent variables were British national 
identity, need for government surveillance, benefits of government surveillance and 
concerns about government surveillance. Data were analysed using an independent 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). In Pearson's correlational design, 
the variables included were British national identity, need for government 
surveillance, benefits of government surveillance and concerns about government 
surveillance. The expectation maximization algorithm was used to account for 





Box’s Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices was not significant so the 
assumption of equality of covariance matrices has been met (F (10, 210146.904) = 
.869, p = .562). 
 
Descriptive statistics for the variables were the following: British national identity 
M = 31.03 (SD = 7.6), perceived need for government surveillance M = 12.24 (SD 
= 5.28), perceived benefit of government surveillance M = 29.66 (SD = 6.1) and 
concerns about government surveillance M = 26.85 (SD = 6.727).  
 
5.4.1 Multiple analysis of variance 
We tested whether British national identity priming caused an effect on 
participants’ attitudes towards the need for government surveillance, benefits of 
government surveillance, government intrusion concerns and threat of government 
surveillance. Multivariate analysis of variance revealed that British national 
identity priming did not significantly influence the composite dependent variable 
(F (4, 207) = .726, p = .575, partial η 2 = .014). In addition, there was no effect of 
prime on any of the dependent variables in the univariate analyses (p > .10). 
 
5.4.2 Correlations 
British national identity was found to be positively correlated with perceived need 
for government surveillance (r (214) = .248, p < .001), and benefits of government 
surveillance (r (214) = .191, p = .005). Furthermore, a significant negative 
correlation was found between British national identity and concern about 
government surveillance (r (214) = -.141, p = .039).  
  
5.5 Discussion  
The present study investigated the associations between British national identity 
and three different facets of attitudes toward surveillance imposed by the British 
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Government; perceived need for surveillance, perceived benefits of surveillance 
and concern about surveillance.   
 
We predicted that a national identity priming manipulation – whereby participants’ 
feelings of Britishness were made salient – will affect participants’ perceptions of 
surveillance (H1), although we did not find a significant priming effect, therefore 
our first hypothesis was not supported. The lack of significant priming effect may 
be explained by the recent denunciation of priming techniques because of the 
‘replication crisis’, where a large number of social psychological studies using 
priming techniques were not able to be replicated (Cesario, 2014; Klein, 2014; 
Shanks et al., 2015). The replication crisis has fundamentally changed the field of 
social psychology over the last few years (Świątkowski & Dompnier, 2017), but 
when this study was designed and conducted, priming techniques were still widely 
used. Revisions of the priming literature after the replication crisis now suggest that 
social psychological priming effects may be much less powerful than once thought, 
and potentially extremely short-lived (just a few seconds). In the case of our study, 
it is therefore possible that priming may have made national identity more salient, 
but for just a few fleeting seconds. Alternatively, it may be that the priming 
manipulation failed to influence British identity because this social identity is 
robust and well-developed within our participants, and because of this, resistant to 
being primed by relatively mundane tasks such as the one used in the manipulation, 
perhaps only fluctuating in response to more meaningful real-world events such as 
reporting of terror attacks, sporting or military events. 
 
Although our national identity priming manipulation showed no effect, all of our 
correlational hypotheses were supported. We predicted that British national identity 
is in a positive relationship with perceived need (H2) and perceived benefits (H3) 
of government surveillance and the results supported both our hypotheses. 
Therefore, we suggest that those participants who have stronger feelings and 
identification of Britishness are more likely to perceive governmental surveillance 
to be needed and to be beneficial. Although our study did not explore the causal 
direction of this relationship between British identity and support for surveillance, 
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the previous literature on social identity and attitudes towards surveillance allows 
us to suggest that it is from higher British national identity to more positive attitudes 
towards surveillance, and not in the other direction. As need and benefit of 
surveillance are both perceptions that are ultimately linked to supportive attitudes 
towards surveillance (Budak et al., 2013; Dinev et al., 2008; Murakami Wood & 
Webster, 2009; Sanquist et al., 2008; Webster, 2009), we propose that our findings 
are in line with those of O’Donnell and colleagues’ (2010) who showed that shared 
social identity with the source of surveillance increases its acceptance, and we have 
extended the literature by demonstrating that this works for national identity and 
surveillance attitudes in a UK context.  
 
Our fourth hypothesis (H4) was also supported, whereby a negative relationship 
between British national identity and concerns about government surveillance was 
found. Again, due to the correlational design this result can be interpreted in two 
ways when it comes to causality, however the interpretation that is most in keeping 
with previous research is one in which increasing British national identification 
reduces concern about government surveillance. This finding is in line with 
previous research which showed that when identity is not shared between surveilled 
and the source of surveillance, then it is more likely that the monitoring will be 
viewed as an infringement of privacy (O’Donnell et al., 2010).  
 
Overall, our findings revealed that British national identity has a significant role in 
explaining perceptions of government surveillance. When individuals strongly 
identify as British, they are more likely to feel that there is a need for surveillance 
and that such measures imposed by the Government are effective in protecting its 
citizens. On the other hand, lower national identification is related to the 
perceptions/feelings of concern regarding government surveillance. As outlined in 
the literature review to this chapter, it is likely that the link between British national 
identity and acceptance of government surveillance is linked to arguments that 
position surveillance as in the national interest and as linked to national security. 
These kinds of social constructions of government surveillance thus put pressure 
on those who see themselves as British to accept surveillance as a way of adhering 
142 
 
to group norms (as described in Self-Categorisation Theory’s notion of ‘self-
stereotyping’; see Turner, 1991) and demonstrating their ‘loyalty’ to the in-group. 
The construction of government surveillance as necessary for national security also 
plays on the function that national identity serves for protecting the individual 
(Bloom, 1990).  To our knowledge, no previous study has been designed to explore 
the relationship between national identity and surveillance perceptions, and by 
providing a unique perspective, the results of this study expand the literature on the 
understanding of public perceptions of surveillance. The current study presents 
evidence that the various surveillance perceptions that ultimately impact upon one’s 
positive or negative attitudes towards government surveillance are significantly 
related to British national identity. 
 
The present study suffers from a number of limitations, primarily the lack of 
consideration of other constructs that might have impacted upon perceptions of 
government surveillance. For example, even though correlational results supported 
our hypotheses, the relationships between British national identity and perceptions 
of surveillance imposed by the British Government might be mediated by one’s 
political orientation, certain personality dimensions, and trust in the current 
government. Future research could therefore seek a more nuanced appreciation and 
operationalisation of British national identity and trust in the Government. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that Right-Wing Authoritarianism had a 
contributing role in the Brexit vote (Kaufmann, 2016). It has been argued that RWA 
should be thought of in the context of order vs openness, as an emerging political 
divide by which those who prefer order are more likely to support Brexit. Therefore, 
we believe that the RWA personality variable would be worth exploring in the 
context of surveillance attitudes. Future studies should explore and measure the 
effects of political orientation, governmental trust and RWA on surveillance 
perceptions.  
 
Furthermore, it is possible that other variables affected our results, such as the 
recent terrorist attacks or political changes in the UK. Our study was conducted 
between September 2016 and January 2017. Prior to and during the data collection 
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phases of the study, three major terrorist attacks happened across Europe in 2016; 
the Brussels bombing in Belgium in March, the Nice truck attack in France in July 
and the Berlin Christmas market attack in Germany in December. Moreover, in 
October 2016 a college student left an unattended bag of explosives on the Jubilee 
Line in London which failed to go off but would have caused casualties. Even 
though his motivations were not fully known, he admitted to having an interest in 
Islam and posed next to an image of an Islamist extremist. The event received a lot 
of media attention and possibly caused fear and a perception of increased terrorism 
threat amongst Britons. It has been suggested that terrorist events increase national 
identification, for example after the attacks on September 11th led to a significant 
increase in expressions containing sentiments of national identification or unity in 
the US (Li & Brewer, 2008). 
 
Therefore, we believe that the recent terrorist attacks across Europe could have 
affected our participants by impacting perceptions of the threat of terrorism, 
national identification and ultimately their perceptions of government surveillance. 
Studies have also shown that in the case of national emergencies, people are more 
likely to trust the Government and are more willing to sacrifice their civil liberties 
for increased security by giving the Government additional surveillance powers 
(Gould, 2002; Westin, 2003). Furthermore, as a response to the recent attack in 
November 2016 the British Government started pushing for the implementation of 
stricter surveillance measures (Investigatory Powers Act) and so the topic of 
government surveillance was at the forefront of attention at the time the study was 
conducted, and the British media carried frequent stories about surveillance that 
used the previously mentioned discourses around national security.  
 
Moreover, in June 2016 the British Referendum on European Union membership 
was held, where the majority of Britons voted to leave the EU. The negotiations 
regarding the exact circumstances and dates are still ongoing but nevertheless this 
historic event has hugely impacted British national identity. We believe that Brexit 
had an influence on people’s perceptions of Britishness and national self-
evaluations. It is possible that Remain voters’ feelings of Britishness and national 
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identification have already been altered as a result of Brexit and what it means to 
be British is not so clear-cut anymore.  
 
Finally, from a methodological point of view, we would again note that the 
correlational design implemented does not allow inferences about the causal 
direction of effects, although as previously discussed there is good reason to have 
some confidence in the likely direction of relationships based on previous research. 
Nevertheless, we believe that future research would benefit from mixed methods – 
experimental studies could attempt to tease out some of the additional factors that 
impact support for surveillance that may be sensitive to contextual effects. 
Additionally, qualitative work could seek to map some of the societal discourses 
(e.g., in the mainstream media) around surveillance and how these discourses draw 
upon themes linked to national identity and terrorism.  
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6. Exploring Views on the Acceptance or Rejection of 
Increased Surveillance in the UK in the Aftermath of a 
Terrorist Attack  
 
6.1 Abstract 
The public is often reluctant to accept the implementation of new surveillance 
technologies, and the issue is likely to evoke strong emotions, particularly when 
two undesirable outcomes are pitted against each other; infringement of civil 
liberties and terrorist attacks. As a response to the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, in 
November 2016 the British Government proposed the implementation of stricter 
surveillance measures. As public perceptions of surveillance have not been 
thoroughly explored, particularly not in this context, this qualitative study applied 
thematic analysis in order to identify themes in an online forum discussion vis-à-
vis the implementation of stricter surveillance measures. Several theoretical 
perspectives and constructs from psychology were used to explain people’s 
constructions of surveillance; intergroup threat theory, black sheep effect and 
perceived collective continuity. We posit that the acceptance or rejection of 
surveillance is at least partly dependent on one’s evaluation of the symbolic threat 
to privacy posed by surveillance and the realistic threat posed by terrorism resulting 
in the need for security. These perceptions are impacted by the perceived 
effectiveness of surveillance and trust in the institution imposing it, and seem to 





6.2.1 Post 9/11 surveillance  
Surveillance practices and thus the views regarding surveillance and privacy have 
changed substantially in recent times mainly due to the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001. While Americans have been dealing with the external threat 
to their democratic and personal freedoms posed by terrorism, conversely, in 
response to the attacks, in an effort to provide security for their citizens the US 
Government have placed restrictions on their freedom and privacy (Davis & Silver, 
2004; Haggerty & Gazso, 2005a). In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, 
the US Government expanded their powers by the passing of the USA PATRIOT 
Act which allowed for extensive and intensive surveillance (Levi & Wall, 2004) 
ultimately resulting in the restriction of civil liberties (Cohrs, Kielmann, Maes, & 
Moschner, 2005). The Act grants the Government powers to surveil and intercept a 
wide range of oral, wire and electronic communications and to gather data 
electronically from platforms and databases, including but not limited to emails, 
personal records, internet usage, GPS tracking data and profiling/data-matching 
databases (Gellman, 2002; Mitchener-Nissen, 2014). The Act received criticism for 
allowing the infringement of privacy by law enforcement sans judicial oversight 
(Nelson, 2002). 
 
As well as in the USA, several Western European governments have enacted new 
policies after 9/11, which principally depend on surveillance technologies (such as 
CCTV, biometrics, eavesdropping, automatic face recognition, number plate 
recognition systems etc.) to stimulate a proactive and preventative approach to 
terrorism (Bassett, 2007; Pavone & Esposti, 2012; Ramraj, Hor, & Roach, 2009; 
Vermeersch & Pauw, 2018). 
 
All in all, the policies enacted led to increased governmental surveillance powers 
at the cost of civil liberties (Dragu, 2011; Posner, 2006). It is argued that a 
consequence of post 9/11 surveillance is the subsequent increase in scrutiny of 
everyday, ordinary conversations and transactions. Although the new laws may not 
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affect the efficacy in apprehending terrorists, the lives of ordinary citizens could be 
complicated and intruded upon with increased monitoring, classification and 
evaluation (Lyon, 2003).  
 
While those advocating increased surveillance and security argue that for protection 
these measures are essential, advocates of civil liberties and privacy express 
concern regarding the increased use of formerly protected information (Bowyer, 
2004; Casella, 2003). Public concern has been well illustrated by polling data which 
suggests that worry exists over the benefits proffered by homeland security 
technologies being outweighed by potential infringement of privacy and civil 
liberties (Davis & Silver, 2004). Moreover, fears of the development of an 
Orwellian society have been illuminated by a focus group report from the League 
of Woman Voters (2005) which highlights people’s concerns regarding the specific 
risks inherent with homeland security technologies. 
 
6.2.2 The trade-off model  
The relationship between civil liberties and security are often expressed as a trade-
off, whereby any gain in security via implementation of surveillance measures 
results in a proportional loss of citizen’s privacy (Friedewald et al., 2015; Lewis, 
2005; Pavone, & Esposti, 2012). 
 
It has been posited that during national emergencies, US citizens are more willing 
to sacrifice their civil liberties for increased security by giving the Government 
additional surveillance powers (Gould, 2002). In the context of terrorism for 
instance, it has been shown that in the wake of 9/11 the sacrifice of civil liberties in 
order to limit terrorism was regarded as necessary by the majority of survey 
respondents (Lewis, 2005). Moreover, another public opinion poll found that 
around two thirds of the respondents favoured the investigation of possible terrorist 
threats by the FBI, even if privacy is intruded upon, while only a quarter of people 
preferred the FBI not to be able to investigate possible terrorist threats at the 
expense of personal privacy (Lewis, 2005). In the wake of the Boston Marathon 
bombing, a poll found that 78% of people supported the implementation of 
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surveillance cameras as they believed them to be beneficial in minimizing the threat 
of terrorism. Moreover, only 16% of people were against the installation of said 
technology on the grounds of privacy infringement (The New York Times, 2013).  
 
A manifestation of the trade-off model often leads to the following, oft quoted 
argument: ‘If you have got nothing to hide you have got nothing to fear’ 
(Friedewald et al., 2015; Solove, 2007). However, the model has been criticised 
from a multitude of angles; the terms privacy and security are abstracted and viewed 
within the context of a zero-sum game where surveillance technologies increase 
security but harm privacy (Friedewald et al., 2015; Pavone & Esposti, 2012; Solove, 
2007). For example, it has been asserted that privacy and security are not 
exchangeable goods, but are factors influenced by trust and concern; socially 
embedded, contextually-dependent, fluid attitudes (Pavone & Esposti, 2012). 
 
Moreover, it has been argued that by framing questions comparing the relative 
importance of privacy versus security concerns, the debate is inevitably tilted in 
favour of security (Dragu, 2011). There is a presupposition that security is the more 
important of the two and so the burden lies upon those wishing to argue that privacy 
rights hold higher societal value than security does (Mitchener-Nissen, 2014). 
Interestingly, a Belgian study demonstrated the importance of framing the 
presentation of surveillance technologies in influencing people’s acceptance of 
such technologies (Vermeersch & Pauw, 2018). Those presented with a security 
frame tended to support the use of security-oriented technologies, as opposed to 
those who were presented with a privacy frame. This suggests that people may be 
malleable when forming their attitudes towards surveillance and the efficacy of 
framing surveillance debates in a security frame of reference (which also links to 
the issues around national identity serving security motivations discussed in an 
earlier chapter).   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Additionally, privacy is often depicted as an individual right while security is 
perceived as a collective, societal right. This results in a biased conceptualisation 
whereby the importance of individuals’ privacy rights is overshadowed by the 
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security needs of the many (Solove, 2009). The by-product of such 
conceptualisation is the disregard of the social value of privacy (Mitchener-Nissen, 
2014). 
 
While some see privacy and security as fundamentally interweaved conditions 
whereby the increase of one is followed by the subsequent decrease in the other 
(trade-off model), other views also exist. For instance, scepticism regarding the 
benefits offered by the implementation of surveillance. This can be extended to 
those who view surveillance not only as ineffective, but also harmful due to 
infringement on privacy. Finally, there are those who consider surveillance to be 
beneficial, and do not view it as detrimental to privacy (Kreissl et al., 2015).  
 
6.2.3 Threat  
One of the results of 9/11 was the considerable, significant and widespread anxiety 
amongst Americans it caused. An often-observed emotional response to threat is an 
attempt to reduce the distress by increasing levels of personal security; this can lead 
to increased support for government efforts which target threats to personal 
security, such as strategies designed to prevent future terrorist attacks (Davis & 
Silver, 2004). The current climate in which the threat of terrorism has been 
heightened has led people to value safety and security over privacy, and so 
surveillance is tolerated where once it may have been regarded as unacceptable 
(Levi & Wall, 2004). Thus, it can be argued that surveillance is considered to be 
necessary during times when threat is perceived to be high. 
 
To support this, it has been found that people’s perception of threat significantly 
affects levels of support for policies targeted at reducing terrorism and if the 
perceived threat is abated, then support for these policies significantly decreases 
(Malhotra & Popp, 2012). Individual differences have also been shown to affect 
how the threat of terrorism links to support for surveillance - e.g., authoritarian 




It has been argued that the threat posed by terrorism provides political leverage for 
the implementation of measures that erode civil liberties (Neocleous, 2007; 
Waldron, 2003). The passing of the USA Patriot Act by the US Government 
following 9/11 is a notable example. For instance, a study conducting critical 
discourse analysis of www.lifeandliberty.gov – a website created to educate the 
public on the USA PATRIOT Act – showed that rhetorical strategies utilising 
authority, security, efficacy and responsibility were overused (Simone, 2009). The 
portrayal of the Government’s role as a paternalistic protector, with citizens as 
innocent victims and terrorists as foreign threats was deployed, so as to link national 
identity to national security and suggest both are served by government 
surveillance. As discussed in previous chapters, this takes advantage of a well-
established link between national identity and concepts of security (see, for 
example, Bloom, 1990). 
 
By the very nature of terrorism, prevention requires pre-emptive action providing 
potential justification for implementing new policies and security technologies 
without having to provide evidence of real threats (Dinh, 2002). Absent of a threat, 
governments can deliberately construct a climate of fear within the populace to 
justify the implementation of new security measures thereby introducing 
technologies more proficient at controlling and manipulating citizens (Mitchener-
Nissen, 2014; Pavone & Pereira, 2009; Waldron, 2003). The citizen, depicted as an 
innocent victim of potential security threats (e.g., terrorist attacks), and dependent 
on the Government to provide security becomes an individual more malleable, 
obsequious and self-sacrificial (Mitchener-Nissen, 2014). 
 
6.2.4 Trust 
The role of trust in accepting surveillance has been investigated previously by 
research, generally concluding that trust in institutions has a positive correlation 
with an individual’s acceptance of intrusive, privacy invading measures (van den 
Broek, Ooms, Friedewald, van Lieshout, & Rung, 2017; Vermeersch & Pauw, 
2018). As previously mentioned, trust impacts upon the balance between privacy 
and security (Pavone & Esposti, 2012). Political trust has been found to positively 
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relate to people’s acceptance of surveillance in Germany (Trüdingera & 
Steckermeierb, 2017) as well as increasing levels of support for policies targeting 
terrorism and fostering support for anti-terrorism policies in six other countries 
(Denemark, 2012). Furthermore, in the US and in Canada it has been demonstrated 
that those who trust the Government tend to support security and surveillance 
policies (Nakhaie & de Lint, 2013). Interestingly, a study showed that trust is a 
better predictor of support for surveillance in those who are privacy orientated 
compared to those who are security orientated (Vermeersch & Pauw, 2018). 
Furthermore, based on focus group interviews conducted amongst Spanish citizens, 
Pavone and Esposti (2012) posited that those with lower levels of trust in 
institutions implementing surveillance-oriented security technologies tended to be 
more concerned about their misuse and consider privacy a priority. On the other 
hand, people placing more trust in said institutions were less likely to be concerned 
about privacy and instead prioritised security. All in all, trusting people believed 
that in addition to privacy not being affected by the implementation of surveillance 
technologies, they also asserted these technologies to be effective at preventing 
crime (Pavone & Esposti, 2012). 
 
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the level of trust citizens had in the Government 
increased to heights not seen since the 1960’s (Chanley, 2002; Cook & Gronke, 
2005; Westin, 2003) along with the public approval of new government 
surveillance powers (Harris Interactive & Westin, 2001). Furthermore, a poll 
conducted after the Boston Marathon Bombings by The New York Times and CBS 
News found that 70% of respondents had confidence in the Government to protect 
its citizens from possible future attacks (The New York Times, 2003).  
 
In a study conducted in the aftermath of 9/11, Davis and Silver (2004) concluded 
that individuals who felt a greater sense of threat from terrorism were more willing 
to support surveillance and to trade off civil liberties in exchange for security, with 
one’s trust in the Government interacting with this effect. They concluded that those 
with higher levels of trust in the Government and with a greater sense of threat had 
lower support for civil liberties, while people with lower levels of trust in the 
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Government had higher levels of support for civil liberties regardless of their 
concern about a possible terrorist attack.  
 
On the other hand, a multi-method research study conducting a logistic regression 
of a public opinion survey and a Twitter discourse analysis demonstrated the 
presence of consistent, and mostly negative sentiments directed towards NSA 
surveillance programs. Analysis of #nsa tweets revealed that the top ten most active 
tweeters using #nsa have shown a tendency to distrust the Government and to hold 
beliefs that NSA surveillance programs infringe upon the rights of citizens 
(Reddick, Chatfield, & Jaramillo, 2015). 
 
6.2.5 Perceived effectiveness 
Even though there is a lack of research evidence demonstrating that the reduction 
of civil liberties correlates with increased effectiveness of terrorism prevention, 
counterterrorism policies post 9/11 tend to rely on the presumption that it does 
(Dragu, 2011). 
 
Regardless of whether surveillance is in fact effective or not, previous research has 
suggested that surveillance is evaluated more positively when it is perceived to be 
effective (Murakami Wood & Webster, 2009; Sanquist et al., 2008; Webster, 2009). 
For example, with homeland security technologies, acceptance is contingent upon 
a balancing of the benefits (perceived effectiveness) against the risks (perceived 
intrusiveness). This results in those technologies viewed as more intrusive being 
deemed less effective, and those considered to be more effective being perceived 
to be less intrusive (Sanquist et al., 2008). 
 
The data supports the theory that acceptance of surveillance technology is 
predicated on the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis, where the perceived 
advantages (benefits) are weighted against the disadvantages (risks). For example, 
people may tolerate increased invasion of their privacy (cost) in exchange for 
increased effectiveness in the prevention of terrorism (benefit) (Fischhoff, Slovic, 
Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978). 
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As described above, studies have previously asserted that perceptions of 
threat (Cohrs et al., 2005; Davis & Silver, 2004; Levi & Wall, 2004; Malhotra & 
Popp, 2012), governmental trust (Davis & Silver, 2004; Denemark, 2012; Nakhaie 
& de Lint, 2013; Pavone & Esposti, 2012; Trüdingera & Steckermeierb, 2017; van 
den Broek et al., 2017; Vermeersch & Pauw, 2018) and effectiveness of 
surveillance measures (Murakami Wood & Webster, 2009; Sanquist et al., 2008; 
Webster, 2009) contributed to people’s evaluations and attitudes towards 
surveillance. It has also been shown that terrorist attacks had a great impact on such 
perceptions; when the threat of terrorism is heightened people are more inclined to 
value security and safety over privacy and therefore tolerate surveillance laws that 
might normally be seen as unacceptable (Gould, 2002; Lewis, 2005). In order to 
explore whether these perceptions and constructions of surveillance are present in 
a prominent social media platform, we took advantage of the then current socio-
political events, which provided us with the ideal setting to conduct our study. 
 
6.2.6 The present study  
 
The November 2015 Paris Attacks  
 
A series of coordinated terrorist attacks took place in Paris on 13 November 2015 
killing 130 people and wounding 494. Six different locations were targeted, starting 
with three explosions outside the Stade de France during a football match, followed 
by a series of shootings and a suicide bombing at various restaurants and cafés. 
Another mass shooting was carried out in the Bataclan concert hall at an Eagles of 
Death Metal concert. The Islamic State (ISIS) claimed responsibility for the attacks 
(CNN Library, 2015).  
 
Investigatory Powers Act 
 
In the wake of the terrorist attacks, the British Government (mainly Conservative 
politicians such as David Cameron and Boris Johnson) started to fast-track the 
passing of the surveillance law called the Investigatory Powers Act (nicknamed the 
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Snoopers’ Charter) whereby internet companies are forced to retain data pertaining 
to their customer’s browsing habits for up to a year. Additionally, rules would be 
included which would give the Government the right to force companies to break 
their encryption, potentially resulting in the prohibition of iMessage and WhatsApp 
in their current form (Griffin, 2015). 
 
Research focused on the investigation of public attitudes towards government 
surveillance has been very limited. For example, most studies so far were conducted 
in the US or Canada, and to our knowledge there are as yet no studies with British 
participants. Furthermore, the majority of studies were carried out after 9/11, 
principally due to the lack of major recent terrorist attacks prior to that event. In 
terms of their applications of theoretical models, most studies applied the trade-off 
approach to understand the public’s views, though with some exceptions. 
Moreover, most research has relied on attitude surveys and public opinion polls – 
with some exceptions utilising focus group interviews – but it would seem that 
studies focused on understanding the perceptions manifested in an organic natural 
environment (e.g., cyberspace) have been neglected. We aimed to address this gap 
in the literature by exploring the public’s constructions of surveillance in general, 
in the light of the unfortunate recent terror attacks and to attempt to examine their 
views on the proposed implementation of stricter surveillance measures by the UK 
Government. 
 
Moreover, in our previous quantitative study (Chapter 5) we investigated the 
association between British national identity and different perceptions of 
government surveillance. We found that those with strong British identification are 
more likely to perceive government surveillance to be both necessary and 
beneficial, while those with weaker feelings of Britishness tended to be more 
concerned about it. We were interested to see whether any manifestation of British 
national identity will be apparent in the present study, and if these patterns between 
national identity and support for surveillance are also manifested in the naturally 
occurring discourses of an internet discussion forum. Furthermore, we wished to 
move beyond the quantitative approach we previously adopted and embark upon a 
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qualitative approach that will allow a more in-depth understanding of the way 
arguments around identity, surveillance and terrorism are constructed and defended 
by British citizens. 
 
In our understanding, one’s trust (in the institution carrying out surveillance, i.e. 
the Government), perception of threat and perception of how effective the measures 
are, relate to one’s acceptance of surveillance. We were interested in investigating 
and evaluating these notions in an organic setting instead of an experimentally 
manipulated environment. Thus, we conducted an exploratory qualitative study by 
analysing data from a discussion forum in the aftermath of the Paris attacks 
following the proposal made by the UK Government for increased surveillance 
powers. We believed that a qualitative approach exploring views of British citizens 
on surveillance and more specifically, the proposed implementation of stricter 
measures, might provide us with a richer, more in-depth analysis than a quantitative 
approach. The broad research question of the study was: ‘How do people in an 
online forum environment view and discuss the proposed increase of surveillance 
measures in the UK?’ 
 
 
6.3 Methods  
6.3.1 Data collection and participants 
In the present study we were interested in people’s views on surveillance as a 
response to the attack, more specifically their attitudes towards the British 
Government’s initiative to increase surveillance measures in the UK as a result of 
the Investigatory Powers Act in the aftermath of the 2015 Paris attacks. 
 
It has been suggested that those who are distrustful of surveillance, and among 
them, the ones who are the most knowledgeable about the topic, are 
underrepresented in opinion polls, while those who may be considered pro-
surveillance are over-represented (Haggerty & Gazso, 2005b). Underrepresentation 
of those who are anti-surveillance could be due to the adoption of behaviours likely 
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to predispose them to exclusion from studies. These factors may therefore skew the 
findings, and subsequently the conclusions derived by such studies. Thus, we 
decided to discard the idea of any quantitative methodologies and instead adopt a 
qualitative approach.  
 
The feasibility of electronic data collection methods has been attested to by studies 
appropriating such methodologies which have stated that this is due to a decrease 
in human errors, swift and informative responses from participants and the richness 
of electronically collected data (Fawcett & Buhle, 1995; Robinson & Curl, 1994; 
Stanton, 1998). As an electronic data collection method, online forums provide a 
plentiful amount of asynchronous interactions, whereby individuals participate in 
conversations at their leisure, disparate to other methods requiring synchronous 
interactions. Asynchronous online forums are described as being accessible, secure, 
uncomplicated and easily observable (Anderson & Kanuka, 1997; Im & Chee, 
2006). Confidentiality of data can be guaranteed as online forums require 
registration and the creation of a password. In comparison with other Internet data 
collection methods that are publicly accessible without passwords, online forums 
are more secure. 
 
Taking the above described concerns into consideration regarding the under-
representation of anti-surveillance views in studies with sample recruitment, we 
decided to carry out a secondary data analysis of naturalistic data in the form of an 
online forum discussion. We believe that due to the secondary analysis of a 
discussion, the underrepresentation of individuals with anti-surveillance views 
should not be an issue because recruitment did not take place as such, thus negating 
the risk of a self-selecting sample. Furthermore, since the internet forum we scraped 
for data was not explicitly focused on political issues, it was likely that the posters 
to the forum would vary in political beliefs. These assumptions are, we would 
argue, borne out by the fact that there were indeed anti-surveillance views 
expressed in the data set. Furthermore, we believed that due to the richness and 
earnestness of the range of attitudes and views expressed in an online forum 
discussion (Beretta, Maccagnola, Cribbin, & Messina, 2015; Seale, Ziebland, & 
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Charteris-Black, 2006), the analysis of such provides us with the ideal platform to 
conduct this study. As we were interested in layperson’s views on surveillance, we 
chose to avoid a discussion forum that was specifically tailored for people 
concerned by these and similar issues, and instead we chose to analyse relevant 
discussions on a forum that was likely to be used by a range of people from different 
backgrounds and with varied political views. Furthermore, due to the fact that the 
online forum discussion is naturally occurring – and not driven by the researcher – 
the likelihood of response bias reduced (Smith et al., 2017; Smedley & Coulson, 
2018).  
 
Football365 (F365, https://www.football365.com) is a Leeds-based website – 
launched in 1997 – that primarily focuses on the English Premier League, in 
addition to other European football leagues and cups. The approach is often 
informal and humorous, with the use of witticisms and satire directed at individuals 
connected to the sport being widespread. F365 also provides its users with a Forum 
to discuss mainly football, however a range of other topics are also conversed about 
including current events, politics, television, food etc. F365 can be considered quite 
popular, having 4268 predominantly British members.  
 
As F365 is a well-known discussion forum and we had knowledge that 
conversations often arise regarding current events, we decided to use it to collect 
data. Registration on the forum as a member was required. 
 
The conversation we decided to analyse occurred on the night of the 13 November 
2015 Paris attacks and lasted for one full week. The discussion thread was 
downloaded, archived and dialogues between forum members (n = 94) discussing 
surveillance in the aftermath of the attack were selected for analysis. As stated in 
the Terms and Conditions of the website (Football365, n.d.), users have the right to 





6.3.2 Data analysis 
Through the phases of thematic analysis, the six-phase step-by-step guide offered 
by Braun and Clarke (2006) was utilised. The analysis started with the 
familiarisation of the data which was achieved through multiple read-throughs as 
well as the creation of marginal notes (phase 1). Coding of the data set (phase 2) 
was performed manually in a systematic way whereby key analytic ideas relating 
to the research question were identified. At this point in the analysis, through the 
coding process, the broad research question was After a double round of coding, 
codes were combined to create overarching themes and sub-themes within them 
(phase 3). In the fourth phase of the analysis, the themes were reviewed and 
examined against the coded data relevant to each individual theme and against the 
entire data set, in order to make sure no aspect of the data was missed and that the 
analysis presented the data set in a meaningful way. At this stage, a thematic map 
(Figure 6.1) was created to map out the themes and subthemes.   
 
 
6.4 Results  
Through the process of thematic analysis four major themes were identified; 
‘realistic threat of terrorism versus symbolic threat of surveillance’, ‘with ‘us’ or 
with the terrorists’, ‘efficacy of surveillance’ (which included ‘effective old and 
ineffective new surveillance measures’, ‘adaptability of terrorists’ and ‘independent 
cells’) and finally ‘governmental trust’ (which included ‘misuse of surveillance’) . 
These themes can be construed as different factors that are discussed when 
considering the acceptance or rejection of the implementation of new surveillance 
measures. The themes and subthemes identified in response to how people 
construct their views (either acceptance or rejection) on the proposed increase of 
surveillance measures in the UK are presented in a thematic map in Figure 6.1. The 
thematic map maps out the themes, subthemes and the relationship between them 
– both ‘horizontal’ which captures how themes fit together and ‘vertical’ shows the 





Themes and subthemes are illustrated with relevant data extracts. Each participant 
has been given a pseudonym, and data extracts are presented with the participant’s 
pseudonym and age. Any editing of the data (for instance, the removal of 
unnecessary and irrelevant details) is indicated by [...]. Frequency counts are not 
provided when reporting the results, but as a general rule, ‘majority’ and ‘most’ 
refer to around two-thirds or more of the participants, ‘some’ to less than half and 










In order to exemplify a given view, original content from the forum discussion is 
employed using quotation marks. These quotations are used with original spelling 
without the username to protect the anonymity of the user. It is important to note 
that there is an interaction between the themes and thus quotations can illustrate 
more than one theme.  
 
6.4.1 Realistic threat of terrorism versus symbolic threat of surveillance 
The first theme we identified was the association between the perception of the 
realistic threat of terrorism and the symbolic threat of surveillance to 
freedom/privacy. 
 
The notion of realistic and symbolic threat first appeared as components of the 
Integrated Threat Theory proposed by Stephan and Stephan (1993, 1996) which we 
believe can offer a plausible explanatory framework for making sense of people’s 
views towards the acceptance or rejection of surveillance.  
 
Terrorism is perceived to present a realistic threat and is associated with supportive 
views towards surveillance, whilst the symbolic threat posed by surveillance stems 
from a fear of loss to an individual’s freedom and privacy. Those most concerned 
about the threat of terrorism believed the loss of personal freedom imposed by 
increased surveillance to be necessary in order to safeguard against this threat. They 
posited that security, safety and self-defence are more important than the right to 
privacy. In other words, those who perceived the realistic threat of terrorism to be 
more important than the symbolic threat to privacy imposed by surveillance tended 
to have more supportive attitudes towards increased surveillance measures.  
 
We identified three different ways the symbolic threat of surveillance was 
perceived, and subsequently with the addition of perceived importance of realistic 
threat of terrorism, contributed to people’s support for surveillance; (a) those who 
acknowledged the symbolic threat to privacy as a result of surveillance, did not like 
it but still supported the implementation of it, (b) those who acknowledged the loss 
of privacy imposed by surveillance but did not care, thus supported the 
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implementation of it and (c) those who did not even acknowledge the symbolic 
threat of surveillance and supported the implementation of new measures in the 
light of the terrorist threat. 
 
(a) Acknowledgement, dislike 
 
In spite of acknowledging the potential issues with increased surveillance, some 
users still supported the implementation of it. Users advocated that extra measures 
are needed even if ‘some lines have to be crossed’. Thus, even though the loss of 
privacy – resulting from the symbolic threat of surveillance – is acknowledged, the 
realistic threat of terrorism and therefore the need for security are perceived as more 
important, leading to support for implementation of new measures.  
 
“We are living in extraordinary dangerous times, therefore such measures 
are necessary. I don't like it, but I would accept it if it helped security forces 
to prevent such attacks.” 
 
“I wasn't advocating a police state and better ways of intelligence gathering 
need to be developed. But unfortunately to catch these bastards some lines 
may have to be crossed.” 
 
“I don't want a police state but sometimes the state will have to do bad stuff 
to catch evil cunts like last night.” 
 
(b) Acknowledgement, indifferent 
 
There were members who did acknowledge that surveillance comes with privacy 
infringement, but they were indifferent about it. Thus, in the light of the realistic 
threat posed by terrorism and the need for security, they supported the 




“I value my life and those of others more than someone reading my emails 
tbf. Wouldn't trade a another London bombing for more privacy” 
 
“It's got to the stage where our primary focus must be on self-defence, and 
fuck the PC brigade. Somebody offended it better than somebody dead.” 
 
“I have no problem whatsoever if my phone is tapped, my emails read - some 
poor sap is going to bore himself silly reading my texts to the wife asking her 
if she wants anything in M&S on my way home for work, but for the greater 
good, not a problem.” 
 
(c) No acknowledgement 
 
Evidence was found for individuals expressing their lack of understanding as to 
why anyone else would be disturbed by additional surveillance and the added loss 
of privacy that comes with it. For some, the threat of terrorism was perceived to be 
so prevalent that the support for surveillance was automatic and unquestioned.  
 
“I just don't care about extra surveillance, if they want to watch me, the big 
dog, getting on with my day then they can. Doesn't bother me in the slightest 
if they have access to my emails, texts etc. I can't understand why anyone 
would be bothered but that's just me.” 
 
“Give the security services everything they need to catch these higher level 
fuckers ‐ be it surveillance or whatever.” 
 
“So how many attacks and lives lost on our soil before you'd be happy to have 
your emails looked through?” 
 
Individuals opposed to further surveillance protested against the alleged erosion of 
civil liberties such as freedom and privacy. For these individuals, the perceived 
symbolic threat of surveillance resulting in a loss of freedom and privacy is of larger 
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concern than the realistic threat of terrorism which could be countered by increased 
surveillance. In order words, it seemed that those attributing higher importance to 
the perceived symbolic threat of surveillance than to the perceived realistic threat 
of terrorism tended to have more negative views on the implementation of new 
surveillance measures. 
 
We identified two ways in which the realistic threat of terrorism was perceived, and 
with the added importance of the loss of privacy imposed by the symbolic threat of 
surveillance, affected people’s support for surveillance; (a) those who 
acknowledged the risk of the attack but still perceived the erosion of civil liberties 
as a larger threat, therefore rejecting the new measures (b) those who did not 
perceive the threat of terrorism to be significant enough to sacrifice privacy and 
thus rejected increased surveillance. These argument constructions are illustrated 
in Figure 6.5. Examples for each attitude are described below. 
 
(a) Acknowledgement, indifferent  
 
As described previously, some individuals acknowledged the realistic threat posed 
by terrorism, yet felt that the alleged security provided by surveillance is not worth 
the sacrifice of civil liberties. This notion is expressed in the example quotations 
presented below.  
 
“I'd rather be at risk of attacks like these than let the police/security services 
have access to all communications. Freedom > 1984, even if it does come 
with perils.” 
 
“To those proposing increased surveillance and phone tapping, fuck off. That 
bill put forward by the Government would do fuck all to stop this. The 
terrorists would have been using secured and anonymous communications 
otherwise the security services would had picked them up already. I do not 
want my right to privacy being taken away due to the actions of some 
terrorists, because what happens when the new measures don't work to stop 
terrorism - further eroding of our civil liberties? National ID card which must 
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be carried at all times? Anyone entering the UK has to have a GPS chip and 
microphone inserted in them so they can be tracked? Babies being born 
having their DNA taken and secretly recorded (oh that one happens 
already )? National curfews and if you want to go anywhere having to 
obtain relevant travel documents approved by the Government? Your DNA 
taken and analysed to see if you have the terrorist gene and then you are put 
into concentration/containment camps?” 
 
“Would I sacrifice the freedoms my grandfather fought to maintain because 
some goat fuckers have managed to take advantage of our culture of freedom 
and civil rights? No, absolutely not.” 
 
(b) No acknowledgement 
 
In addition to the symbolic threat of surveillance being perceived as more important 
than the realistic threat of terrorism and therefore resulting in negative attitudes 
towards surveillance, not acknowledging the realistic threat posed by terrorism also 
led to negative views on surveillance. In order words, some individuals believed 
that terrorism does not impose a threat significant enough to sacrifice privacy, thus 
the need for surveillance is not supported. 
 
“Why do you support great swathes of imposing legislation to reduce the 
incidence of something that happened once?” 
 
“More people have died from Bees than terrorists in the UK in the last 10 
years. So a bit of perspective please.” 
 
“If you want those freedoms taken away from you, then good for you, but 
don't expect me to consent to them for the one in a million chance you'll be 




6.4.2 With ‘us’ or with the terrorists 
As described above, the main debate amongst the forum members was whether to 
support, or not support new increased surveillance implementations as a pre-
emptive measure against possible future terrorist attacks. Thus, the majority of 
members could be divided into two groups, pro- and anti-surveillance. 
Interestingly, we identified a second theme within the forum members’ debates in 
which the opposing arguments presented by both groups tended to arrive at the 
same, extreme conclusion, that the ‘other’ was supporting or giving in to terrorism 
through their attitudes. Pro-surveillance members tended to believe that those 
opposing surveillance due to privacy concerns, are supporting terrorism by 
preventing the implementation of new surveillance measures.  
 
“I know the chances of being involved in a terror attack is minute, but I 
believe that something has to be done to stop innocent people getting 
murdered. You are happy for people to be murdered as long as no one can 
read your Gmail.” 
 
Meanwhile, anti-surveillance members argue that by surrendering their freedom 
and privacy in support of further surveillance measures, it is the pro-surveillance 
individuals who are therefore supporting terrorists. This is premised on the belief 
that terrorists want us to fear them, thus forcing us to alter our core values (e.g., 
freedom) and way of life. 
 
“My opinion is if we have to change our way of life or give up any of our hard 
won freedoms then the terrorists have already won.” 
 
“Terrorism thrives on fear, the clue is in the title. You have already thrown 
the towel in and help realise the terrorists ambition.” 
 
“And big clampdowns on civil liberties - freedom to protest, freedom of 
speech, freedom of thought, privacy etc is playing directly into terrorist 
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hands. If you want to live in fear and have authoritarians watching your every 
move, go and resurrect the Taliban” 
 
“In a roundabout way you might as well cheer the terrorists on - "Go on lads! 
Erode my civil liberties! GET IN"” 
 
The exchange described below provides a neat example for this theme. 
 
Person A: “And you're helping fight the terrorists battle for them by making 
the job of catching them harder for our government” 
 
Person B: “No, you're doing their job for them by wanting less freedom, 
ffs” 
 
These examples show how members of both pro- and anti-surveillance camps 
ultimately arrive at the same conclusion; the ‘other’ group assists terrorists by either 
supporting, or not supporting surveillance. This reasoning is dichotomous, 
suggesting an ‘either you are with us, or you are abetting terrorism’ attitude. This 
discourse results in and can be explained by the black sheep effect (Marques & 
Yzerbyt, 1988) whereby members of the ingroup who ‘let the side down’ are 
perceived as negatively as members of the outgroup are; anti-surveillance 
individuals are perceived to be assisting terrorists by pro-surveillance individuals 
and pro-surveillance members are perceived to aid terrorists in the eyes of anti-
surveillance members. 
 
We detected clear expressions of national identity within these arguments. We 
argue that the opposing sides disagree about the interpretations of core national 
values and present different narratives of what British values are and how to 
interpret them. This leads to both sides positioning the ‘other’s’ argument as 
incompatible or disloyal to the past, which ultimately leads to a discrediting of the 
‘other’s’ view. Furthermore, the notion of perceived collective continuity was 
mainly crystallised (Sani et al., 2007) within the anti-surveillance arguments - a 
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construct that represents the idea that social groups value a sense of continuity 
between past, present and future. They argue that giving up freedom and civil 
liberties would be incompatible with what the nation had stood for through time, 
incompatible with core values associated with national identity and a potential 
threat to the perceived collective continuity of the nation.   
 
6.4.3 Efficacy of surveillance strategies 
Although some individuals admitted to the necessity of surveillance in the fight 
against terrorism, those who were against increased surveillance measures argued 
that the effectiveness of these measures were uncertain. Three subthemes were 
identified here, all of which posited the ineffectiveness of new surveillance 
measures and therefore rejected their implementation: ‘effective old and ineffective 
new surveillance measure’s, ‘adaptability of terrorists’, ‘independent cells’. 
 
6.4.3.1 Effective old and ineffective new surveillance measures 
Some believed that the proposed increase in surveillance measures were 
unnecessary as the already existing measures were already sufficient. Not only are 
the new surveillance measures unnecessary, they are in fact detrimental due to the 
impingement on civil liberties.  
 
“Perhaps most importantly, do you know that our police and intelligence 
forces are already lawfully able to hack/examine internet activity of anyone 
they see fit, after simply obtaining a warrant? Do you therefore see why the 
proposed new surveillance powers are something of an irrelevance, and as 
an intrusion on the civil liberties of the general population, can be seen to 
represent a victory for terrorists who seek to limit the freedoms of civilians in 
the countries they attack?” 
 
Several forum members posited that the enactment of new, invasive surveillance 
measures would be ineffective, partly based on past events, i.e. the Paris attacks 
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occurred in spite of the rigorous surveillance measures in place in France. Thus, 
this view led to doubt regarding the necessity of the new measures. 
 
“so what you're saying is that passing draconian and invasive surveillance 
legislation achieves the square root of fuck all regarding terrorism? […] 
many attacks have been prevented without the need for draconian new 
legislation because it doesn't actually exist here yet. in fact, the one place that 
has introduced it suffered the worst terrorist attack mainland Europe has ever 
seen last night. it doesn't work, and it's not about terrorism.” 
 
6.4.3.2 Adaptability of terrorists 
Several forum members highlighted how the adaptability of terrorists, and the sheer 
number of platforms available for interpersonal communication renders 
implementation of new measures unnecessary. If one form of communication is 
surveilled, then terrorists are able to quickly adapt and switch to alternative 
platforms.  
 
“The surveillance bill will do nothing to stop well organised attacks like this, 
they will just adapt their communication methods. Ill thought out legislation 
is a victory for the terrorists.” 
 
“I don't know how they communicated, but communication monitoring won't 
stop these events any more than giving everyone a gun would stop events like 
this.” 
 
 “Have you heard of TOR? Do you know that it is freely available to install 
on any computer? Do you know that any prospective terrorist could do this 





“The main point is terrorists will no longer be using things like Facebook, 
Whatsapp and Twitter as they are all monitored, there is an almost never 
ending list of platforms that are not monitored that will be used instead.” 
 
“Well in theory if you were a terrorist and kept seeing plots foiled you'd be 
looking for new ways to avoid detection. Like with the drugs cartels and 
smuggling - if all your boats are getting seized you'll find another mode of 
transport/find new routes/pay different people off - government have gotta 
then change their approach to catching them.” 
 
The example below suggests that terrorists may be able to use new and creative 
platforms to communicate on, such as various applications, video games etc.  
 
“It has been suggested for example terrorists could spell out an attack plan 
in Super Mario Maker’s coins and share it privately with a friend, or two Call 
of Duty players could write messages to each other on a wall in a 
disappearing spray of bullets. Probably bollocks, but it does go to show just 
how easily it will be to get around this surveillance bill.” 
 
“Telegraph feed, citing a Forbes article. Thing is, they're not wrong are they? 
Ok, those are merely two examples (and the Mario thing will inevitably raise 
chuckles and sceptism), but what about one of those "Draw Something" (?) 
games on Tablets? Or say, a custom car design in Forza. Hell, you could do 
a teamviewer/remote desktop session, type everything out in notepad and 
you'd never even need to send it. Fuck knows how you would extract that from 
the data stream. It would need data collection on an unprecedented scale.” 
 






Some argue that the new, stricter surveillance measures would be redundant, 
because of the systems being bypassed with the use of red herrings and therefore 
still permitting communication between terrorists. 
 
“Also, no doubt terrorists could just flood all channels with red herrings to 
make things practically impossible to follow” 
 
“Terrorists now are semi-autonomous. There isn't necessarily a plan being 
handed down from a mastermind. All they need to do is send one person with 
a message. And flood the internet with a whole load of shit they aren't going 
to do.” 
 
It was also mentioned that the IRA was successful prior to the development of 
electronic modes of communication (such as WhatsApp), therefore supporting the 
view that new surveillance measures are redundant. Terrorism existed before the 
advent of electronic communication. 
 
“The IRA did ok without WhatsApp.” 
 
Additionally, some also believed that new increased measures could lead to the 
evolution of communication methods utilised by terrorists.  
 
“They will get better at deception, only communicating via untraceable 
means. It's very possible that increasing our pressure on them will improve 
their methods (think selection pressures and Evolution).” 
 
The above described examples suggest that the perceived adaptability of terrorists’ 
methods of communication in response to increased surveillance measures 
contributed to people’s beliefs regarding the effectiveness (and therefore the 




6.4.3.3 Independent cells 
Some members held the belief that the proposed surveillance measures are less 
effective at mitigating the risk of attacks when perpetrated by independent cells or 
lone wolves in comparison to larger scale, organised terrorists. Thus, the 
effectiveness of surveillance measures in mitigating against a terrorist threat 
diminishes when fewer terrorists are involved in coordinating an attack.  
 
“[…] nobody can stop small independent cells, or lone attackers. Co-
ordinated attacks should be easier to stop though as it only takes one person 
who knows something to fuck up, or become an informant.” 
 
“i would imagine, as has been said, it was the nature of these attacks i.e. 
small individual cells in a co-ordinated attack, which are probably a lot 
harder to intercept than big large plots like those of 9/11 and 7/7” 
 
Some claim that even though the intelligence and security services in the UK are 
good, there is not much that can be done to combat independent terrorist cells. 
 
“Our intelligence service is one of the best, if not the best, in the 
world...however if someone completely off the grid, no history if 
radicalisation, unknown to police were to commit a similar atrocity then there 
would be very little we could do to defend ourselves...” 
 
“Absolute madness, it's questionable how we can even fight this war. You 
can't effectively fight rogue individuals, it's just not possible with technology 
as it is today (you'd need mind reading or some shit).” 
 
6.4.4 Governmental trust 
The fourth theme we identified from the forum discussion was governmental trust. 
People’s trust in the Government was recognised as contributing to their views 
towards the acceptance or rejection of new surveillance measures. We suggest that 
their trust in the Government was underpinned by these two subthemes we 
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identified, namely ‘misuse of surveillance and ‘trustworthiness’. These subthemes, 
in our view, provide explanations as to why individuals do or do not trust the 
Government. 
 
6.4.4.1 Misuse of surveillance 
Because some forum members regarded the proposed implementation of new 
surveillance laws to be unnecessary, some scepticism was evident in the discourse 
as to the reason why the Government wished to implement these increased 
measures. Several members felt surveillance will be misused because there was a 
sinister reason behind the implementation of the new surveillance measures, 
namely that instead of combatting terrorism, the purpose behind the implementation 
of new measures is public monitoring and data collection.  
 
“it's not pointless, it just doesn't do anything to help tackle terrorism really. 
but it does mean that the govt has more control over it's population. yay!” 
 
“Okay, can I ask if people truthfully believe that the Government (not just 
Tory either, New Labour were at this as well so lets keep parties out of it) 
really just want access to people's internet history purely to prevent terrorist 
attacks? That they have either no other reason for this or won't abuse this 
trust?” 
 
“The people who are going to be monitored aren't the ones that we need to 
keep an eye on.” 
 
Several users advocated that the Government used the attacks in Paris as an excuse 
to justify the implementation of stricter surveillance laws that they already wanted 
to enforce.  
 
“Politicians in this country must secretly be loving this. I'm not going all tin 
hat here, but something tells me the new security measures will breeze 
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through now. And thats not directed just at the Tories, Labour are just as 
dangerous.” 
 
“I'm no suggesting its some false flag bollocks at all, merely that those who 
want these measures to go through are going to be a lot more confident of it 
going through now. Any politician who points out that its overboard (despite 
the measures we have working very well a couple of days ago) is going to get 
slaughtered in the press.” 
 
Some members also claimed that the Government has already been misusing their 
powers and conducting surveillance that is not for counter terrorism purposes.   
 
“it's [the anti-terror legislation] been used for anything from half the councils 
in the uk using secret cameras to spy on residents putting their bins out to 
more sinister stuff like attempting to smear journalists reporting on political 
scandal by covertly monitoring their e-mails. it does not help fight terrorism, 
but it does help fight the more un-cooperative members of the electorate that 
governments all over the world find to be a bit of a pain in the arse. 
 
“Powers designed to combat terrorism and serious crime have been used to 
catch dog owners whose pets fouled the streets and to investigate breaches of 
the smoking ban, according to a report. Local councils have carried out more 
than 9,000 surveillance operations over a three-year period, campaign group 
Big Brother Watch said. It said details obtained from 345 local authorities 
across the UK under the Freedom of Information Act showed they conducted 
operations under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (Ripa) on 
9,607 occasions between 2008 and 2011 - more than eight a day. Among the 
cases highlighted in the report was Suffolk County Council, which was said 
to have used Ripa to make test purchases of a puppy, dating agency services 
and at a house of horrors. Stockton Borough Council was said to have used 
Ripa powers for investigations into a fraudulent escort agency and the 
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movement of pigs while councils used Ripa on 550 occasions to try to catch 
fly-tippers.” 
 
“[…]its been demonstrated that the Government regularly abuses these 
powers.” 
 
“A government (and I'm not limiting this just to Tories) who have have been 
found to allow sensitive personal information such as medical records to be 
brought by the private sector?” 
 
Some offer support for this view by stating that the intelligence services in the UK 
already have the ability to conduct surveillance on potential terror suspects, 
therefore the implementation of new measures can only serve to aid the 
Government in eroding the civil liberties of the public.  
 
“Our intelligence services already have the ability to observe whoever they 
want, whenever they need to. The new proposed powers are an irrelevance to 
counterterrorism and serve only to limit the privacy of the general 
population.” 
 
“Let me just remind you the authorities have the powers to look at peoples 
emails already. They just have to demonstrate there’s a reason to” 
 
On the other hand – as described previously – one’s trust in the Government was 




We found evidence of some members placing their trust in the Government to use 
their powers and make decisions correctly, and so if legislation for additional 
measures was requested, it should be granted. We believe this attitude reflects an 




“Nonsense, the Government and the security forces want these powers, I 
think given whats happened we can see why and put our trust in them, rather 
than listen to deluded types who think its all a conspiracy” 
 
“I would like to think the new surveillance bill now gets passed with 100% 
commons support and immediate ratification by the Lords. As its now clear 
they want it because of real security concerns.” 
 
It was also stated that the Government has been effective in countering terrorism in 
the past so if they need more powers they should have them. Thus, people’s trust in 
the Government either comes from, or is reinforced by, positive past experience – 
when the Government has previously used their surveillance powers effectively. 
 
“Ultimately it comes down to the fact that since 7/7 the Government/anti 
terror police have a good handle on preventing any more attacks - if they say 
they need more powers to keep that up then I'm willing to accept that, for now 
at least.” 
 
“I'm not fearful because the Government seem to be doing a good job of 
preventing further attacks post 7/7 - why the need for increased surveillance? 
Because the people who are doing a good job of preventing attacks post 7/7 
say they need it and i imagine they know what they're doing (lack of attacks 
since 7/7)” 
 
“With regards to complete faith - the Government are the body who are 
fighting our corner in this mess, they're the ones who have to protect the 
country and the population, we have to defer to them otherwise who is going 
to protect the country?”  
 
It is important to highlight that throughout the analysis many instances were found 
for the metaphor of a war/fight regarding the constructions of government 
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surveillance. The metaphor of war has been widely used by politicians mainly in 
the US and the UK, the positioning of military and intelligence efforts against ISIS 
and certain regimes as a ‘war on terror’ being the most notable example. Metaphors 
can be very powerful in terms of their influence on the way people think, through 
the way they can suggest preferred frames for interpreting events (e.g., Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980). Using a metaphor of war suggests that there is a serious threat to 
the state, with an identifiable and tangible enemy; thus, the use of such a metaphor 
positions anyone against government surveillance as an unpatriotic ‘traitor’ or 
‘enemy within’, unwilling to rally behind the nation at its time of need. In the 
context of increased surveillance measures, this kind of powerful language makes 
it harder to oppose the British Government because opposing can be perceived as 
siding with the ‘enemy’ and used by pro-surveillance citizens to question one’s 
patriotism. The power of this metaphor is increased by the fact that national identity 




The present study investigated people’s attitudes towards surveillance in the 
aftermath of a terrorist attack. As opposed to statistical analysis of attitudes using 
representative sample data, we attempted an exploratory, qualitative approach to 
researching this issue, aimed at gaining insight into the meaning construction 
around surveillance in a way that only qualitative methodologies can facilitate.  
 
Using thematic analysis on data acquired from a forum discussion we identified 
four master themes that contributed to our understanding of different factors that 
might influence one’s stand on surveillance. The unfortunate historical event (i.e. 
2015 Paris attacks) and the consequent proposal of strengthened surveillance laws 
by the UK Government provided us with a unique opportunity to capture discourses 
around surveillance in the aftermath of a real-world event that was likely to impact 




First of all, the findings of the present study suggest that those valuing their security 
more than their privacy tended to have more favourable views on the 
implementation of new surveillance measures (imposed by the Investigatory 
Powers Act) than those allocating more importance to privacy, freedom and civil 
liberties. We offered an ITT explanation of this phenomenon, whereby attitudes 
towards surveillance can be explained by one’s perception of realistic threat of 
terrorism versus symbolic threat of surveillance. Thus, it seemed that higher 
realistic threat perception was associated with more favourable views on 
surveillance, implying that perhaps that the heightened sense of threat imposed by 
terrorism resulted in people valuing security over privacy. This can be explained by 
the too common emotional reaction to a threat, where an effort is made to increase 
levels of personal security so as to reduce the distress. This finding is in line with 
previous research in the area where the threat of terrorism was found to positively 
affect people’s acceptance and support for surveillance (Cohrs et al., 2005; Davis 
& Silver, 2004; Levi & Wall, 2004; Malhotra & Popp, 2012). Furthermore, similar 
attitudes were observed in the aftermath of terrorist events such as 9/11 and the 
Boston Marathon Bombings (Gould, 2002; Haggerty & Gazso, 2005a; Lewis, 
2005).  
 
On the other hand, as elaborated upon previously, for some people the symbolic 
threat of surveillance was perceived to be more important than the realistic threat 
of terrorism. These individuals tended to be more concerned about their loss of 
privacy, freedom and individual liberties as a result of the increased surveillance 
measures. Concerns regarding privacy infringement, stemming from stronger 
surveillance measures leading to a surveillance society have been well documented 
previously by researchers (David Lyon, 2003; Lyon, 1994; Mitchener-Nissen, 
2014; Murakami Wood & Webster, 2009). 
 
We argue that the realistic threat of terrorism versus the symbolic threat of 
surveillance theme we highlighted is essentially the security versus privacy debate, 
most commonly explained by the trade-off model, whereby surveillance is 
evaluated in terms of a trade-off between privacy and security. We believe that even 
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though the attitudes we discovered reflected trade-off thinking to some extent, one’s 
evaluation of privacy and security is multi-faceted.  
 
One does not just simply prefer security over privacy (or the other way around) but 
instead the less valued factor is carefully evaluated. When the realistic threat is 
perceived to be more important than the symbolic threat, we observed three 
different ways the symbolic threat perceptions were evaluated. Some individuals 
acknowledged that surveillance leads to the infringement of civil liberties and 
disliked it, some acknowledged the loss of civil liberties but were not perturbed by 
it and finally, there were those who did not even acknowledge the symbolic threat 
to privacy imposed by surveillance. Eventually, all three perceptions seemed to be 
associated with the view that privacy is less important than security. Consequently, 
when terrorism threat was perceived to be more important than the threat to privacy, 
attitudes and support for surveillance seemed to increase. 
 
On the contrary, when it comes to one’s assessment of the realistic threat of 
terrorism and need for security, we witnessed two different perceptions. Some 
individuals acknowledge the threat of terrorism but are indifferent about it and 
believe that the proposed security gained from surveillance is not worth the sacrifice 
of civil liberties. Some people do not acknowledge the realistic threat of terrorism 
by claiming that the threat is not significant enough to sacrifice their privacy for. 
Both perceptions of the realistic threat of terrorism end up being evaluated as less 
important than one’s right to privacy which seems to be associated with less 
favourable attitudes towards surveillance.  
 
Furthermore, while we agree that one’s perception of privacy and security are part 
of a finely tuned balance, we also believe that the relationship is hugely affected by 
mostly trust in the institution that carries out surveillance (the UK Government in 
the case of this study) and the perceived effectiveness of surveillance. Regarding 
one’s trust in the Government, two different types of trustworthiness were detected 
in the discussion; inherent and proven. Some people inherently trusted the 
Government to make the correct decision, and to use their powers justly and thus 
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believed that if implementation of additional security measures were asked for, they 
should be given. Proven trustworthiness was manifested in beliefs where positive 
past experience with the Government (i.e. surveillance powers have been used 
effectively in countering terrorism) seemed to be related to trust. Both inherent and 
proven trust in government increases the perceived need for surveillance – whereby 
their evaluation of privacy and security led to security being deemed more 
necessary – and the support for the implementation of stricter measures. 
 
Consequently, one’s lack of trust in the Government seemed associated with 
negative views on surveillance. We determined four different manifestations of 
people’s distrust, all of which expressed scepticism about the Government’s 
intention to conduct surveillance. Some believed the measures were not designated 
for combatting terrorism but for public monitoring, some claimed the attacks served 
as a reason to justify/as a justification for stricter measures, some believed the 
Government already possesses surveillance capabilities and some claimed that 
these powers are already misused. Conclusively, people’s lack of trust in the 
Government seemed to influence their evaluations of privacy and security resulting 
in the view that surveillance is privacy infringing, which in turn led to the rejection 
of new surveillance measures. 
 
Similarly to our study, Pavone and Esposti (2012) suggested that trust impacts on 
the balance between privacy and security. Moreover, trust has been found to 
positively relate to surveillance acceptance (Denemark, 2012; Nakhaie & de Lint, 
2013; Trüdingera & Steckermeierb, 2017; van den Broek et al., 2017; Vermeersch 
& Pauw, 2018) especially in the aftermath of a terrorist attack (Davis & Silver, 
2004) when people’s level of trust has been observed to increase (Chanley, 2002; 
Cook & Gronke, 2005). Consequently, distrust in the Government has been found 
to be associated with surveillance being viewed as privacy infringing (Reddick et 
al., 2015). 
 
As described previously, whether people perceived surveillance measures to be 
effective or not also influenced their support. Evaluations of effectiveness were also 
181 
 
multi-faceted and were expressed in four different ways, all of which seemed to 
influence the perceived ineffectiveness of surveillance and seemed to be associated 
with the rejection of the new measures. Some believed that the old surveillance 
measures are effective enough not to support the new ones, some claimed that 
stricter measures would not be efficacious, some feared that the adaptability of 
terrorists render any surveillance ineffective and some believed that there is no 
effective surveillance measure against independent terrorist cells. In line with our 
observations, previous research has also found that when surveillance is perceived 
to be efficacious it is assessed more positively (Sanquist et al., 2008).  
 
Another interesting theme we discovered in our data was the dichotomous 
reasoning whereby both pro- and anti-surveillance individuals ultimately arrived at 
the same conclusion; the ‘other’ group assists terrorists by either supporting, or not 
supporting surveillance. Pro-surveillance individuals believed that the anti-
surveillance camp supports terrorism by preventing the implementation of new 
surveillance measures, while anti-surveillance members argued that by 
surrendering their freedom and privacy in support of further surveillance measures, 
the pro-surveillance individuals support terrorists. We explained this phenomenon 
using the opposing sides’ competing narratives of nation whereby core British 
values are interpreted differently, ultimately leading to a black sheep effect. 
 
Interestingly, comparing the findings of this study to those of Study 3 (Chapter 5) 
we discovered different effects of national identity on surveillance perceptions 
between the two studies. While in our previous study we found a significant 
negative correlation between British national identity and concerns about 
government surveillance, suggesting that anti-surveillance positions are associated 
with lower British identity, in the present study we discovered a more nuanced 
reality, where national identity can be levied in arguments as a justification for both 
pro and anti-surveillance stances. We suggest that people construct and interpret 
British national identity and values differently, and in doing so argue about 
differing versions of national identity - for some, surveillance reinforces the safety 
and security of the nation, while for others it is seen to challenge national values of 
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freedom and the civil liberties that the nation had fought for in the World Wars. 
These observations are in keeping with a social constructionist view of national 
identity that emphasises how different social representations of the nation are the 
subject of debate and can be levied by different interest groups in order to bolster 
their political arguments (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). 
 
The present study is unique in investigating public perceptions of surveillance and 
the implementation of stricter surveillance measures in the light of recent terrorist 
attacks. More specifically, as described beforehand, the 2015 Paris attacks and the 
proposed fast-tracking of the Investigatory Powers Act – allowing the British 
Government to use more invasive surveillance measures – provided a uniquely 
suitable climate to conduct the present study in. Research investigating public 
understanding of surveillance has been very limited and has mostly used 
quantitative analysis. Utilising a qualitative approach allowed us to gain a richer, 
more detailed insight into the beliefs that lie behind people’s perceptions of 
surveillance, more specifically the factors affecting one’s support, or opposition to 
it. The study is also novel in how it deploys ITT as a theoretical lens to explore the 
public understanding of surveillance in a UK context.  
 
As with all research, the present study has some limitations that should be 
addressed. By its very nature, a qualitative approach does not seek to survey 
attitudes and beliefs in a comprehensive manner that could be called generalisable 
or representative of a population. As such, it is important to recognise that the study 
does not provide, nor did it seek to provide, insight into the prevalence of the beliefs 
that we identified within the wider population of the UK. With this in mind we have 
no specific demographic information about our sample, since the contributors to the 
internet forum that we used for data collection remain anonymous. At best, given 
the focus on the British Premier League and the fact that it is a UK based website, 
we can assume that most forum posters are likely to be British citizens. Moreover, 
given the nature of football fandom, that male posters are likely to outnumber 
female posters. We can therefore make no claims that the extracts we pulled from 
forum discussions are representative, in a sampling sense, of the views held by the 
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UK population. Additionally, we must accept, as is the nature of thematic analysis, 
that the interpretation presented here is a unique product of the specific researcher, 
and as such represents one possible lens to make sense of the data, the value of 
which should be judged based on the degree to which the analysis appears to be 
coherent and insightful (Elliott, Fischer, & Rennie, 1999). 
 
Instead, the benefit of our qualitative approach is in delving deep into the 
construction of arguments and justifications for either pro- or anti-surveillance 
views, something which quantitative attitude surveys are not well placed to explore. 
As such we are able to map different ways in which pro- or anti-surveillance views 
are bolstered, and in doing so provide ideas that could be explored more 
quantitatively in experiments and attitude surveys if desired. For example, our 
observations about the role of realistic and symbolic threat perceptions could be 
more formally tested using survey methodologies, given that there already exists a 
body of work within the ITT framework exploring these constructs using 
quantitative techniques.  
 
It should be highlighted that various factors can influence the interactions between 
people in an online environment (such as this forum from where data was gathered) 
compared to an offline setting. For a more in-depth discussion on computer-
mediated communication and its psychological implications, please see Section 1.  
 
We must also acknowledge the possibility that the discussion forum ecosystem 
itself may play a role in impacting the nature of discussion and argumentation. As 
research in the SIDE model has shown (Social Identity and Deindividuation; see 
Postmes, Spears, & Lea (1998)) cyberspace can enhance the impact of social 
identity on individuals, leading, for example, to enhanced levels of group 
polarisation (the strengthening of entrenched attitudes/beliefs) and greater levels of 
intergroup conflict and stereotyping. It indeed appeared that social identities were 
at play in the forum discussions regarding surveillance. On the one hand, British 
national identity was leveraged by both pro and anti-surveillance posters to support 
their respective positions. The arguments forwarded by pro-surveillance posters 
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alluded to discourses around (national) security and loyalty to the state and security 
services. In contrast, anti-surveillance supporters sometimes wove British national 
identity into their discourses by positioning support for more surveillance as 
incompatible with British values around freedom and liberty (the symbolic threat 
argument). In both cases, pro and anti-surveillance posters often seemed to 
stereotype the ‘other’, perhaps partly, as the SIDE model suggests, because the 
semi-anonymous discussion forum environment facilitates enhanced social identity 
maintenance and makes intergroup differences more evident and easier to express. 
It is therefore possible that the arguments constructed within the forum discussions 
that we explored may be more oppositional and based around ‘othering’ those who 
take the opposite view than would be observed outside of the online environment, 
however these arguments are no less interesting or valid, in terms of exploring lay 
beliefs about surveillance, since online behaviour is now an integral element of 




7. Exploring Manifestations of People’s Attitudes Towards 
Islam on Twitter After the Westminster attack 
 
7.1 Abstract 
The manifestation of Islamophobia and negative attitudes towards Islam have been 
increasingly widespread in Western nations post 9/11, and the expression of such 
attitudes both online and offline have been investigated previously. However, a 
majority of the existing qualitative and quantitative social science research on 
Islamophobia explores negative thinking about Muslims and Islam, neglecting the 
fact that there are counter-discourses which seek to defend Islam. As there is a lack 
of research that explores both pro- and anti-Islamic tweets in the wake of a terrorist 
attack, in this exploratory study we aimed to address this gap in the literature using 
mixed methods to better understand the manifestation of people’s attitudes towards 
Islam on Twitter after a terrorist attack carried out by a Muslim perpetrator. Tweets 
were classified in terms of their sentiment regarding Islam, and an in-depth content 
analysis of such tweets was performed to identify themes, arguments and 
constructions of nation, Islam, Muslims and terrorism. Twitter has been shown to 
be an excellent platform to study the expression of social identity and social 
processes on a large-scale network. Therefore, as a compliment to qualitative 
analyses, a quantitative network analysis was also conducted to gain insight into 










The term Islamophobia is still highly controversial amongst academics due to the 
lack of a universally agreed upon definition, although the present study is going to 
rely on the eight components – closed views, as defined by the Runnymede Trust 
(1997) – that constitute Islamophobia: (1) Islam is considered to be an unchanging, 
dogmatic monolith insensitive to new and current realities. (2) The aims and values 
of Islam are viewed as have nothing in common with other cultures and is 
(therefore) unable to affect or be affected by them. (3) Islamic culture is considered 
inferior to that of the West, nonsensical, misogynistic, primitive and cruel. (4) Islam 
is seen as a vicious, aggressive, terrorism supporting religion at war with the West. 
(5) Islam is considered to be a political ideology. (6) Islamic critiques of the West 
are rejected forthright. (7) Discriminatory behaviour and prohibition of Muslims 
from mainstream society justified by an ideological hostility towards Islam. (8) 
Hostility against Muslims is normalised and seen as acceptable. In summation, 
Islamophobia is the discrimination against or prejudice towards Muslims for 
reasons of nationality, ethnicity or religion as they relate to Islam. 
 
Theories in the field of social psychology, and particularly intergroup relations, can 
provide a useful lens through which Islamophobia can be understood. Within 
integrated threat theory (ITT, also called intergroup threat theory), Stephan and 
Stephan (1993, 1996) contend that defensive, prejudicial responses are probable 
when individuals feel that their beliefs, values and social groups are threatened. 
According to ITT, there are four types of threat that can lead to prejudice: realistic 
threats, symbolic threats, negative stereotyping and intergroup anxiety. A perceived 
threat can lead to a prejudicial response, regardless of the threat’s validity. Realistic 
threats tend to be political, economic or physical. Competition with outsiders for 
scarce resources within a zero sum-game can often be perceived as a legitimate 
reason for individuals to exhibit prejudicial and discriminatory behaviour. 
Symbolic threats tend to be due to perceived differences between groups; in values, 
beliefs and norms. The difference in beliefs and worldviews between the dominant 
187 
 
group and the outside group is considered a deviation and counter from the norm. 
Negative stereotypes of out-group members begin to materialise based on the 
perceived behaviours of a typical individual within that group. Intergroup anxiety 
may occur upon interaction with out-group members. Research has previously 
suggested that Islamophobia is a response to perceived realistic and symbolic 
threats (for example Ciftci, 2012; Croucher, 2013; Hitlan, Carrillo, Aikman, Zárate, 
2007; Uenal, 2016; Velasco-González, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008). 
 
On the morning of 11th of September four fuel-loaded airplanes were hijacked and 
crashed into the North and South World Trade Center towers in New York City, 
into the Pentagon in Washington and into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, 
killing 2996 people. The Islamist terrorist group al-Qaeda took responsibility for 
the attacks (CNN Library, 2018). 
 
Beginning with the September 11 attack, the recent terrorist incidents have led to a 
shift towards a more negative social perception of Islam and a subsequent increase 
in anti-Islamic sentiment and rhetoric throughout the Western world. Research 
demonstrated that discrimination and Islamophobic attitudes continued to worsen 
in the wake of 9/11, not only in the US (Cainkar, 2004) but also in Europe. For 
example, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia found that 
Muslims living in Western Europe had experienced an increase in hostility and 
physical attacks since September 11 (Allen, & Nielsen, 2002). Post 9/11 a growth 
of prejudice against Muslims has been reported in the United Kingdom (Sheridan 
& Gillett, 2005), and evidence for the rise of both covert (implicit, e.g., being 
treated with suspicion) and overt discrimination (explicit, e.g., violent experiences) 
experienced amongst British Muslims was found (Sheridan, 2006). Muslims were 
victims of prejudice more often than other immigrants were, both in Western and 
Eastern Europe (Strabac, & Listhaug, 2007). Moreover, a recent study conducted 
ten years after 9/11 reported a lessening in positive attitudes towards Muslims after 




The rise of Islamophobic sentiment is largely reinforced by the negative media 
representations of Muslims (e.g., Poole, 2006; Richardson, 2004, 2009). For 
instance, Moore, Mason, and Lewis (2008) analysed British newspaper articles 
about British Muslims between 2000 and 2008 and found they are often associated 
with threat, problems or as an enemy to Britain and its values. A meta-analysis of 
345 studies on the media representation of Muslims demonstrated that not only did 
most of them report portrayals of Muslims negatively and in association with 
themes of terrorism, but Islam was also strongly linked to violence (Ahmed & 
Matthes, 2017). Jaspal and Cinnirella (2010) argued that the British press often 
portray Muslims as a group presenting a hybridisation of both realistic (from 
terrorism) and symbolic (from cultural incompatibility) threats.  
 
Even though terrorist events, mainly 9/11, have negatively affected the perception 
of Muslims across the West, occurrences of Islamophobia have been reported as far 
back as several centuries ago, and it has been argued that this is often due to the 
Arab world being viewed through the scope of ‘Orientalism’ (Said, 1978). Edward 
Said’s writings on ‘Orientalism’ contend that entrenched ideas about Islam result 
in the formation of an ‘us’ vs ‘them’ relationship with the West. Thus, it has been 
suggested that 9/11 acted as a catalyst for an alteration in discourse within Western 
media to Said’s (1978) ‘Orientalist’ approach, whereby Muslims were seen as 
‘others’ (Ahmed & Matthes, 2017). Saeed (2007) also believed that the construction 
of Muslims as an ‘alien other’ to the ‘British way of life’ has foundations in 
‘Orientalist’ ideology and is manifested as Islamophobia. Furthermore, Kumar 
(2010) describes the rebirth of Orientalist and Islamophobic rhetoric during Bush’s 
Presidency in the US, and emphasises five predominant frames; Islam is a 
monolithic religion, Islam is misogynistic, Muslims are averse to science and 
rationality, Islam is violent, and the West is democratic while Islam gives birth to 
terrorism. Additionally, Samuel Huntington’s (1993) ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis 
positions the Christian West and the Islamic East on opposing, irreconcilable sides, 
and this gross oversimplification only acts to accentuate both emerging anti-
American sentiment and increasing Orientalism. These sociological, historical and 
political writings about rising Islamophobia seem to support Jaspal and Cinnirella’s 
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(2010) ITT-influenced analysis and suggest that Islam and Muslims are often 
constructed as both symbolic-cultural and realistic-security threats to ‘mainstream’ 
society and/or the nation. 
 
Furthermore, there has been a change in the recent political climate both in Europe 
and in the US – an upsurge of right-wing movements often deploying anti-
immigrant rhetoric that typically focuses particularly on the portrayal of a threat 
from Islam and Muslims (Rydgren, 2008, 2011). Two salient examples are the 
recent election of US President Donald Trump, and the UK’s decision to leave the 
European Union. These movements form part of a pattern becoming ever more 
present in the West, whereby politicians utilise anti-immigration rhetoric to play on 
current anti-Muslim sentiment simmering within the public sphere, sentiment partly 
fueled by recent Islamic-related terror incidents. Kazi (2017) suggested that the 
trademark of the 2016 U.S. elections was Islamophobia, and the Trump campaign 
was the embodiment of this sentiment. Although it would be disingenuous to 
attribute the success of these campaigns solely to the rhetoric employed, there is 
little doubt that it played a large role in their victories. Anti-immigration sentiment 
was not isolated to the campaign trail; one of Donald Trump’s first acts of his 
Presidency was the enactment of the highly controversial ‘Muslim travel ban’. 
Regarding Brexit, the campaign rhetoric of the Leave EU position was centred 
around the preservation of British values and culture and thus aimed to prevent 
Muslims from entering the United Kingdom. Analysis of Brexit tweets revealed 
that one of the primary themes evoked by Brexit supporters was immigration, while 
migrant/migration related discussion increased during the day the Brexit results 
were announced (Miller, Krasodomski-jones, & Dale, 2016). Swami, Barron, Weis, 
and Furnham (2018) suggested the intention to vote to leave was heavily influenced 
by voters’ perceptions of realistic and symbolic threats, mediated by Islamophobia 
and Islamophobic conspiracy theories. In addition, racist and xenophobic sentiment 
during the Leave campaign may have resulted in the significant increase of hate 




7.2.2 Westminster attack 
On 22 March 2017 a British lone offender named Khalid Masood (born Adrian 
Elms) drove his car into pedestrians on the pavement of Westminster bridge and 
stabbed an unarmed police officer. The attack only lasted for 82 seconds but five 
people died and over fifty people were injured. The attacker was shot dead by a 
police officer (Warrell, 2017). Even though the Islamic State claimed responsibility 
following the attack, there was no evidence found that he was in alliance with them 
(Dearden, 2018). This attack was the first Islamic related attack committed in the 
United Kingdom since the 7 July 2005 London bombings.  
 
A number of studies have been published after and in relation to the Westminster 
attack, including some exploring the microsocial explanations of Homegrown 
Violent Extremists’ violence (McCleery & Edwards, 2019) and investigating how 
crisis-related information is being published by municipalities and emergency 
service agencies by analysing posts on Facebook (Ross, Potthoff, Majchrzak, 
Chakraborty, Lazreg, & Stieglitz, 2018).  
 
Sadique, Tangen and Perowne (2018) collaborated with Tell MAMA (Measuring 
Anti-Muslim Attacks) in order to ascertain the patterns of hate incidents after 
‘trigger events’, such as the Westminster attack. They conducted semi-structured 
interviews with hate crime and journalism professionals as well as analysed reports 
of hate incidents and concluded that post ‘trigger event’, hate incidents undergo a 
sharp increase, most often occurring between 24-48 hours online and 48-72 hours 
offline. Governmental, media and police responses to ‘trigger events’ impact the 
severity and prevalence of hate incidents, both of which are significantly affected 
by the chosen target, in cases when the ‘trigger event’ is a terrorist attack. 
 
Using data from Twitter and Facebook Innes, Dobreva and Innes (2019) examined 
how the communication of misinformation and disinformation are used on social 
media to influence the public’s understanding of four terrorist attacks (one of which 
was the Westminster attack). Amongst other findings, they described the 
appearance of some highly active and influential Russian state operated puppet 
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accounts dispersing rumours regarding the identity of the attacker as well as 
extreme far-right anti-Islamic messages with the ultimate aim of disseminating 
divisive sentiments among their readers. 
 
7.2.3 Twitter and online Islamophobia 
Since the establishment of the Twitter online microblogging platform, it has 
become popular amongst researchers as a resource for gathering freely and publicly 
available real-world data. The expression of Islamophobic sentiment online, 
especially on Twitter has already been the focus of some academic research. 
 
The first study that utilised data from Twitter to explore online Islamophobia was 
conducted by Awan (2014). Using #Woolwich, #Muslim and #Islam the author 
collected and analysed 500 tweets from 100 different users to identify patterns 
arising about Muslims especially by those committing online abuse. He found that 
more than 75% of the tweets expressed a derogatory and strong Islamophobic 
sentiment, such as ‘Muslim pigs’, ‘Muzrats’, ‘Muslim terrorists’, ‘Pisslam’ etc. 
Furthermore, several accounts denigrated Muslims and portrayed them as 
paedophiles via the distribution of anti-Muslim images and literature. 
 
Magdy, Darwish and Abokhodair (2015) carried out quantitative and qualitative 
analyses on 900K tweets relating to Muslims and Islam after the 2015 Paris attacks. 
They found that Muslims were defended and not held accountable for the attacks 
in the majority of tweets. Regardless, there remained a substantial number of tweets 
laying the blame on Muslims, most of which were posted by those within Western 
countries.  They also identified the top negative and positive hashtags towards 
Muslims, such as #MuslimsAreNotTerrorists, #NotInMyName, 
#MuslimsStandWithParis and #ThisIsNotIslam representing the positive and 
#IslamIsTheProblem, #RadicalIslam, #IslamIsTheProblem and #BanIslam 
reflecting the negative attitudes.  
 
In order to examine the different features of online Islamophobia, Evolvi (2018) 
conducted a qualitative analysis of 1329 tweets after the 2016 British referendum 
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on European Union membership. The in-depth analysis of Brexit-associated 
Islamophobic tweets revealed that online Islamophobia amplifies offline 
Islamophobic discourse, denying the religious sincerity of Islam and denouncing it 
as a manipulative, violent, anachronistic ideology unsuited to Western values. 
Muslims are portrayed as the ‘other’ and should be removed from society according 
to the tweeters and Brexit is believed to be the bulwark against the reputed invasion 
by Muslim migrants and refugees. Furthermore, Donald Trump was often praised 
and associated with Brexit in the tweets, specifically expressed through the use of 
#MAGA (Make America Great Again) showing that Brexit became intertwined 
with U.S. politics and right-wing discourses around Islam. It has been suggested 
that Twitter can act as an ‘echo chamber’, a networking platform by which populist 
views can be shared, reverberated and disseminated thereby reinforcing and 
legitimising ant-Islamic discourse, as transpired when the perspectives of Trump 
and Brexit supporters intermingled (Evolvi, 2018).  
 
In the aftermath of the 2016 Brussels bombings carried out by the Islamic State, 
tweets with Islamophobic sentiment were explored and identified as being 
derogatory, angry and openly Islamophobic (Miller et al., 2016). A significant 
increase in the number of anti-Islamic tweets sent out by users was also observed 
subsequent to the attack. On the basis of a sample of 100 tweets Miller at al. (2016) 
also concluded that Islam was often characterised as violent and the enemy of the 
West, portrayals of Muslims relied on generalisations such as them being terrorist 
and paedophiles as well as some tweets calling for an online action against them. 
In addition, derogatory Islamophobic comments were found to be sent to other 
accounts, some of whom were the intended targets of this abuse.  
 
7.2.4 The present study 
As previous studies have demonstrated, the manifestation of Islamophobia and 
negative attitudes towards Islam are increasingly widespread in Western nations 
post 9/11. Moreover, Twitter has been shown to become a popular platform for 
online hate and Islamophobia. In our understanding, there exists only one study that 
explored positive and defending attitudes towards Islam on Twitter in the aftermath 
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of a terrorist event. Additionally, a majority of the existing qualitative and 
quantitative social science research on Islamophobia explores negative thinking 
about Muslims and Islam, as one might expect, neglecting the fact that there are 
counter-discourses which seek to defend Islam. These pro-Muslim/Islam discourses 
are not commonly present in the mainstream media, but are easy to find on social 
media. There is a lack of research that explores both pro- and anti-Islamic tweets in 
the wake of the Westminster attack, and we aim to address this gap in the literature. 
Thus, the focus of the present study was to explore people’s views and perceptions 
of Islam after a terrorist attack committed by a Muslim perpetrator, as manifested 
on social media. In order to gain an insight into the perceptions that were expressed 
on Twitter, qualitative analysis was applied to the tweets posted in the aftermath of 
the event. First, we decided to classify the tweets in terms of their sentiment 
regarding Islam, and we aimed to address the following research questions. 
 
RQ1:  With what sentiment do people tweet about Islam in the aftermath of 
the Westminster attack? Are there examples of Islamophobic and anti-
Islamophobic (pro- and anti-Islam) sentiments? 
 
In order to gain a more diverse understanding of people’s perceptions of and views 
on Islam, we decided to perform a more in-depth qualitative analysis of the tweets. 
 
RQ2: What themes and arguments are being strategically deployed within 
pro and anti-Islam Tweets? How do these strategies rely upon different 
constructions of nation, Islam, Muslims and terrorism? 
 
As described earlier, Twitter provides us with a wide-reaching platform to examine 
human behaviour and is a rich resource for access to organically occurring public 
conversations (Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al., 2011). Large networks allow for 
substantial statistical power during analyses and the detection of patterns not able 
to be seen in traditional, smaller network studies. Using computational methods, 
Twitter has been shown to be an excellent platform to study the expression of social 
identity and social processes on a large-scale network. For example, Tamburrini, 
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Cinnirella, Jansen and Bryden (2015) after identifying social groups within a 
Twitter network, showed how linguistic behaviour is altered depending on the 
group membership of the conversation actors. Therefore, we decided to extend the 
focus of the present study by combining a qualitative analysis of tweet content with 
the tools of quantitative analysis, more specifically, to conduct a network analysis 
to gain an insight into ingroup following, and to discover which group social 
identities are presented, and whether attitudes towards Islam are represented in the 
social identities of the groups.  
 
RQ3: Considering Twitter accounts which discuss Islam in response to a 
terrorist attack, are they members of groups and what kinds of social identities 
are found in those groups? 
 
RQ4: Are attitudes, views and perceptions of Islam represented in the social 
identities of the groups? 
 
Moreover, once groups were identified and we allocated sentiments to them, we 
were interested to further explore their following behaviour; if accounts which used 
Islamophobic or anti-Islamophobic sentiments follow one another and whether they 
were more likely to follow each other than other members.  
 
RQ5: To what extent do accounts which used Islamophobic or anti-
Islamophobic sentiments tend to follow one another compared to other 
members? 
 
The present study thus aimed to offer a novel perspective on public perceptions of 
Islam and following behaviour on Twitter post-terror events, by the application of 






7.3.1 Data collection  
Twitter is a free, public social networking and microblogging platform with user 
generated content. It was established in July 2006 and as of 2019 Twitter has 275 
million monthly active users globally (Statista, 2019). Since the 7th of November 
2017 Twitter allows its users to post messages – tweets – in 280 characters, 
although the maximum length was 140 characters at the time of data collection and 
analysis. Users can follow each other without reciprocity, retweet each other’s 
tweets – i.e. reposting and therefore circulating other users’ messages – as well as 
directing posts, questions and answers to each other using the @ symbol followed 
by the username. The symbol # followed by a word is called a hashtag and by 
clicking on one, users can explore tweets that share the same hashtag. When certain 
hashtags are written and retweeted frequently in a given period and therefore 
reaching visibility, they become ‘trending’. As the present study is exploring 
attitudes in relation to the Westminster attack we are focusing on #westminster 
which became a trending hashtag after the attack. 
 
The Westminster attack happened on the 22nd of March 2017. Tweets written in 
English using #westminster (n = 88844) were retrieved from Twitter between 
15/03/17 and 14/04/17 and saved into an Excel document. The data were retrieved 
using the Twitter REST API which gives historical tweets up to two weeks 
previously to the current date. A script was repeatedly run which searched for all 
historical tweets which used the term #westminster and any new tweets were added 
to the database. Each tweet contained the following identifying features: username, 
number of followers, time, number of retweets, text (the tweet itself), Twitter’s 




Retweets, duplicates and tweets that were unrelated to the event but used 
#westminster due to its ‘trending’ nature were excluded from the data set (for 
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example as spam and unrelated advertising tweets). Moreover, several Russian state 
operated sock puppet accounts were identified (Innes, Dobreva, & Innes, 2019) that 
were purposefully created to disseminate either rumours about the attack 
(@TEN_GOP) or to share anti-Islamic messages (@SouthLoneStar). Tweets from 
both accounts were also excluded from the analyses. In order to explore people’s 
online attitudes towards Islam, we chose the keyword ‘islam’ and conducted the 
analysis on a subset of #westminster tweets that included ‘islam’ (n = 3623). Those 
tweets were posted between 22/03/2017 and 13/04/2017.  
 
7.3.2.1 Quantitative social network analysis  
Methods from network theory and statistical physics were used to identify groups 
in the network structure. This was done by building a network of accounts where a 
link between two accounts is generated if those accounts had mutually followed 
each other. We then used a mathematical technique (Blondel, Guillaume, 
Lambiotte, & Lefebvre, 2008) which generates community groups in the network 
where members of each community are more linked to each other than to members 
of other communities. The groups found were characterised by generating word 
frequencies for every word and pairs of words (unigrams and bigrams) used in the 
biographies of the Twitter accounts for each group. Words were converted to lower 
case and stripped of punctuation. 
 
Using a method developed in a study by Bryden, Funk and Jansen (2013) we 
established which words or word pairs characterise each group, we compared the 
fraction of users that use each word within a group with the fraction of users that 
used the word globally. We then assessed how unlikely it was that the difference 
between these two fractions could have happened by random chance. This is given 







where μc is the fraction of users in community c which have used the word, μg is 
the fraction of all users that have used it, Nc is the number of users in community c, 




7.3.2.2 Qualitative analyses 
Sentiment and content analyses (described below in Section 6.4.2) were conducted 
on those 3623 tweets in order to ascertain the sentiment in which people tweet about 
Islam and/or Muslims after the attack and to identify patterns (themes) across the 
data set. Both analyses were carried out in Microsoft Excel. 
 
Inter-coder reliability  
 
One of the analysis methods deployed to explore tweet content here was traditional 
(or ‘Functionalist’) content analysis. Epistemologically, this is a departure from the 
more social constructionist kinds of qualitative analysis, as it attempts to bridge 
qualitative and quantitative analysis methods by summarising large amounts of 
qualitative data through the application of themes and quantifying the appearance 
of each theme within a body of data (Weber, 1990). Traditional content analysis is 
particularly suited to handling large amounts of data (Weber, 1990), as was the case 
here with 1000s of tweets, which would be cumbersome to analyse using in-depth 
social constructionist qualitative techniques such as discourse analysis.  
 
Conclusions drawn from large-scale content analysis of qualitative data need to 
demonstrate reliability prior to being deemed trustworthy (Hayes & Krippendorff, 
2007). Krippendorff’s alpha has been proposed to be the standard reliability 
measure when comparing inter-coder reliability because of its general-purpose use 
and flexibility; any number of observers, levels of measurement or sample sizes can 
be used, while the presence or absence of missing data has no effect. Therefore, 
while the lead researcher undertook the bulk of the content analysis, as a check on 
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the reliability of coding, 10% of the tweets (n = 363) were randomly selected and 
coded independently by two coders. Each identified code was represented in the 
reliability analysis. In order to determine inter-coder reliability, the judgements of 
the coders were compared and Krippendorff’s α (Kalpha) was computed using 
Hayes’ (2005) SPSS macro. Alphas were above .83 which is considered good 
reliability. The list of Krippendorff’s alphas for each code can be found in the 
Supplemental material (Section 7.6.2). 
 
 
7.4 Results  
7.4.1 Quantitative social network analysis  
A social network analysis was conducted to explore which groups on Twitter took 
an interest and tweeted about the Westminster attack. Social network analysis is a 
‘big data’ technique that attempts to find potentially meaningful networks in 
massive social media data sets, and is somewhat unusual in the social psychology 
literature, but is gaining popularity amongst researchers exploring social media. 
The analyses were performed using custom-written code designed for this project. 
Firstly, our analysis looked to form groups based on accounts that followed each 
other. Each group was characterised according to the words they used in their 
profile descriptions and were allocated random numbers as identifiers. 
Consequently, Figure 7.1 shows all the groups (using #westminster, >250 
members) that were formed after the attack based on their followers and followings. 
Groups are differentiated by colour for the purpose of clarity. Based on each 
group’s most unusual words we are able to get a picture of their social identity 
(Bryden et al., 2013). The notion that unique use of language and ‘codes’ within 
tweets and Twitter profile text helps identify groups of twitter users is forwarded in 
Bryden’s previous work. For example, groups represent members with different 





Figure 7.1  Groups using #westminster formed after the attack. Circles represent groups, with the 
size of the circle being in proportion to the number of users within the group (>250 
shown). The thickness of inter-group links represent how commonly accounts are 
followed within the target-group. Rings around the circles are for intra-group links and 
their widths represent how commonly accounts are followed in the same group. The 
inter- and intra-group widths were calculated by recording, for each member of the 
focal-group, the proportion of accounts which were followed in the target-group. Words 
identifying each group are the most unusual words within the group compared to the 
other groups. 
 
As described previously, for the purpose of the current study, we put emphasis only 
on the tweets that included the word ‘islam’. In order to visualise the magnitude of 
tweets collected and subsequently analysed, Figure 7.2 was created that illustrates 
all groups shown in Figure 7.1 (tweets using #westminster) and the proportion of 
tweets that included the word ‘islam’. Due to the magnitude of tweets a logarithmic 
scale was used. Groups with a high number of tweets regarding the attack also had 
a high number of tweets that included the word ‘islam’, such as Group 355 
(#westminster n = 13302; ‘islam’ n = 181), Group 313 (#westminster n = 9329; 




We decided to statistically test this relationship between #westminster and ‘islam’ 
tweets. As the data are not linear or normally-distributed, a non-parametric 
correlation test (Spearman’s Rank) was applied. Spearman correlation analysis (rs 
(45) = .818, p < .001) confirmed a positive association between the number of 
#Westminster tweets and the number of ‘islam’ tweets. Therefore, this result shows 
that the more a group tweeted about the Westminster attack, the more likely it was 
that those tweets included the word ‘islam’. This suggests that the more interested 
a group was in the attack the more likely they were to tweet about the attack in 




Figure 7.2 Logarithmic scale illustrating the amount of the tweets using #westminster in comparison 
to tweets including ‘islam’. Group numbers are the same as in Figure 7.1. 
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To get an insight into the groups that used the word ‘islam’ more frequently, a 
network analysis graph was created (Figure 7.3) excluding groups that had less than 
20 tweets using the word ‘islam’. We now have a picture of which groups were 
interested in Islam in relation to the attack, which provides an answer to RQ3 
whereby we are able to show what identifying features groups possess. The graph 
suggests that these groups tended to be mainly political, for example, Group 9 
consists of members that can be identified as conservative Trump supporters, while 




Figure 7.3  Groups that used the word ‘islam’ in their tweets and had more than 20 tweets, based 
on tweets retrieved between 22/03/2017 and 13/04/2017. The description of the 








7.4.2 Qualitative analyses 
 
7.4.2.1 Sentiment analysis 
We were able to identify the groups that were tweeting about Islam, and so were 
interested to explore whether different groups have different views on Islam and 
what the sentiment of the tweets were (RQ4). Therefore, we carried out a sentiment 
analysis with the aim of providing an answer to RQ1. Even though manual analysis 
is time consuming and labour intensive (Philander, & Zhong, 2016), both the 
sentiment and the subsequent content analyses were carried out manually for a 
number of reasons. Not only do tweets tend to utilise abbreviations (because of the 
length – only 140 characters) but users often employ irony and sarcasm which 
would have been impossible to detect using an automated machine-based analysis. 
Furthermore, tweets are regularly accompanied by a photo or a link to a certain 
website that can change or give a different meaning and polarity to a tweet. Thus, 
we decided that the expertise of a human coder was required to carry out an in-
depth qualitative analysis of the tweets and to detect the aforementioned nuances.  
 
In the sentiment analysis each tweet received a code based on attitude, sentiment 
and emotion in relation to Islam and/or Muslims. Tweets that were defending Islam 
and/or Muslims after the attack were considered positive, while tweets that were 
attacking Islam and/or Muslims were classified as negative, and those tweets that 
were just general reports of the attack without defending or attacking Islam and/or 
Muslims were coded as general. Tweets that were difficult to allocate valence to 
were marked as ambiguous. The results of the sentiment analysis demonstrate that 
31% (n = 1134) of the tweets were classified as negative, 16% (n = 575) were 
positive, 12% (n = 575) were coded as general and 41% (n = 1476) were considered 
ambiguous.  
 
As mentioned previously, ambiguous tweets were impossible to allocate sentiment 
to, for a number of reasons. Sarcasm and irony are often hard to detect even by 
manual coding and in most cases the judgement of the coder was aided by some 
accompanying photo or by looking at the users’ profiles, their followers and their 
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followings etc. However, in some cases the use of irony and/or sarcasm was not 
that clear-cut, thus we decided to employ the ambiguous sentiment code. 
Furthermore, the attack was reported as an act of Islamic terrorism by Prime 
Minister Theresa May and the following morning after Conservative MP Michael 
Tomlinson highlighted this, she issued an apology and rebranded the incident as 
‘Islamist terrorism’ (Stone, 2017).  However, we believe that not all Twitter users 
were aware of the difference and even if they meant ‘Islamist’ they might have 
accidentally used the ‘Islamic’ term. Thus, in those cases where the users’ 
background information did not offer sufficient insight into the sentiment of the 
tweets, it was classified as ambiguous.  
 
To portray the sentiment of the tweets within each group, a new network analysis 
graph was created (Figure 7.4) using the same group as in Figure 7.3, except with 
the addition of coloured pie chart that illustrate group sentiment (red = negative, 
green = positive, magenta = ambiguous). The figure shows that different groups 
talked about Islam using different sentiments (RQ4). For example, most of the 
tweets of Group 1, 313, 355 and 522 consisted of tweets with positive sentiment 
and Groups 9, 515 and 1096 tweeted tweets with mostly negative sentiment. The 
graph also indicates that political identity may be linked to attitudes towards Islam. 
For example, Group 1096 can be classified as having a UKIP, Brexit social identity 
and most of their tweets are of negative sentiment. Meanwhile, Group 313 






Figure 7.4  Sentiments within groups that used the word ‘islam’. The colours within the pie charts 
indicate the sentiments of the tweets within the group; red colour indicates negative, 
green colour indicates positive and magenta indicates ambiguous sentiment. The 
description of the characteristics of the graph is the same as in Figure 1. It should be 
noted that there was a distortion in the figure due to multiple retweets of an advertising 
tweet from a single account (@PeterTownsend), therefore 716 tweets coded ambiguous 
were removed.   
 
The graph shows strong intra-group following (represented by the rings around the 
circles) which addresses RQ5 and for the rest of the thesis we are going to refer to 
this behaviour as ingroup insularity. As a part of RQ5 we were also interested in 
whether accounts which used positive and negative sentiment were more likely to 
follow each other (ingroup insularity) than members of other groups. In order to 
investigate this, a quantitative analysis was conducted. First, we assigned a score to 
each tweet (+1 for positive, -1 for negative and 0 for neutral and ambiguous tweets). 
Then we took the average score for each tweet of the group and used the absolute 
value of this average to measure how extreme the group’s tweets are on Islam 
(either positive or negative). Using Spearman’s Rank correlation, we found that this 
extremity measure positively correlated with the insularity of the group (rs = 0.59 
p = 0.02). This finding suggests that those groups with more ingroup following 
206 
 
were more likely to tweet in a more extreme way vis-à-vis Islam and provides an 
answer to RQ5. 
 
In relation to the sentiment of the tweet, we were interested to see the most frequent 
hashtags as well as identifying the most frequent retweets. Table 7.1 shows the top 
five most frequently used hashtags accompanying tweets that were positive – 
supporting and defending – and negative – blaming and attacking – regarding Islam 
and/or Muslims. As shown, the positive hashtags reflect unity and solidarity as well 
as disassociation of the religion Islam and terrorism. The negative tweets clearly 
associate Islam with the attack and indicate that it should be banned. Additionally, 
a number of tweets involve politics in the discussion about the event using #Brexit 
suggesting that immigration should be stopped, and Muslims should not be allowed 
to enter Western countries. The tweet counts demonstrate that the individual 
positive hashtags were more popular and were more likely to be used which suggest 
a more united and homogenous nature of those tweeting in a positive sentiment. 
However, the negative tweeters were more creative in coming up with new hashtags 
to express their hatred of Islam. The list of total hashtags accompanying the positive 
and negative tweets can be found in the Supplemental material (Table 7.6 and Table 
7.7). 
 
Table 7.1 Examples of the most frequently used hashtags accompanying tweets with positive and 
negative sentiment. The number of hashtags is presented in brackets. 
Positive  Negative 
#WeStandTogether (76) #BanIslam (54) 
#TrueIslam (47) #StopIslam (35) 
#TheyShallNotDivideUs (11) #Brexit (26) 
#LoveForAllHatredForNone (7) #IslamIsTheProblem (16) 
#NotInMyName (3) #MuslimBan (13) 
 
The five most frequently retweeted tweets are shown in Table 7.2. The tweet that 
was retweeted the most (n = 1494) was given a negative sentiment. The tweet 
echoes the theme noted in the literature review of ‘othering’ Islam, by positioning 
it in conflict with values of liberalism, and using ‘our’ to promote in-group versus 
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outgroup thinking. This speaks to earlier discussions of Islam being positioning as 
a symbolic threat via perceived cultural incompatibilities. The portrayal of Islam as 
laughing at ‘our liberalism’ also suggests that Muslims show contempt for Western 
values. It is not clear if there is also a critique of liberalism implied within the tweet, 
since this is sometimes a theme in Islamophobic tweets and was noted in the 
previous study we conducted on discussion forum content, where some 
Islamophobes criticise liberals for being too forgiving of Islam in their eyes. So, it 
could be that the tweet not only attacks Muslims, but also liberals.  
 
The second most often retweeted tweet (n = 880) expressed positive sentiment. The 
tweet defends Islam and disassociates it from the attack by claiming that the Islamic 
State does not represent the religion. The employed hashtags also reflect the 
positive, defensive sentiment. The third tweet (n = 777) was also categorised as a 
negative one and brought politics into the discussion. The tweet is sarcastic and 
opposes London Mayor Sadiq Khan (unnecessarily demarcated as a Muslim) and 
US President Donald Trump. The tweet implies that the Mayor should not have 
blamed Trump for alienating Muslims, who has now been vindicated due to the 
perpetration of this attack by a Muslim. The fourth most retweeted tweet (n = 663) 
was a neutral one from Sky News reporting that the Islamic State claimed 
responsibility for the attack. Finally, the fifth tweet that was retweeted (n = 584) 
most frequently was also categorised as carrying a negative sentiment. 
Interestingly, the message was posted by a Russian state operated spoofed identity 
account ‘SouthLoneStar’ which was excluded from the analyses, but we felt that 
even though the tweet itself does not represent the manifestation of a real user’s 
attitude, the responses to the tweets – and retweets do qualify as such. The tweet 
was purposefully tailored to pursue an anti-Islamic agenda and the high number of 









Table 7.2 The first five tweets with the highest number of retweets and their sentiment. 
Tweet Number of Retweets Sentiment 
“Tomorrow there will flowers and vigils and 
candles and tears. And Islam will continue to 
laugh at our liberalism. #Westminster” 
 
1494 Negative 






Flashback: London Muslim Mayor Lectures 




Islamic State claims responsibility for terror 
attack outside Parliament in London 
#Westminster. Latest on Sky New 
 
663 Neutral 
In 1952 ISLAM WAS NOT ALLOWED IN 
AMERICA because immigration WITHOUT 
assimilation IS INVASION. 
584 Negative 
 
7.4.2.2 Content analysis 
In order to gain a more in-depth understanding of people’s perceptions of, and 
views on Islam. Therefore, answering RQ2, we conducted content analysis on the 
tweets that were previously identified as having positive and negative sentiment (n 
= 1709). We believe that the attitudes, views and perceptions of Twitter users on a 
given topic can be usefully explored and represented using content analysis. We 
applied inductive content analysis – which is a data-driven approach – as our 
identified themes were linked to the data and the coding process was not performed 
using a predetermined structure or coding frame (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Elo & 
Kyngäs, 2008). Even though this approach is more time-consuming it is also more 
comprehensive and current research on analogous data sets is lacking. 
 
After familiarisation with the data (reading and re-reading multiple times) and 
identifying certain patterns, the initial codes were created by the researcher. In the 
process of multiple read-throughs, codes were revisited, refined and some were 
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collated. After the coding process was finalised, the researcher created a guideline 
set of definitions for the codes, as well as an example tweet for each code. As 
described previously, 10% of the data (n = 363) was coded by a second independent 
coder. Each tweet received up to four codes – together with the initial sentiment 
codes – and they were marked by colour. The colours, names and meanings of all 
identified positive (Table 7.3) and negative codes (Table 7.4) are described below. 
After the reliability analyses (see Section 7.3.2.2) the long list of codes were sorted 
into themes which were then reviewed and refined and eventually four themes (two 
positive and two negative) were identified in the data set.  
 
7.4.2.2.1 Positive themes  
Nine codes were identified that described the outstanding features of the positive 
tweets which were then grouped into broader themes. It is worth noting that even 
though we distinguished two themes in our data set, they are very closely linked, 
and many tweets fit into both. The two themes we identified are Unity and Defence. 
Tweets employed as examples to portray a theme are used with original spelling 
without the username to protect the anonymity of the tweeter. 
 
Table 7.3 Colours, names and description of positive codes. 
Colour Code Meaning 
 Negative reactions Sorry to see the negative Islamophobic reactions  
 Together Do not let the attack drive us apart, #WeStandTogether  
 Not a real Muslim The perpetrator is not a real Muslim 
 Not Islam Islam is not terrorism, ‘this is true Islam’ 
 Real victims Muslims are the real victims of the attack 
 Islam = peace Islam is the religion of peace  
 No religion Terrorism does not have a religion/depends on person, 
not religion 
 Justification People use the attack as a justification against 
Islam/Muslims  








One of the themes that emerged from our data we named unity. Tweets within this 
theme urge people to stand together in this difficult time and to not let the hatred 
spread. Several tweets in this theme were posted during and after the Westminster 
vigil that was held a week after the attack where #LoveForAllHatredForNone 
became popular. Tweets were frequently accompanied with #WeStandTogether 
which was mainly used to show solidarity and defiance towards those who would 
sow division. The overarching aim is to inspire the population to unite as one, to 
celebrate diversity and differences and together construct a securer, stronger United 
Kingdom.  
 
“NO to hatred, NO to killing, NO to divided. #WeStandTogether #peace 
#Westminster #trueislam” 
 
The message is that people should be unified against Islamophobia, hatred and 
extremism. Many tweets in this theme express concern and discontent as a response 
to all the Islamophobic reactions following the attack. The tweets reflect the users’ 
encouragement to fight Islamophobia and the acceptance of all nationalities and 
religions. 
 
“Horrified by Islamophic tweets after #Westminster attack. Stand against the 
hate #PrayForLondon “ 
 
“The incidents in London today have encouraged me to stand up against 
Islamophobia more than ever. #PrayForLondon #Westminster’ 
 
“Please treat this incident with compassion and love. Let's not resort to 
islamophobia, xenophobia and bigotry. Love you all #Westminster” 
 
“Remember, the horror that happened at #Westminster was bad enough so 




“It makes me sick to see the events of today being used as a springboard for 
islamophobia and hate speech!  #WeAreNotAfraid #Westminster” 
 
Tweets in this theme also suggest that the attack will play into the anti-Islam agenda 
of right-wing political parties, leaders and supporters and will be used as a 
justification to propagate their hate. According to a large number of tweets their 
aim is to divide us, and we should not let that happen. A lot of users tweeted about 
their anticipation of Donald Trump (45th president of the United States) and his 
supporters blaming the attack on Muslims and utilising anti-immigration rhetoric.  
 
“It sickens me how right-wing politicians immediately began using the 
#westminster attack as a means to promote their own anti-islamic agenda” 
 
“I see the Trumpets are all over #Westminster as justification for their 
Islamophobia. I hope we're better than to give in to hate that way.” 
 
“Expecting Trump tweet blaming Islam/Immigration in 5, 4, 3, 2,  
1........exploiting a truly horrific incident.#Westminster” 
 
“Afraid of future #islamophobia/hatred/nationalism.Our London is better 
than this #WeStandTogether #Westminster” 
 
It is suggested that Muslims are also the victims of the attack because of the rising 
Islamophobia and hate crimes directed towards them.  
 
“The attack on #Westminster will fuel #Islamophobia and #HateCrime 
against #Muslims.” 
 
“RIP to those in Westminster Attack but also thoughts to the ordinary Islam 
community who now, once again, must suffer backlash #Westminster” 
 
Tweets also suggest that the ultimate aim of terrorists is to divide Western nations 




“The people making political capital out of #Westminster are extremists the 
far right and islamists, both can fuck off. #theyshallnotdivideus” 
 
The only people who want a Britain in a state of violent crisis are the far-
right & Islamists. #Westminster #WeStandTogether 
 
Never forget that Islamophobes and ISIS share one goal: an apocalyptic 
civilizational war. The rest of us must stand together. #Westminster 
 
Defence 
The other theme identified from the positive valence tweets we called defence. 
These tweets are in defence of Islam and disassociate the religion and its followers 
from the attack. They express that Islam and its teachings have nothing to with 
terrorism but the exact opposite – it is the religion of peace. Some of these tweets 
also ask others not to blame the attack on Muslims.  
 
“@toneloque @TerrorEvents this is not islam. I am sorry that it is associated 
with it. Islam translates to peace not violence. #Westminster” 
 
“"Terrorism" and "Islam" should not be synonymous and we have a duty to 
dispel that link at times like this. #westminster” 
 
“#Islam religion of #peace being maligned by a handful of perverts” 
 
“Beautiful #London under attack,Plz don't blame Muslims,killing innocent 
ppl has nothing to do with Islam. prayers with victims #Westminster” 
 
It is also articulated in the tweets that the perpetrator is not a ‘real’ Muslim and not 
a representative of Islam because a Muslim would never commit a terrible crime 
like this in the name of Islam. Tweets also suggest that terrorism has no religion. 




“Terrorism knows no religion, why must these acts of hate be associated with 
Islam. These people are not Muslims #Westminster #PrayForLondon” 
 
“Khalid Masood had nothing to do with Islam, he was not a Muslim. He was 
a Terrorist. Terrorism has no Religion #Westminster” 
 
“people who commit terror attacks in the name of islam are not muslims. how 
have you not sussed that yet. #Westminster” 
 
“You can't blame Islam for one person's dumb actions. Islam does not 
condone terrorism, when will people understand #Westminster” 
 
7.4.2.2.2 Negative themes 
A large number of codes were created that capture and describe salient features in 
the negative tweets. While all these codes essentially represent negative views and 
attitudes towards Islam, they were collated into two themes, Islamophobia and 
Politics & liberal backlash. As stated previously, even though we identified two 
themes from our data set, it is essential to acknowledge that there are tweets which 
co-inhabit both themes. As in the case of positive themes, tweets used as examples 
are written with original spelling without username. Some tweets that we felt were 
worth employing but have accompanying pictures can be found in the Supplemental 
Material (Section 7.6). They are written with original spelling without the 





Table 7.4 Colours, names and description of negative codes. 
Colour Code Meaning 
 Islamophobia Any Islamophobic tweets  
 Religion Islam is not a religion of peace 
 Threat Islam/Muslims are a threat to the Western world  
 Refugees Refugees are the problem, immigration should be 
stopped 
 Surprise Sarcastic way of saying that it was surprising that the 
perpetrator was Muslim  
 War Islam/Muslims are the enemy, we/the West/Europe/GB 
is at war with them  
 Same All Muslims are the same, they are all terrorists or in 
some way helping each other 
 Multiculturalism  Multiculturalism/diversity/inclusion/integration is to 
blame for the attack  
 Violence Islam/Muslims are violent and barbaric  
 Nothing Sarcastic way of saying that terrorism has 'nothing to do 
with Islam'  
 Politicians Politicians let ‘them’ in, they should finally do 
something! e.g., ban Islam 
 WW2 Comparing Islam/Muslims to Nazis/fascism 
 Reform Islam has to be reformed 
 Ban Muslims should be deported, Islam should be banned, 
mosques should be closed 
 Apologists Apologists defend Islam, put Islam before Brits  
 Wake up  It is time for the West/left-wing politicians to wake up  
 Trump Tweets that tagged Trump or used #MAGA to justify 
their negative views on Islam 
 Mayor Mention of Sadiq Khan in a negative way 
 Cancer Islam/Muslims are cancer or any derogative and 
degrading adjective 
 Islam = terror Islam means terrorism  
 Liberals Liberals/left are the ones to be blamed, they protect 
Muslims/Islam  






While all of the negative tweets expressed Islamophobic sentiment, we still felt it 
important to name a theme Islamophobia where tweets we collated were openly 
Islamophobic, and the fear and hatred towards Muslims were manifested in several 
ways.  
 
Most of the negative codes described above collated into the Islamophobia theme. 
Most of the tweets are openly Islamophobic and the fear and hatred towards 
Muslims is manifested in several ways. One of the most prevalent is the view that 
Islam is a threat to Western culture (including Europe, Great Britain and the United 
Kingdom), incompatible with its values and has no place in it.  
 
“These exist because of Islam. These exist because Muslim fanatics are a 
continual, deadly threat, to us all. RUN” 
 
“So now the whole “Islam is incompatible with western civilization” is totally 
relevant. #TrevorBrooks #Westminster`”  
 
“Islam and Western Civilization, a case were the software don’t match the 
hardware. Inevitably resulting in BSOD” 
 
Due to Muslims and Islam being a threat and having no place in Western societies, 
Tweeters claim that they should be banned, deported and removed from society. 
Tweeters also believe that mosques should be closed down. 
 
“Just another reason why #Islam needs to be banned in the west! Not 
compatible with modern society. #BanIslam #Westminster” 
 
“The biggest problem we face is Islam. The only way we get out of this mess 




“#Westminster The religion of peace strikes again. Ban Islam from the West 
now, I don’t care where they were born, deport them all.” 
 
“Islam is a problem. Muslims are a problem. We shouldn’t just ban them, we 
should deport the existing population.” 
 
Muslims are also portrayed to be the enemy and ‘we’, the West are at war with 
‘them’. Islam has to be stopped.  
 
“#westminster We are at war with Islam. Or at least, Islam is at war with us. 
Please wake up Britain.  Before it's too late.” 
 
“@TheHappyKipper @_MikeBravo_ As commanded by Allah. The pagan 
moon god is our greatest enemy.  Death to Islam. Wipe it out. #Westminster” 
 
“#westminsteR WE ARE AT WAR WITH ISLAM . MUSLIMS ARE THE 
ENEMY. ALL TERRORISTS R MUSLIM . POLICEMAN KILLED TODAY . 
WHAT NEXT” 
 
“It's not about resources. It's about identifying the enemy and destroying 
them. #Westminster #StopIslam” 
 
Muslims are very often dehumanised not only by calls for deportation but also by 
being compared to illnesses, such as cancer, AIDS etc. Degrading tweets were also 
discovered claiming Muslims to be toxic, evil, disgusting, subhuman. They are 
often described as being violent, barbaric, aggressive, medieval, sexist and 
primitive. Some also suggested that Islam is a political ideology. 
 
“Islam is mental AIDS, we need to find a cure or, failing that, kill it with fire 




“Reminder that Islam is not a religion of peace but rather a barbaric, inbred, 
expansionist political ideology. #London #westminster” 
 
“#Westminster is the result of flooding countries with islamic refugee scum. 
#islam is a fucking joke and a cancer to the world. Fuck islam.” 
 
“#Westminster Soon whole Europe will be Islamized (>50% Muslims), then 
slaughter of Christians men will start to enslave Christians Women.” 
 
“#Westminster Inviting inbred Muslims to your country who openly want to 
subjugate & kill us has consequences. Ban Islam full stop!” 
 
“#problemisislam MSM talk abt moslem terrorism & forget #islam aspects: 
pedo rape FGM sharia halal misogyny fascism Ban islam #Westminster” 
 
WWII metaphors are also used to describe Islam. Multiple parallels were drawn 
between the religion and Nazi ideology, and Tweeters seemed to deploy hybrid new 
words to express the Nazi comparison such as ‘islamonazi’, ‘islamofascism’ and 
‘islamofascists’. 
 
“#Westminster #parliament When you allow islamic nazi flags to be freely 
flown in #London islamic nazis follow” 
 
“This, in Peckham y'day. The heartwarming truth of #BritishIslam, despite 
what Islamists/fascists would bid us believe” 
 
“#islamofascism will not win. moslems not welcome in Europe & will be 
expelled AGAIN #Westminster” 
 
A lot of sarcastic Tweets appeared after the attack, twisting the claim that ‘Islam is 
a religion of peace’. Sarcasm also occurred in tweets as a response to tweets stating 
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that the attack has nothing to do with Islam. Users expressed the view that terrorism 
cannot be stopped until the role of Islam is acknowledged.  
 
“Islam is a religion of peace. And I am president of Jupiter. #Westminster” 
 
“@GrrrGraphics But, Ben, Ben, "Allahu Akbar" is just Arabic for "Islam has 
nothing to do with terrorism." #londonattack #westminster” 
 
“#Westminster #NothingtodowithIslam How many people have to die before 
we start saying #EverythingtodowithIslam” 
 
“This will defiantly, 100% not be anything to do with #Islam allahu akbar 
#Westminster” 
 
Some suggest that the religion as a whole has to change and undergo reformation, 
as it has violent teachings, arguing that without Islam being reformed it cannot 
assimilate into Western societies. 
 
“@Channel4News Baroness Warsi cannot bring herself to say Islam needs a 
reformation. Its violent teachings need to go. #C4News #Westminster”  
 
“#Westminster #westminsterbridge #WestminsterAttack Until #Islam has its 
#Reformation, they can't #coexist with the West. #Trump #MAGA #truth” 
 
“Islam is a political and religious organisation. For any other organisation 
on the planet we would demand reform #westminster” 
 
“#Islam needs to reform. Until it does. Terror and innocent killing will 
continue #Westminster #WestminsterAttack” 
 
More radical Tweeters identify Islam with terrorism and believe that all Muslims 




“@AliImdadBakes u all r same. All rich Muslims help radical islamic 
extremists financially from the backdoor & pretend like this.#Westminster” 
 
“#Islam It's a choice, but not a free one. Not a race. Not pre-determined. 
Not inate. Terrorists the same. Islam  terrorism” 
 
“@DefendEvropa deport the lot. islam is a terrorist cult #westminster” 
 
“Lies. Islam is terrorism. Always has been, always will be. #londonattack 
#Westminster #WeStandTogether” 
 
“@Trvmpepe Let's correct that: ALL #Muslims are terrorists. #Islam is a 
death cult that should be banned. #Westminster #BanIslam” 
 
Many believe that multiculturalism, diversity, immigration and refugees are the 
problem. Letting everyone into ‘our’ society led to the ‘islamisation’ of the country 
and some refer to London as ‘Londonistan’ in their tweets.  
 
“Multiculturalism and cultural relativism allowed fundamentalist Islam to 
grow and fester in Britain. #Westminster” 
 
“This is diversity, this is Islam, this is fear - This doesn't have to be. 
Multiculturalism is White Genocide” 
 
“#WorldHealthDay Stop attracting Muslims in to Europe would be better for 
your health #StopIslam #Westminster #Stockholm” 
 
“Londonistan U wanted the islamisation of ur country now is too late and not 
finished nor in France Sweden Germany #London #Westminster” 
 
“Welcome to #London under #Islam, #Londonistan. #Londres #Westminster 




Politics & liberal backlash 
The second theme identified from the analysis of Twitter data with the collation of 
negative codes is called Politics & liberal backlash. As described previously, an 
enormous amount of tweets were Islamophobic and blamed the attack on Islam. 
However, politics appeared a lot in the tweets too, as well as verbal attacks and 
hostility against those who protected Muslims in their tweets. For example, tweets 
appeared expressing anger and discontent against ‘Islam apologists’ who rush to 
defend Muslims and claim that the attack has no association with Islam. Tweeters 
claim that these ‘apologists’ should realise that Islam is the problem.  
 
“Islam is a 'Religion of Peace' ain't it Liberals & Refugee Apologists? 
#UKParliament #Westminster” 
 
“Those who kept harping the tune about peace and Islam are terror 
apologists #westminster” 
 
“Looking forward to the forthcoming bullshit articles about awful 
"islamophobia" & the rising tide of naughty name calling. #Westminster 
 
“Cue the Islam sympathisers and the love not hate brigade... fuck off and pull 
your head out of your fucking arses #London #Westminster” 
 
“#APOLOGISTS SHOULD #STOP #DENYING THAT #ISLAM IS 
#RESPONSIBLE #WESTMINSTER & EUROPE #TERRORISM in the name 
of ISLAM #FACE #UP DEAL WITH IT” 
 
“#westminster how long before the apologistS will be paraded on TV news 
saying this's nothing to do with Islam! IT DOES! IT IS ISLAM #London” 
 
However, even more hatred is expressed towards left wing supporters and liberals. 
Not only because they are ‘Islam apologists’ but because they are also less 
concerned about the attack than about the Islamophobia that appeared afterwards. 
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Some even went as far as to state that the left is also responsible for the attack 
because they bring and let Islam in to England. They were often being referred to 
as ‘libtards’ which is derived from the words ‘liberal’ and ‘retard’ so as to condemn 
and degrade liberals.  
 
“Liberals forcefully bring Islam into our countries and Islam forcefully kills 
us. The blood is on Liberal hands. #Westminster” 
 
“Liberals first response to #London terrorist attack: "Islam is a peaceful 
religion, Muslims are victims too". #Westminster #Parliament #MAGA” 
 
“FOUR DEAD, thanks to the Islamic state and the radical left that enables 
terrorism is England #Westminster #PrayForLondon Abu Izzadeen” 
 
 “@PrisonPlanet A stupid hashtag will do fuck all against Islamist killers, 
Time for safe societies not Leftist societies. #Westminster” 
 
“Left wing beg establishment to arrest anybody who critisizes their Islamist 
friends for "hate speech" #Westminster” 
 
“the loony liberals are more bothered about angry people's comments on 
Islam,than the people affected in the tragedy #westminster #idiots” 
 
 “All you #lefties talking about #islamophobia & #Westminster should pay 
attention to what #Israel has to deal with on a daily basis.” 
 
“The fucking retarded left-wing idiots will still ignore Islamic terrorism. 
Carry on and ignore facts and condemn Trump. #Westminster” 
 
“#westminster this is entirely the fault of the hard left, who imported Islamism 




Sadiq Khan (Mayor of London since 2016, centre-left social democrat, member of 
the Labour party) was mentioned numerous times in the negative tweets as well. As 
well as other left wingers, he is also suggested to be an ‘Islam apologist’ who 
protects Muslims and therefore a traitor and so shares responsibility for the attack.  
 
“The fraudulently elected Islam loving Mayor #SadiqKhan & #Traitor to the 
#UK 
#Westminster #WestminsterAttack”  
 
“@bluehand007 @SadiqKhan is mouthing Muslim apologist language of 
traitors. How long will fools pretend Islam isn't cancer? #westminster” 
 
“#westminster let's see #SadiqKhan apologize and make excuses for the 
#muslimfilth and how it's got nothing to do with #Islam #liberalprick” 
 
"#London when you choose a Muslim as mayor, you choose #Terror .... It's 
that simple.. #westminster #Islam” 
 
Not only the Mayor but all political leaders should realise that Islam is the problem. 
The attack is their fault too because they let ‘them’ in. Political correctness should 
be abandoned.  
 
“Make no mistake, this attack happened due to political correctness and 
symopathy towards violent Islam. #WestminsterAttack #Westminster” 
 
 “@KirklandBloke stop importing #muslims you sick blind politically-correct 
traitors.” 
 
“#westminster WHAT WILL OUR POLITICIANS DO TO STOP CREEPING 
FORCED ISLAMIFICATION. NO GO AREAS IN BRADFORD LEEDS 




“All politicians who acquiesced to daily importation of Islamics share guilt 
with Islams Killers! #westminster #AlexJayMac @annemieke1949” 
 
“#Westminster maybe our political leaders will now consider the rise of 
Islam a threat to Western way of life. And take steps to halt it” 
 
“Enjoy the #islamic enrichment of the #european societies. Enjoy your new 
#EU. #Westminster #BrusselsAttacks #London” 
 
“Europe will kill itself with political correctness.  Not one media outlet 
calling it an Islamist attack.  #westminster #parliament” 
 
"They know that Islamism and PC bigotry are dangerous and hiding behind 
weasel words in armoured limos keeps THEM safe” 
 
Tweeters demand the West and the left wake up because Islam is trying to conquer 
‘us’. They should do something about Islam, such as ban it, make it illegal, stop 
immigration, deport Muslims etc. 
 
“solution. Make islam illegal in this country. Government dont have the balls. 
Unlike putin hes nuts but he looks after his own #westminster” 
 
“Wake Up! The goal of Islam is to conquer the world #Westminster” 
 
“Wake up! Mass immigration and Islam is destroying Europe! #London 
#PrayForLondon #Westminster” 
 
“So from #Westminster the trail of the #Muslim attacker quickly led back to 
the #IslamicCityofBirmingham.  time for #UK to wake up ?” 
 
As opposed to all left-wing politicians they condemn, Donald Trump and his anti-
immigration policies and Muslim ban are highly praised. People believe Trump can 
224 
 
offer a solution for the ‘Islam problem’. A large number of tweets included 
#MAGA (Make America Great Again) and #Trump. 
 
“WHAT HAS TRUMP BEEN SAYING ALL ALONG??? #WakeupAmerica 
#BanIslam #westminster #WakeupUK” 
 
“Putin and trump should teach us how to deals with extremist 
islam..#Westminster #londonattack” 
 
“@MayorofLondon President Trump Ignorant of Islam? Convert all to Islam 
or else. Mohammed a murderous child molester, rapist.” 
 
“@RobbieSpacey #Westminster   Im sick and tired of muslims getting away 
with this   Time to stamp it out  work with trump to destroy islam” 
 
“Trump right about now #toldyouso #Westminster #Islam” 
 
“Islamists strike again. Trump is right, we need a complete shut down 
#Westminster” 
 
“@realDonaldTrump European leaders are to weak and scared to address 





In this exploratory study we used different qualitative and quantitative techniques 
to better understand the manifestation of people’s attitudes towards Islam on 
Twitter after a terrorist attack carried out by a Muslim perpetrator. In order to 
identify said attitudes, tweets containing #westminster and the word ‘islam’ were 
collected and collated over a three-week period and then their sentimental and 
content were analysed. Furthermore, combining qualitative analyses with 
quantitative network analysis, the present study provides a unique approach to 
understanding how Islam-related views are expressed and social groups are bonded 




As a first step of the analysis, we identified a group structure that tweeted about the 
Westminster attack and showed that each group possessed different social 
identities; for example, various geographical, religious and political identities were 
represented (see Figure 7.1). As the focus of this study was the manifestation of 
Islam related attitudes, we identified a group structure consisting of only Twitter 
members who tweeted about Islam in relation to the attack (see Figure 7.3). Our 
findings showed a positive correlation between tweets about the attack and Islam-
related tweets, which indicates that when people tweeted about the attacks, those 
tweets tended to be related to Islam. This finding suggests that the attack was 
perceived as being perpetrated through Islam.  
 
By the adoption of our mixed methods approach we were able to identify social 
groups within our data and the sentiments with which they tweeted about Islam (see 
Figure 7.4). Most groups could be identified as either extremely negative 
(Islamophobic) or positive (anti-Islamophobic) and strong ingroup insularity was 
also evident from our network analysis graph. Furthermore, we found statistical 
evidence for a positive association between ingroup insularity and the extremity of 
the tweet’s sentiment, indicating that groups with more ingroup following were 
more likely to tweet in a more extreme way about Islam (either positive or 
negative). We believe this finding presents potential evidence for group polarisation 
occurring in cyberspace. Evidence for group polarisation has been well documented 
(for example Bauer & Judd, 1996; Isenberg, 1986; Myers & Lamm, 1971) and the 
present study adds to the literature by showing that members of groups with more 
extreme views on Islam are more likely to follow each other than members of other 
groups on Twitter. The self-selecting nature of this following behaviour ensures 
twitter users are ‘preaching to the converted’ and most likely results in a 
polarisation of their views about Islam, pushing extreme views (either positive or 
negative) further towards the extreme. The work of Reicher, Spears and Postmes 
(e.g., 1995) suggests that computer-mediated communication can provide an 
environment for a more powerful impact of group processes and social identities, 
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and our observations support the idea that social identities are apparent in 
cyberspace.  
Interestingly, the overall number of negative tweets toward Islam also exceeded the 
number of positive tweets and that is with the exclusion of retweets and tweets 
generated by bots. Moreover, three out of the top five most retweeted tweets were 
those of negative sentiment. These results indicate that negative information – in 
this case negative and mostly Islamophobic views of Islam – is more likely to be 
expressed and disseminated, and those who express these views are more likely to 
follow each other. Our data supports the view that Twitter serves as a platform for 
like-minded people to connect and share their views and interestingly those with 
anti-Islamic views are more likely to utilise it. Previous research has also shown 
evidence that tweets with negative sentiments are spread more frequently than 
positive ones (Salathé, Khandelwal, & Hunter, 2013; Tsugawa & Ohsaki, 2015).  
 
In an analysis of online BBC forums it was also found that negative emotions 
increase the activity of users, e.g., posting rate (Chmiel, Sobkowicz, Sienkiewicz, 
Paltoglou, & Buckley, 2011). The magnitude of negative tweets and views could 
be explained by ‘negativity bias’ wherein people usually give more prominence to 
negative information over positive information in their judgements, feelings and 
information-processing tasks (Rozin, & Royzman, 2001). The elicitation of 
cognitive, emotional and behavioural responses is quicker and stronger in response 
to negative information compared to positive or neutral information and bad 
impressions and bad stereotypes are quicker to form (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). Another explanation for this phenomenon could be the 
concept of hypercriticism (Amabile & Glazebrook, 1982) whereby negative 
statements are seen to be more erudite and intelligent in comparison to positive 
comments; one is more likely to assert a negative statement over a positive one if 
the aim is to impress others with our intelligence. 
 
We conducted content analysis on the positive and negative valence tweets in order 
to explore the themes through which the users express their attitudes in relation to 
Islam and/or Muslims. A large number of salient codes were identified that aided 
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our analysis and in regard to the positive tweets we identified two themes; unity and 
defence. The most often employed tweets mirror both themes, for example 
#WeStandTogether, #TheyShallNotDivideUs, #LoveForAllHatredForNone, 
#TrueIslam etc. Although we identified two themes, there was a lot of overlap 
within the tweets.  
 
Tweets in the unity theme tended to express solidarity not only towards the victims 
of the attack but also towards the Muslim community who are the sufferers of the 
subsequent Islamophobia evoked by the attack. Discontent and concern are often 
expressed in the tweets in a response to the anti-Islamic rhetoric. Many fear that the 
attack will be used by right-wing politicians (mainly Donald Trump) and supporters 
to disseminate and promote anti-Muslim sentiment in addition to the cultivation of 
anti-immigration views with the ultimate aim of dividing society. The tweets warn 
the other users about this and attempt to rally everyone against the hatred and 
division while praising unity and peace. The predominant goal is to promote the 
unification of a diverse and varied population, and as a collective build a safer, 
stronger and a more United Kingdom. This overarching aim supports a construction 
of British national identity that is multicultural and also tolerant. Tweeters also 
believe that the division of the West is the fundamental aim of terrorists and people 
should stand up against it.  
 
The other theme we identified from the tweets that were positive in their sentiment 
in association to Islam, we named defence. These tweets showed support and 
defended Islam, while often disconnecting it and its followers from the attack. It 
was also signified that the perpetrator does not represent Islam and he is not a ‘real’ 
Muslim because the religion does not support, condone or sympathise with 
terrorism in any way. They claimed that the act of terrorism is committed by an 
individual and it has no religion. Furthermore, the tweets encourage the public not 
to associate the attack with Islam and remember that it is the religion of peace. In 
their analysis of tweets posted after the Paris attacks, Magdy et al. (2015) showed 
similar findings according to which the tweets expressing positive attitudes towards 
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Muslims after the attacks were also found to have defended them and emphasised 
the importance of differentiating between Islam and ISIS.  
 
Furthermore, negative tweets tended to be multi-layered, utilising a lot of metaphor 
and hyperbole in order to express their anti-Islam rhetoric as well as creating new 
hybrid words and hashtags to strengthen said sentiment. We identified two themes; 
Islamophobia and Politics & liberal backlash. 
 
The strongly Islamophobic attitudes in the tweets were expressed in several ways, 
one of the most prevailing views was Islam being a threat to the West, being 
incompatible with its values and having no place in it. Being incompatible with the 
Western world, Islam should be banned, and as Muslims are incapable of, and 
nevertheless should not be assimilating, they should be deported and removed from 
Western society. This attitude can be explained by the notion of symbolic threat 
identified by Stephan and Stephan (1993, 1996) in the Integrated Threat Theory. 
Perceived symbolic threats can arise when a divide is deemed to exist between the 
worldview and values of an ingroup and outgroup. This divide can invoke the 
ingroup to feel that their beliefs, attitudes and group morals are under threat from 
the outgroup. In the case of the negative Islamophobic tweets in the present study, 
Muslims are the outgroup who are perceived to pose/be a symbolic threat by their 
conflicting and incompatible values which subsequently leads to Islamophobia. 
Several researchers have also previously found evidence for this notion, for 
example perceived symbolic threat predicted prejudice towards Muslims amongst 
Dutch participants (Velasco-González et al., 2008) as well as predicted outgroup 
attitudes in Northern Ireland (Tausch, Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy, & Cairns, 
2007). Thomsen et al. (2018) also showed that symbolic, and to a lesser degree, 
realistic threats were inextricably linked to anti-Muslim attitudes and behavioural 
intentions held by Westerners. These themes are an echo of existing mass media 
representations of Muslims and Islam (Driggs, Abraham, & Harris, 2018; Jaspal, & 




Furthermore, using data form the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France 
and Spain provided by the Pew Global Attitudes Survey (Ciftci, 2012) it was found 
that both perceived symbolic and realistic threats are the largest contributor to the 
Islamophobic attitudes held by Westerners. We believe that terrorism can be 
categorised as a realistic threat, and as Islam and all Muslims are allegedly 
associated with it they are therefore perceived as a realistic threat, as was noticeable 
in the tweets. Moreover, a large number of tweeters suggested that multiculturalism, 
diversity, immigration and refugees are problems, all of which are associated with 
Muslims and thus also contribute to them being perceived as a realistic threat. 
Research in the US, for example, showed some evidence for a rise in general anti-
immigrant feelings post-9/11 (Hitlan, Carrillo, Zárate, & Aikman, 2007). Analysing 
data collected from the United Kingdom, France and Germany, Croucher (2012) 
demonstrated that there is a significantly negative relationship between the 
perceived real and symbolic threat, and the belief that Muslims are effectively 
assimilating, thus suggesting that when the ingroup perceives themselves to be 
under threat from Muslim immigrants, they are less prone to believe that Muslim 
immigrants want to assimilate. Thus, it can be concluded that the negative tweets 
posted in the aftermath of the Westminster attack portray Muslims as representing 
a hybridised threat – a term proposed by Jaspal and Cinnirella (2010) – that 
combines both symbolic and realistic threats. Muslims and Islam are perceived to 
be the enemy (some even claim that they are the greatest enemy) of the West and 
its values, and tweeters believe that the West is at war with them. The construction 
of this as a ‘war’ is important to highlight, as it adds perceived justification for the 
prejudice and dehumanisation, since wartime enemies have traditionally been 
vilified throughout history.  
 
A large number of ‘us’ and ‘them’ differentiations are expressed in the tweets, 
which exemplifies the use of language associated with social identity (as well as 
national identity). This is reflected by the tweeters – who are the citizens of the 
West and mainly Great Britain – referring to themselves as ‘us’ (the ingroup) and 
Muslims as ‘them’ (the outgroup). Thus, tweeters claim that Islam and Muslims 
should be destroyed and killed, whose view is justified by the ongoing war that they 
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claim is happening. Consistent with our findings, Muslims were depicted as the 
enemy of the West in the tweets after the Brussels bombings (Miller et al., 2016) 
as well as after the 2016 E.U. referendum in the U.K. where Brexit was viewed as 
a stratagem to avert a conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims in the UK 
(Evolvi, 2008). Media representations of Muslims also showed that they were 
frequently adjudged to be an enemy of Britain and its values (Driggs, Abraham, & 
Harris, 2018; Jaspal, & Cinnirella, 2010; Moore et al., 2008; Poole, 2006; 
Richardson, 2004)). In addition, this was also frequently utilised in right-wing 
political rhetoric (Khan et al., 2019; Nielson & Allen, 2002).  
  
All anti-Islamic tweets implemented generalisations of Muslims, they are often said 
to be the same and are referred to as a homogeneous entity and are therefore all 
responsible for the attack. This shows evidence for the outgroup homogeneity effect 
(Quattrone & Jones, 1980) whereby members of the outgroup are perceived to be 
more similar, and thus more homogeneous than members of the ingroup. 
Subsequently, outgroup members are more likely to be stereotyped – as is observed 
in the negative tweets. Muslims are often dehumanised, said to be inferior and 
construed with derogatory characteristics – they are alleged to be barbaric, 
medieval, sexist, evil, primitive etc. – and are depicted to be inherently negative 
and immutable. The use of negative and degrading sentiment to portray all Muslims 
in the aftermath of a terrorist attack has been noted by previous studies, such as in 
the analysis of tweets following the Woolwich attack (Awan, 2014), Paris attack 
(Magdy et al., 2015) and after the Brussels bombings (Miller et al., 2016). Analysis 
of tweets in the aftermath of the British European Union membership Referendum 
also showed consistent findings (Evolvi, 2018). Moreover, fine-grained media 
analyses found that frequently, Muslim culture is portrayed as intrinsically negative 
and they are often described as possessing characteristics which are innate and 
indelible, and constitutive of all Muslims (Cinnirella, 2012; Jaspal, & Cinnirella, 
2010).  
 
Metaphors were also frequently used in the tweets to portray Muslims, examples 
such as ‘cockroach’, ‘subhuman’, ‘pig’, ‘pigshit’ and ‘scum’ were endemic. Islam 
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and Muslims are also depicted in metaphorical terms for illnesses, such as ‘cancer’, 
‘Black Plague’, ‘sickness’, ‘mental AIDS’, ‘virus’ etc. They are depicted as similar 
to animals, perceived to be of lesser humanness which reflects dehumanisation so 
as to raise the ingroup above the outgroup. Haslam et al. (2008) proposed that out-
group ‘others’ are often excluded from full humanness in an animalistic sense, they 
are less than human because they have not yet evolved from their animalistic 
origins. This dehumanisation is typified by the belief that these others are devoid 
of cognitive sophistication, refinement, morality, civility and self-discipline. 
Research showed that blatant dehumanisation amongst British participants 
predicted endorsement of belligerent actions like torture and retributory violence 
against Muslims after the Woolwich attacks (Kteily, Kteily, & Bruneau, Waytz, & 
Cotterill, 2015). Furthermore, several tweets implemented WWII metaphors to 
describe Islam. These metaphors were utilised in order to draw parallels between 
Nazi ideology/Nazis/fascism and Islam. Tweeters even created and deployed new 
hybrid hashtags to express the views, such as ‘islamonazi’, ‘islamofascism’ and 
‘islamofascists’. 
 
It is also worth noting that the previously described eight closed views that 
constitute Islamophobia – defined by the Runnymede Trust (1997) – were 
reflected/mirrored/echoed in negative Islamophobic tweets analysed in the present. 
Islam was portrayed as (1) immutable, (2) incompatible with the West, (3) inferior 
and barbaric, (4) violent and aggressive, (5) a political ideology. Although no two-
way communication (i.e. a discourse between a Muslim and non-Muslim) was 
analysed, (6) the West was portrayed to be superior and tweets by Muslims were 
attacked or reused in a sarcastic manner, such as ‘religion of peace’, (7) the claim 
that Muslims should be banned and excluded from society justified by an 
ideological hostility, (8) derogatory and hostile tweets were seen as acceptable. The 
hashtags created by users to accompany their messages also reflected their strongly 
anti-Islam attitude, for example #IslamIsCancer, #Rapefugees, #StopIslam, 





The content analysis of the negative tweets yielded another theme that we 
categorised as Politics & liberal backlash. While most of the negative tweets were 
characterised as Islamophobic, politics were integrated into the tweets and a 
differing hostility emerged. Verbal attacks, anger, discontent and hostile tweets 
were directed against those who defended Muslims – ‘Islam apologists’ as they 
were often referred to as – and those who claimed that the attack has no association 
with Islam. Tweeters demanded these ‘apologists’ stop denying the responsibility 
of Islam and realise that Islam is the problem. Hatred was directed against liberals, 
left-wing politicians and left-wing supporters for defending Islam and for being 
more concerned about the emerging Islamophobia than the attack itself. In addition, 
London Mayor Sadiq Khan was often negatively referred to – or being tweeted to 
– for protecting Muslims and thus sharing responsibility for the attack. He was 
identified as a traitor, which positions him as an ingroup black sheep. This 
exemplifies the so-called black sheep effect whereby the ingroup derogate those in-
groupers deemed socially undesirable and attempt to deny their membership of the 
in-group (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988). Some tweeters suggested that the left is also 
responsible for the attack because they brought and let Islam in to England. They 
believe political correctness should be abandoned and they demand that the West 
and the left wake up because Islam is trying to conquer ‘us’. They should do 
something about Islam, they should ban it, make it illegal, stop immigration, deport 
Muslims etc. We observed similar findings in Study 4 (Chapter 6) where we looked 
at people’s views on the implementation of stricter surveillance measures by the 
UK Government in the aftermath of the Paris attacks. An interesting theme we 
identified was the dichotomous reasoning whereby both pro- and anti-surveillance 
individuals ultimately arrived at the same conclusion; the ‘other’ group assists 
terrorists by either supporting, or not supporting surveillance. We explained this 
phenomenon using the opposing sides’ competing narratives of nation, whereby 
core British values are interpreted differently, ultimately leading to a black sheep 
effect. The same explanation stands in its place within this context – right-wing 
Islamophobic groups position liberals as the ingroup black sheep, due to their 




As a stark contrast to the condemning views they hold on liberals and left-wing 
politicians, Donald Trump, his anti-immigration policies and his Muslim ban are 
highly praised. People believe Trump can offer a solution to the ‘Islam problem’. 
This is also corroborated by the frequent use of some tweets accompanying 
hashtags, such as #MAGA, #Trump and #Brexit. The identification of left-wing 
politicians as ‘protectors’ or ‘allies’ of Muslims, and the applauding of right-wing 
politicians for their use of anti-Muslim rhetoric has been prevalent in Brexit related 
tweets too, as demonstrated by Evolvi (2017). Consistent findings were presented 
by Miller and colleagues (2016) in the tweets after the Brussels attacks, showing 
that tweets that related the terrorist attacks to broader issues, such as Islam, 
migration and assimilation often articulated their endorsement for Trump’s 
opinions regarding the cessation of Muslim immigration following the attacks. Our 
findings show the undeniable role Donald Trump played in the shaping of anti-
Islamic sentiment amongst Twitter users whose tweets were analysed in the current 
study. The now President incessantly vocalised his anxiety and fear of Islam, and 
Muslims. Trump has presented Islam and Muslims as a grave threat, and his anti-
Islamic ideology is offered to the public as Islamophobic rhetoric; rhetoric often 
directed towards the Muslim community. All discursive strategies that he utilised 
worked to polarize society by playing on us versus them sentiments, whereby the 
depiction of Muslims and Islam is built upon a foundation of them as an outgroup, 
with incongruous and aversive characteristics (Khan et al., 2019).  
 
It should be highlighted that various factors can influence the interactions between 
people in an online environment (such as Twitter from where data was gathered) 
compared to an offline setting. For a more in-depth discussion on computer-
mediated communication and its psychological implications, please see Section 1.  
 
This study demonstrates the value of using a combination of methods to provide 
answers for insufficiently explored key research questions. The present study 
provided a unique perspective to understand views on Islam and following 
behaviour on Twitter in the aftermath of terrorist attacks by the application of both 
quantitative and qualitative research analyses. However, one of the possible 
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limitations of this research is the sole focus on tweets with ‘islam’ and the neglect 
of the key word ‘muslim’. Even though a large number of tweets were analysed, it 
is possible that with an extended focus more information could have been gained 
on expressions of attitudes and group behaviour. Furthermore, it is important to 
highlight that this study may not be representative of the populace, as individuals 
using hashtags attract those members who are interested in the topics that the 
hashtags signify which can account for self-selection bias – as previous research 
has suggested (Reddick et al., 2015). 
 
In conclusion, using the combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches, the 
present study provided a unique approach to understanding how Islam-related 
views are expressed by social groups on Twitter after the Westminster attack. The 
study identified Islamophobic and anti-Islamophobic attitudes (RQ1) and the 
expression of such attitudes within the group structure (RQ3 & RQ4), explored in-
depth manifestations of such attitudes (RQ2) and evaluated how those relate to 
online group processes (RQ5). To our knowledge, no previous research has 
attempted to use mixed methods to provide an in-depth analysis of such a 
magnitude of tweets and online group behaviour, especially in the aftermath of a 





7.6 Supplemental Material 
 
7.6.1 Section one 
This section contains images of tweets that were accompanied with pictures and 


































Image 7  
 
 
This tweet was coded with negative, Islamophobic, Trump, liberals, religion of peace 
codes.  
 
Image 8  
 
 
















7.6.2 Section two  
 
Table 7.5 Krippendroff’s α reliability estimate for each code. All Kalphas represent good reliability. 
Code name  Krippendorff’s α 
General Kalpha = 0.94 
Positive Kalpha = 1.00 
Negative Kalpha = 0.94 
Ambiguous Kalpha = 0.97 
Apologists Kalpha = 0.80 
Ban Kalpha = 0.77 
Cancer Kalpha = 0.87 
Politicians  Kalpha = 1.00 
Islam = peace Kalpha = 1.00 
Islam = terror Kalpha = 0.89 
Islamophobia  Kalpha = 0.95 
Justification Kalpha = 1.00 
Liberals Kalpha = 0.93 
Mayor Kalpha = 1.00 
Multiculturalism Kalpha = 0.80 
Negative reactions Kalpha = 0.96 
No religion  Kalpha = 0.86 
Not a real Muslim  Kalpha = 1.00 
Not Islam Kalpha = 0.82 
Nothing Kalpha = 1.00 
PC Kalpha = 1.00 
Politicians  Kalpha = 1.00 
Real victims Kalpha = 1.00 
Reform  Kalpha = 1.00 
Refugees Kalpha = 0.92 
Religion  Kalpha = 1.00 
RW Kalpha = 1.00 
Same Kalpha = 0.86 
Surprise Kalpha = 0.80 
Threat Kalpha = 0.80 
Together Kalpha = 0.83 
Trump Kalpha = 0.83 
Violence Kalpha = 0.89 
Wake up Kalpha = 1.00 
War Kalpha = 1.00 
WW2 Kalpha = 1.00 






Table 7.6. Hashtags accompanying negative tweets within tweets including #westminster. 








































































Table 7.7 Hashtags accompanying positive tweets within tweets including #westminster. 





























8. General Discussion 
This thesis presented an investigation of how people perceive, understand and 
evaluate some of the most pressing issues in modern societies; surveillance, 
privacy, trust, threat of terrorism and Islamophobia. This investigation comprised 
of five empirical studies utilising a mixed method approach. The thesis started off 
with a wide focus where I explored people’s perceptions of surveillance 
(government and corporate; online and offline; mass and targeted) and identified 
five themes that underpin such perceptions. As discussion about privacy in the 
context of social media (online corporate surveillance) was a reoccurring theme in 
Study 1 (Chapter 3), Study 2 (Chapter 4) concentrated solely on information 
privacy concerns on Facebook, and I tested whether these are associated with 
certain personality dispositions that previous research has suggested could be 
relevant. In the following two studies I shifted focus, examining perceptions of 
government surveillance – a decision based on the results of Study 1 (Chapter 3) 
and also influenced by current events unfolding at the time of the research. As 
people’s surveillance evaluations appeared to be related to their feelings of 
Britishness, Study 3 (Chapter 5) investigated the relationship between people’s 
British national identity and three facets of surveillance perceptions (need, benefit, 
concern), and utilised a priming manipulation to test whether increased national 
identity has an effect on them. Building on current events, in Study 4 (Chapter 6) I 
explored how people’s beliefs ultimately led to either the acceptance or rejection of 
increased surveillance measures proposed by the British Government in the 
aftermath of a terrorist attack. The basis of these investigations was somewhat 
similar, guided by research on perceived need, benefit and effectiveness of 
surveillance, concerns about such measures, trust in the Government and perceived 
threat of terrorism. As a result of terrorism emerging as a reoccurring theme 
throughout the studies, and the occurrence of the first recent terrorist attack in the 
UK since 7/7, I dedicated the last study (Chapter 7) to the exploration of a prevalent 
phenomenon – Islamophobia. I utilised a mixed method approach to examine how 
Islam-related views are manifested by social groups on Twitter after the 
Westminster terrorist attack, and explored the manifestation of group processes on 
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Twitter. In the remainder of this discussion, a summary of findings will be provided 
and those findings critically evaluated, and then possible directions for future 
research will be considered.  
 
In Study 1 (Chapter 3), I conducted and analysed twenty face-to-face interviews 
where three main topical and interconnected areas were discussed; surveillance, 
privacy, trust. Regarding surveillance, participants tended to perceive it to be 
ubiquitous and inevitable and constructed it through metaphors such as security 
cameras and the Orwellian principle of Big Brother. Most of them admitted to 
holding a naïve view on surveillance and believed that if employed by the 
Government, it must be for protection, safety and out of necessity. While most of 
them had supportive attitudes towards both online and offline surveillance, those 
who did not, reasoned it was due to their lack of trust in the Government. The 
language of social identity was observed in many responses, and British national 
identity often discussed or implied (‘us’, ‘we’ etc.). The phenomenon of 
surveillance was often anchored into the safety and protection of the group (and 
nation) by the Government. Every participant was aware of targeted surveillance of 
certain groups and most thought that this was justifiable. Most of these interviews 
were held after the 2015 Paris terrorist attack, and hence surveillance and especially 
terrorism was in the forefront of participants’ minds, which we believe impacted 
their surveillance perceptions.  
 
Regarding privacy, we observed that participants tended to anchor their social 
representation of the term into representations of safety – similar to how they 
perceived surveillance. Everyone viewed privacy as important, if not essential. 
However, when asked about privacy protection techniques/measures they might 
implement, the majority revealed that they took no specific measures/precautions 
when online. In terms of their information privacy on the largest social network, 
Facebook, most of them admitted to having never or not very often edited their 
privacy settings. These findings reflect the privacy paradox phenomenon showing 




Trust in the British Government and trust in online companies were both discussed 
in the context of both offline and online surveillance and data monitoring. An 
interesting paradoxical set of beliefs was uncovered here - even though almost 
every participant believed that the Government might misuse their surveillance 
powers for illegitimate reasons, they tended to be rather apathetic about this, and 
half of them still trusted them with such powers. When trust in online companies 
(e.g., Facebook, Google) was explored, the majority of people expressed mistrust 
mainly due to privacy concerns, data misuse and targeted advertising, but again, 
this did not particularly lead to any action to regain privacy. 
 
I proffered a general conclusion, that surveillance is seen as inevitable, thus people 
tend to accept it over time to reduce distress. However, surveillance perceptions are 
also heavily influenced by perceptions of threat and need (which are both 
heightened in the aftermath of a terrorist event) which are intertwined with inherent 
trust in the Government. In a state when people feel a heightened threat of terrorism, 
surveillance is perceived to be needed for protection and safety. Trust in the 
Government leads to surveillance acceptance – although trust in the Government 
tends to increase during a period of heightened threat.  
 
The findings of this study allow for useful insights into the social constructions of 
surveillance, privacy and trust (online and offline, government and corporation 
related) but due to its qualitative nature, causal relationships are not empirically 
tested. Future studies could explore these relationships further by building on 
themes discovered in this exploratory study and investigating, for example, how 
malleable to situational factors some of these factors are. 
 
In the second study (Chapter 4) I presented evidence that certain personality traits 
and trust correlate with and are predictive of information privacy concerns on 
Facebook. The results showed that conscientious and agreeable individuals, as well 
as those who were open to new experiences, tended to display higher concerns 
about information privacy. Conscientious people tend to be careful, diligent, 
foresighted, have heightened sense of awareness, increased attentiveness and a 
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number of studies have previously showed evidence for its relation to privacy and 
security concerns (Bansal, 2011; Junglas et al., 2008; Stieger et al., 2013; Uffen et 
al., 2012). Consistent with our results, studies have previously demonstrated the 
positive association between agreeableness and information privacy concerns, as 
agreeable individuals tend to display heightened apprehensions as regards the 
privacy of themselves and others (Bansal et al., 2010; Egelman & Peer, 2015; 
Korzaan & Boswell, 2008). Those scoring high on the trait openness to experience 
have a tendency to experience novel situations, try new things and acquire a broad 
sense of awareness and tend to be more concerned about the privacy of their 
information, as shown previously (Egelman & Peer, 2015; Junglas et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, neuroticism was found to be a positive predictor of Facebook privacy 
concerns, confirming the results of previous studies showing that individuals high 
on the trait of neuroticism have a tendency to control the information they share 
(Liu et al., 2013; Ross et al., 2009; Sumner et al., 2011). 
 
Interestingly, contrary to our hypothesis, people’s general propensity to trust was 
found to be positively related to Facebook privacy concerns, suggesting that 
individuals who are likely to trust others tend to be more concerned about their 
information on Facebook. I explained this unexpected relationship by the difference 
between trust as a personality trait (considered to be a facet of agreeableness) and 
trust in social networks. As propensity to trust relates to the generalised 
expectations about the trustworthiness of others, it is unrelated to the trust one puts 
in Facebook.  
 
Findings from Study 2 (Chapter 4) also showed that people who are generally open 
in sharing information with others in their social circles on Facebook tended to be 
less concerned about their information privacy on Facebook and so were those who 
placed more trust in Facebook. Regarding self-esteem, the findings were contrary 
to our hypothesis, indicating a negative relationship between self-esteem and 
Facebook privacy concerns. We provided a possible post-hoc interpretation of this 
finding. People with low self-esteem tend to be anxious and shyer and due to their 
proneness to feel socially anxious and their fear of being negatively evaluated, they 
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tend to be cautious and distinctive about self-disclosing, and thus they also tend to 
have increased privacy concerns. Self-esteem has also been shown to be one of the 
lower order indicators of neuroticism (Eysenck, 1990; Watson, 2000), a personality 
trait which I found to negatively predict privacy concerns on Facebook.  
 
The study two results therefore demonstrated the importance of personality traits, 
self-esteem and trust in contributing to privacy concerns on Facebook, although it 
should be noted that there is a high degree of unexplained variance in the analyses, 
since the correlations were rather week and the sample size lower than ideal (in 
terms of statistical power). Future studies could investigate these relationships with 
a larger sample size utilising an a priori power analysis tailored to the predicted 
effect sizes.  
  
In Study 3 (Chapter 5) I found a significant positive association between British 
national identity and perceived need and perceived benefits of government 
surveillance. The finding also showed that those with stronger feelings of national 
identity tended to be less concerned about surveillance imposed by the Government.  
However, the British national identity priming manipulation had no effect on any 
of those surveillance perceptions. I explained this lack of significance by the recent 
denunciation of priming techniques as a result of the ‘replication crisis’ suggesting 
that social priming effects may be much less powerful than once thought, and 
potentially extremely short-lived (Cesario, 2014; Klein, 2014; Shanks et al., 2015).  
It is therefore possible that priming may have made national identity more salient, 
but for just a few fleeting seconds. Alternatively, it may be that the priming 
manipulation failed to influence British identity because this social identity is 
robust and well-developed within our participants, and because of this, resistant to 
being primed by relatively mundane tasks such as the one used in the manipulation, 
perhaps only fluctuating in response to more meaningful real-world events such as 
reportings of terror attacks, sporting or military events.  
 
As beliefs around the need for  and benefits of surveillance are both perceptions 
that are ultimately linked to supportive attitudes towards surveillance (Budak et al., 
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2013; Dinev et al., 2008; Murakami Wood & Webster, 2009; Sanquist et al., 2008; 
Webster, 2009), we propose that our findings are in line with those of O’Donnell 
and colleagues’ (2010) who showed that shared social identity with the source of 
surveillance increases its acceptance and that when identity is not shared between 
the surveilled and the source of surveillance, then it is more likely that the 
monitoring will be viewed as an infringement of privacy. These findings suggested 
that British national identity and acceptance of government surveillance is linked 
to arguments that position surveillance within the national interest and as linked to 
national security. These kinds of social constructions of government surveillance 
thus put pressure on those who see themselves as British to accept surveillance as 
a way of adhering to group norms (‘self-stereotyping’; see Turner, 1991) and 
demonstrating their ‘loyalty’ to the in-group. The construction of government 
surveillance as necessary for national security also plays on the function that 
national identity serves for protecting the individual (Bloom, 1990). The 
quantitative results of this study are also in line the qualitative findings of Study 1 
(Chapter 3), highlighting the importance of shared identity in perceptions of 
government surveillance.  
 
Future research in this area would benefit from a mixed methods approach – 
experimental studies could attempt to tease out some of the additional factors that 
impact support for surveillance that may be sensitive to contextual effects and are 
as yet, under-researched, such as political orientation, certain personality 
dimensions (e.g., RWA) and trust in the current Government. Additionally, 
qualitative work could seek to map some of the societal discourses (e.g., in the 
mainstream media) around surveillance and how these discourses draw upon 
themes linked to national identity and terrorism. It would be interesting, for 
example, to explore how lay discourses around surveillance are impacted by the 
discourses present in mass media and disseminated by ‘opinion leaders’ such as 
politicians. 
 
In Study 4 (Chapter 6) I identified themes from a forum discussion that contributed 
to people’s acceptance or rejection of the proposed implementation of stricter 
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surveillance measures by the British Government as a response to a terrorist attack. 
Building on an ITT explanation, I posited that the acceptance or rejection of 
surveillance is at least partly dependent on one’s evaluation of the symbolic threat 
to privacy posed by surveillance and the realistic threat posed by terrorism resulting 
in the need for security. Higher realistic threat perceptions led to more favourable 
views on surveillance, showing that the heightened sense of threat imposed by 
terrorism resulted in people valuing security over privacy. This can be explained by 
the all too common emotional reaction to a threat, where an effort is made to 
increase levels of personal security so as to reduce the distress. This finding is in 
line with previous research, where the threat of terrorism was found to positively 
affect people’s acceptance and support for surveillance (Cohrs et al., 2005; Davis 
& Silver, 2004; Levi & Wall, 2004; Malhotra & Popp, 2012). On the other hand, 
when symbolic threat of surveillance (resulting in the loss of privacy, freedom and 
individual liberties) was perceived to be more important than the realistic threat of 
terrorism, less favourable views on surveillance were formed. Concerns regarding 
privacy infringement, stemming from stronger surveillance measures leading to a 
surveillance society have been well documented previously by researchers (Lyon, 
2003; Lyon, 1994; Mitchener-Nissen, 2014; Murakami Wood & Webster, 2009). 
Furthermore, while one’s perception of privacy and security are part of a finely 
tuned balance, the findings of this study also suggested that the relationship is 
hugely affected by trust in the institution that carries out the surveillance (the UK 
Government in the case of this study) and the perceived effectiveness of 
surveillance – as also evidenced in findings of my previous studies.  
 
Furthermore, I also reported an interesting theme, the dichotomous reasoning 
whereby both pro- and anti-surveillance individuals ultimately arrived at the same 
conclusion; the ‘other’ group assists terrorists by either supporting, or not 
supporting surveillance. Pro-surveillance individuals believed that the anti-
surveillance camp supports terrorism by preventing the implementation of new 
surveillance measures, while anti-surveillance members argued that by 
surrendering their freedom and privacy in support of further surveillance measures, 
the pro-surveillance individuals support terrorists. I explained this phenomenon 
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using the opposing sides’ competing narratives of nation whereby core British 
values are interpreted differently, ultimately leading to a black sheep effect that 
positions the other side as traitors to the ingroup and consequently the target of 
negative perceptions. 
 
I believe this study benefited greatly from a qualitative design in being able to map 
different ways in which pro- and anti-surveillance beliefs are constructed. The 
nuanced way in which symbolic and realistic threats intertwine with narratives of 
national identity and national values would have been difficult, if not impossible to 
capture using quantitative methods. This is not to say that future studies could not 
move forwards in a multi method manner. The bulk of the social identity and ITT 
literatures within social psychology remain quantitative, and it would be possible 
to explore quantitatively (e.g., via survey experiments) the role of realistic and 
symbolic threat perceptions, perhaps exploring which situational factors impact 
them.  Nevertheless, qualitative analysis remains very well suited to research such 
as that reported in this study, which focuses on naturally occurring interactions in 
social media, and the themes identified in this study could also be explored by 
further qualitative work on, for example, more politically oriented discussion 
forums. 
 
As I elaborated on previously, the threat of terrorism and how it affects perceptions 
seemed to be a reoccurring theme across my studies (except for Study 2, Chapter 
4) and while designing my last study, a terrorist attack occurred in London, raising 
the possibility of tailoring a final piece of work to take account of a current event. 
The use of network analysis on Twitter was always within the scope of this thesis 
and this attack – however unfortunate – provided the climate to mix methods and 
explore social construction in cyberspace. However, instead of tailoring this study 
around surveillance, I decided to focus on Islam-related tweets and the behaviour 
of groups tweeting them. This was, as indicated above, essentially because my 
previous studies had suggested that in some ways, ‘all roads lead to Islamophobia 
and perceptions of Islamic terrorism’. In exploring the manifestation of social 
media activity around the terror event, we had an opportunity to observe naturally 
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occurring communication around the event and deploy some methodologies as yet 
not utilised within the thesis, and which remain rare within social psychology.  
 
Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, Study 5 (Chapter 7) 
provided a unique approach to understanding how Islam-related views are 
expressed by social groups on Twitter after the Westminster terrorist attack. The 
study identified Islamophobic and anti-Islamophobic attitudes, the expression of 
such attitudes within a group structure, explored in-depth manifestations of such 
attitudes and evaluated how those relate to online group processes. The study 
showed that when people tweeted about the attack, the tweets were likely to be 
related to content about Islam, suggesting that Twitter users wished to express 
views about Islam in response to the attack, confirming perhaps Cinnirella’s 
observations that societal social representations in the UK have bound the theme of 
terrorism inextricably to Islam (Cinnirella, 2012). Furthermore, the study found 
evidence for a positive association between ingroup insularity and the extremity of 
the tweet’s sentiment, indicating that groups with more ingroup following were 
more likely to tweet in a more extreme way about Islam (either positive or 
negative). This finding presented potential evidence for group polarisation and in-
group solidarity occurring in cyberspace; members of groups with more extreme 
views on Islam are more likely to follow each other than members of other groups 
on Twitter. The self-selecting nature of this following behaviour ensures twitter 
users are ‘preaching to the converted’ and most likely results in a polarisation of 
their views about Islam, pushing extreme views (either positive or negative) further 
towards the extreme. It has previously been suggested (Reicher et al., 1995) in the 
SIDE model (Social Identity and DE-individuation) that computer-mediated 
communication can provide an environment which amplifies the impact of group 
processes and social identities, and this study seemed to support the idea that social 
identities are apparent in cyberspace.  
 
Overall, I identified two main themes within the positive Islam sentiment tweets 
(Unity and Defence), and I classified negative tweets into themes of Islamophobia 
and Politics & liberal backlash. Due to the length and depth of such expressions, 
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as well as to avoid repetition, the themes will not be described in this section – for 
more information please see Sections 7.4.2.2.1 and 7.4.2.2.2. In conclusion, 
positive tweets tended to be supportive and defensive of Islam, expressed solidarity 
towards the victims and the Muslim community as well as concern in response to 
the anti-Islamic rhetoric. The predominant goal reflected in these tweets seemed to 
be to promote the unification of a diverse and varied population, in a way compliant 
with notions of multiculturalism, as well as to build a safer, stronger and a more 
United Kingdom. This overarching aim supports a construction of a multicultural 
civic-based British national identity with an emphasis on the value of tolerance. 
The difference between Islam and ISIS was also made salient. It is interesting to 
note how, once again, as was observed in some of my previous studies, lay beliefs 
differed partly due to the deployment of competing constructions of British national 
identity. 
 
On the other hand, negative Islamophobic tweets tended to be multi-layered, 
utilising a lot of metaphor and hyperbole in order to express their anti-Islam rhetoric 
as well as creating new hybrid words and hashtags to strengthen said sentiment. 
The strongly Islamophobic attitudes in the tweets were expressed in several ways 
(for a detailed description, see Section 7.4.2.2.2) mapping onto the ’closed’ views 
that constitute Islamophobia (defined by the Runnymede Trust (1997)) and most of 
which I explained with ITT. Perceived symbolic threats can arise when a divide is 
deemed to exist between the worldview and values of an ingroup and outgroup. 
This divide can provoke the ingroup into feeling that their beliefs, attitudes and 
group morals are under threat from the outgroup. In this study, Muslims are the 
outgroup who are perceived to pose/be a symbolic threat by their conflicting and 
incompatible values which subsequently leads to Islamophobia. Furthermore, 
terrorism can be categorised as a realistic threat, and as Islam and all Muslims are 
allegedly associated with it, they are therefore perceived as a realistic threat. 
However, not only Muslims were perceived to be the outgroup and the enemy, but 
also those who defended them; ‘Islam apologists’ (as defined in the tweets), such 
as liberals and left-wing politicians, were often being positioned as the ‘ingroup 
black sheep’. I explained this phenomenon using the opposing sides’ competing 
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narratives of nation, whereby core British values are interpreted differently; right-
wing Islamophobic groups position liberals as the ingroup black sheep, due to their 
different interpretations of British values. This pattern was discovered in the context 
of surveillance perceptions in Study 4 (Chapter 6), where the pro- and anti-
surveillance groups perceived the ‘other’ group to be assisting terrorists by either 
supporting, or not supporting surveillance. That the same observation could be 
made in this study, using twitter data, provides additional validity to the notion that 
the observation has validity. 
 
This study was strong methodologically because it deployed a multi-method 
approach that remained sensitive to the varied content of the tweets investigated, 
but also used ‘big data’ analysis techniques to uncover patterns in follower 
behaviour that could not otherwise be identified using more traditional analysis 
techniques. The study is also unusual within social psychology for its adoption of 
methods and theoretical ideas from the area of research known as network analysis, 
and the exploration of group processes within social media using big data analytical 
techniques is very new within social psychology. Even within social media research 
and the field of internet psychology, it is unusual to see studies like this which 
combine qualitative and quantitative approaches. A further strength of this study is 
its focus on both Islamophobia and pro-Islam social media content – the latter has 
been largely ignored in previous research on perceptions of Islam. Taken as a 
whole, this study provides new theoretical insights into how arguments both pro 
and against Islam are expressed in social media following terrorist events. Like 
some of our previous studies, the data suggest an intertwining of perceptions of 
threat, terrorism, Islam and nation, and we provide novel evidence of how pro and 
anti-Islamic sentiments are constructed in cyberspace. Future research could seek 
to explore whether the themes we identified are present in other social media, as 
well as delve deeper into how many of the arguments rely on forwarding competing 





Through deployment of a range of methodologies, the research reported in this 
thesis has expanded the understanding of lay beliefs around privacy, surveillance, 
terrorism and Islamophobia. The unfolding narrative of the work quickly 
establishes that in the current UK context, lay beliefs about these issues tend to 
intertwine in complex ways. The theoretical lenses offered by social representations 
theory, Intergroup Threat Theory, and Social Identity Theory in particular, offer 
key insights into the strategies that lay behind the construction of competing 
attitudes and beliefs around these main themes. The body of work shows that in 
both interviews, attitude surveys and naturally occurring online communication, 
discussion of surveillance and privacy is impacted by terrorist events, and there is 
a ‘battleground’ over rival constructions of British national identity and values that 
allows both pro and anti-surveillance, as well as pro and anti-Islam individuals, to 
claim that their position is driven by in-group loyalty to British national identity. 
The use of qualitative techniques was crucial in helping to capture these nuanced 
and complex beliefs and their underpinnings in different constructions of nation. 
However, the addition of quantitative techniques also allowed hypothesis testing 
about relationships between variables and in the final study provided an extremely 
novel way into capturing group dynamics in cyberspace using big data techniques. 
It is therefore hoped that the body of work reported herein will not only expand the 
understanding of lay beliefs about privacy, surveillance, terrorism and nation, but 
also provide encouragement for future researchers to appreciate the value offered 
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